Switch to: References

Citations of:

The Ground of Induction

New York: Russell & Russell (1947)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Donald Cary Williams.Keith Campbell, James Franklin & Douglas Ehring - 2013 - In Edward Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. pp. 0.
    Stanford Encyclopedia article surveying the life and work of D.C. Williams, notably in defending realism in metaphysics in the mid-twentieth century and in justifying induction by the logic of statistical inference.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Rationality of Induction.D. C. Stove - 1986 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    Writing on the justification of certain inductive inferences, the author proposes that sometimes induction is justified and that arguments to prove otherwise are not cogent. In the first part he defends the argument of D.C. Williams' The Ground of Induction that induction is justified as a matter of logic by the proportional syllogism: "The vast majority of large samples match the population, therefore (probably) this sample matches the population"). In the second part he deals with such topics as deductive logic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Defeasible Conditionalization.Paul D. Thorn - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):283-302.
    The applicability of Bayesian conditionalization in setting one’s posterior probability for a proposition, α, is limited to cases where the value of a corresponding prior probability, PPRI(α|∧E), is available, where ∧E represents one’s complete body of evidence. In order to extend probability updating to cases where the prior probabilities needed for Bayesian conditionalization are unavailable, I introduce an inference schema, defeasible conditionalization, which allows one to update one’s personal probability in a proposition by conditioning on a proposition that represents a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Is the Humean Defeated by Induction?Benjamin T. H. Smart - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):319-332.
    Many necessitarians about cause and law (Armstrong 1983; Mumford 2004; Bird 2007) have argued that Humeans are unable to justify their inductive inferences, as Humean laws are nothing but the sum of their instances. In this paper I argue against these necessitarian claims. I show that Armstrong is committed to the explanatory value of Humean laws (in the form of universally quantified statements), and that contra Armstrong, brute regularities often do have genuine explanatory value. I finish with a Humean attempt (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Scientific Method Without Metaphysical Presuppositions.Herbert Feigl - 1954 - Philosophical Studies 5 (2):17 - 29.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • On the Nature of Quantum Mechanics.A. H. Klotz - 1988 - Synthese 77 (2):139 - 193.
    It is argued that the EPR paradox cannot be resolved in the context of quantum mechanics. Bell's theorem is shown to be equivalent to a Belinfante theory of zero type. It is concluded therefore that it cannot have as wide a range of applicability in excluding Hidden Variable Theories as commonly alleged. It follows that standard quantum mechanics should not be regarded as a complete theory in Einstein's sense. Indeed, it is argued that a purely probabilistic theory cannot be the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Some Remarks on the Rationality of Induction.Bipin Indurkhya - 1990 - Synthese 85 (1):95 - 114.
    This paper begins with a rigorous critique of David Stove''s recent bookThe Rationality of Induction. In it, Stove produced four different proofs to refute Hume''s sceptical thesis about induction. I show that Stove''s attempts to vindicate induction are unsuccessful. Three of his proofs refute theses that are not the sceptical thesis about induction at all. Stove''s fourth proof, which uses the sampling principle to justify one particular inductive inference, makes crucial use of an unstated assumption regarding randomness. Once this assumption (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Hole in the Ground of Induction.Patrick Maher - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (3):423 – 432.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Ramsey, Truth, and Probability.S. L. Zabell - 1991 - Theoria 57 (3):211-238.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations