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Unnatural Doubts

Noûs 28 (4):533-547 (1994)

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  1. Précis of Philosophy and Its Epistemic Neuroses.Michael Hymers - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (3):569-576.
    I outline the main arguments of my book, Philosophy and Its Epistemic Neuroses (Westview, 2000), in which I defend an anti-theoretical approach to traditional problems in epistemology, metaphysics and the philosophy of language, focusing especially on external-world scepticism, the indeterminacy of reference, relativism and first-person authority, contending that these problems arise from embracing philosophical commitments that are not quite contradictory, but which suffer from what I describe as "epistemic neuroses"--an acceptance of methodological commitments that make these problems look like problems (...)
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  • Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology, By Annalisa Coliva. [REVIEW]Michael Hymers - forthcoming - Analysis:anx030.
    Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology by Annalisa Coliva, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. xii + 222 pp. £60.00.
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  • Extended rationality: a hinge epistemology.Hymers Michael - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):476-476.
    Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology By ColivaAnnalisaPalgrave Macmilla, 2015. xii + 222 pp. £60.00.
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  • Scepticism and the Principle of Inferential Justification.Christopher Hookway - 2000 - Philosophical Issues 10 (1):344-365.
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  • Replies to Greco, Corbí, Moya, Grimaltos.Christopher Hookway - 2000 - Philosophical Issues 10 (1):395 - 399.
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  • Naturalism in Action.Michael Hicks - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (6):609-635.
    Can a naturalist earn the right to talk of a shared empirical world? Hume famously thought not, and contemporary stipulative naturalists infer from this inability that the demand is somehow unnatural. The critical naturalist, by contrast, claims to earn that right. In this paper, I motivate critical naturalism, arguing first that stipulative naturalism is question begging, and second, that the pessimism it inherits from Hume about whether the problem can be solved is misplaced. Hume's mistake was to mis-identify exemplary contexts (...)
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  • A Pragmatist Theory of Convergence.Joseph Heath - 1998 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (sup1):149-175.
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  • The rehabilitation of global scenarios….Modesto M. Gómez Alonso - 2011 - Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía 38:329-350.
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  • Bad bootstrapping: the problem with third-factor replies to the Darwinian Dilemma for moral realism.Michelle M. Dyke - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2115-2128.
    Street’s “Darwinian Dilemma” is a well-known epistemological objection to moral realism. In this paper, I argue that “third-factor” replies to this argument on behalf of the moral realist, as popularized by Enoch :413–438, 2010, Taking morality seriously: a defense of robust realism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011), Skarsaune :229–243, 2011) and Wielenberg :441–464, 2010, Robust ethics: the metaphysics and epistemology of godless normative realism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014), cannot succeed. This is because they are instances of the illegitimate form (...)
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  • Constructivism, Expressivism and Ethical Knowledge.Matthew Chrisman - 2010 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (3):331-353.
    In the contemporary metaethical debate, expressivist (Blackburn, Gibbard) and constructivist (Korsgaard, Street) views can be viewed as inspired by irrealist ideas from Hume and Kant respectively. One realist response to these contemporary irrealist views is to argue that they are inconsistent with obvious surface-level appearances of ordinary ethical thought and discourse, especially the fact that we talk and act as if there is ethical knowledge . In this paper, I explore some constructivist and expressivist options for responding to this objection. (...)
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  • Knowledge and presuppositions.Jason Bridges - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):473-476.
    © The Authors 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected] Blome-Tillmann’s Knowledge and Presuppositions proposes and defends a novel form of epistemological contextualism. As the title would suggest, the view’s novelty lies in its deployment of the pragmatic-theoretic concept of a conversational presupposition to delineate a role for context in shaping the meaning of our knowledge claims. Over the course of six dense, argument-filled chapters, Blome-Tillmann brings his (...)
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  • Feminist epistemology, contextualism, and philosophical skepticism.Evelyn Brister - 2009 - Metaphilosophy 40 (5):671-688.
    Abstract: This essay explores the relation between feminist epistemology and the problem of philosophical skepticism. Even though feminist epistemology has not typically focused on skepticism as a problem, I argue that a feminist contextualist epistemology may solve many of the difficulties facing recent contextualist responses to skepticism. Philosophical skepticism appears to succeed in casting doubt on the very possibility of knowledge by shifting our attention to abnormal contexts. I argue that this shift in context constitutes an attempt to exercise unearned (...)
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  • Minimal empiricism without dogmas.Hilan Bensusan & Manuel Pinedo-Garcia - 2007 - Philosophia 35 (2):197-206.
    John McDowell has defended a position called minimal empiricism, that aims to avoid the oscillation between traditional empiricism’s commitment to a set of contents working as external justifiers for our system of beliefs and a coherentist position where our thought receives no constraint from the world. We share McDowell’s dissatisfaction with both options, but find his minimal empiricism committed to the idea of a tribunal of experience where isolated contents are infused into our network of inferences. This commitment is prone (...)
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  • On the Subtleties of Reidian Pragmatism: A Reply to Magnus.Peter Baumann - 2004 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 2 (1):73-77.
    In this paper I respond to P.D. Magnus’ critique of an earlier paper of mine on Thomas Reid’s theory of common sense. In the earlier paper (The Scottish Pragmatist? The Dilemma of Common Sense and the Pragmatist Way Out, Reid Studies 2, 1999, 47-57) I argued that Reid faces a dilemma between dogmatism and scepticism but that there are also hints in his work towards a pragmatist way out of the problem. P.D. Magnus, in a response to this paper (Reid’s (...)
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  • Review of the book: Pritchard, D. (2016). Epistemic Angst. Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press. [REVIEW]Vicente Raga Rosaleny - 2019 - Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 60.
    Review of the book: Pritchard, D.. Epistemic Angst. Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press.
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  • The sources of scepticism.Duncan Pritchard & Vicente Raga Rosaleny - 2019 - Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 60.
    It is claimed that the radical sceptical problem that is the focus of much of contemporary epistemological discussion in fact divides into two logically distinct subproblems --a formulation that turns on the closure principle, and a second formulation which turns on the underdetermination principle. The Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation is set out, and it is shown how this proposal --at least when properly formulated--can deal with closure-based radical scepticism. It is also claimed, however, that this account (...)
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  • Michael Williams and the hypothetical world.E. P. Brandon - 2002 - Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 6 (1).
    Michael Williams has frequently considered and rejected approaches to "our knowledge of the external world" that see it as the best explanation for certain features of experience. This paper examines the salience of his position to approaches such as Mackie’s that do not deny the presentational directness of ordinary experience but do permit a gap between how things appear and how they are that allows for sceptical doubts. Williams’ main argument is that, to do justice to its place in a (...)
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  • Transcendental Arguments and Realism.Thomas Grundmann & Catrin Misselhorn - 2003 - In Hans-Johann Glock (ed.), Strawson and Kant. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 205--218.
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  • The Relativist Response to Radical Skepticism.Peter J. Graham - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford handbook of skepticism. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • From Epistemic Expressivism to Epistemic Inferentialism.Matthew Chrisman - 2008 - In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Recent philosophical debate about the meaning of knowledge claims has largely centered on the question of whether epistemic claims are plausibly thought to be context sensitive. The default assumption has been that sentences that attribute knowledge or justification have stable truth-conditions across different contexts of utterance, once any non-epistemic context sensitivity has been fixed. The contrary view is the contextualist view that such sentences do not have stable truth-conditions but can vary depending on the context of utterance. This debate manifestly (...)
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  • Contextualismo, fiabilismo y el problema pirrónico.Jonatan García Campos & Ricardo Vázquez Gutiérrez - 2012 - Dianoia 57 (68):3-28.
    En este trabajo se explora una conexión entre el contextualismo y el fiabilismo. El propósito es desarrollar las líneas centrales de un acercamiento contextualista para resolver la crítica internista de que las nociones fiabilistas de justificación y de conocimiento no son adecuadas porque no recogen las intuiciones correspondientes a que un sujeto que está justificado o que sabe es racional y epistemológicamente responsable. Se argumenta que esta crítica y el escepticismo pirrónico comparten un presupuesto común, a saber, la cláusula internista, (...)
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  • Epistemic closure in context.Yves Bouchard - unknown
    The general principle of epistemic closure stipulates that epistemic properties are transmissible through logical means. According to this principle, an epistemic operator, say ε, should satisfy any valid scheme of inference, such as: if ε(p entails q), then ε(p) entails ε(q). The principle of epistemic closure under known entailment (ECKE), a particular instance of epistemic closure, has received a good deal of attention since the last thirty years or so. ECKE states that: if one knows that p entails q, and (...)
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  • Meta-skepticism.David Pérez Chico & Vicente Sanfélix Vidarte - 2019 - Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 60.
    In the present article we subscribe to a form of meta-skepticism according to which the theory of knowledge is impossible. This form of meta-skepticism is based on two apparently necessary conditions: the identification of one or more of the assumptions of the theory of knowledge in order to criticize them; and the more or less explicit assumption that there is an alternative account of knowledge to the one attributed to the theory of knowledge in question. Once these preliminary issues have (...)
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  • Internalism, externalism, and epistemic source circularity.Ian David MacMillan - unknown
    The dissertation examines the nature and epistemic implications of epistemic source circularity. An argument exhibits this type of circularity when at least one of the premises is produced by a belief source the conclusion says is legitimate, e.g. a track record argument for the legitimacy of sense perception that uses premises produced by sense perception. In chapter one I examine this and several other types of circularity, identifying relevant similarities and differences between them. In chapter two I discuss the differences (...)
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  • Minimalism, Psychological Reality, Meaning and Use.Henry Jackman - 2007 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Context-sensitivity and semantic minimalism: new essays on semantics and pragmatics. New York: Oxford University Press.
    A growing number of philosophers and linguists have argued that many, if not most, terms in our language should be understood as semantically context sensitive. In opposition to this trend, Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore defend a view they call "Semantic Minimalism", which holds that there are virtually no semantically context sensitive expressions in English once you get past the standard list of indexicals and demonstratives such as "I", "you", "this", and "that". While minimalism strikes many as obviously false, it (...)
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  • Nietzsche on the possibility of truth and knowledge.Tsarina Doyle - 2005 - Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 9 (1).
    This paper examines Nietzsche’s views on truth and knowledge in the context of both his rejection of the Kantian thing-in-itself and his perspectivism. It is argued that Nietzsche’s principal contention with the thing-in-itself centres round the dissociation of truth and justification. The paper argues that Nietzsche’s perspectivism, understood as an epistemic thesis, sows the seeds for the overcoming of this sceptical dissociation.
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  • Varieties of naturalized epistemology: Criticisms and alternatives.Benjamin Bayer - 2007 - Dissertation, University of Illinois
    “Naturalized epistemology” is a recent attempt to transform the theory of knowledge into a branch of natural science. Traditional epistemologists object to this proposal on the grounds that it eliminates the distinctively philosophical content of epistemology. In this thesis, I argue that traditional philosophers are justified in their reluctance to accept naturalism, but that their ongoing inability to refute it points to deeper problems inherent in traditional epistemology. I establish my thesis first by critiquing three versions of naturalism, showing that (...)
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  • Una defensa del conversacionalismo epistémico.Federico Penelas - 2005 - Análisis Filosófico 25 (1):5-20.
    En el presente trabajo defiendo la concepción conversacionalista de la justificación epistémica en la caracterización que de la misma ha hecho y sigue haciendo Richard Rorty. Me detengo en un grupo de objeciones provenientes del campo pragmatista. Vertebro la exposición a partir de la crítica a Rorty sostenida por Susan Haack, incorporando luego las observaciones que Hilary Putnam y Jiirgen Habermas le han presentado al proyecto rortyano. La critica de dichas objeciones conduce a la asunción de una caracterización contextualista y (...)
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