In an influential article, Gerd Grasshoff has argued for the identification of the objects in Wittgenstein's Tractatus with the ultimate constituents of reality in Heinrich Hertz's Principles of Mechanics. Grasshoff's interpretation is based on two interrelated claims: The specific determination of the objects in the world and the relation among them is the primary theme in Wittgenstein's early philosophy, because it is the primary theme for Hertz. Wittgenstein did not assume the existence of simple objects on purely logical grounds without (...) having specific examples of simple objects in mind, because Hertz did not do this. (shrink)

I argue that the numbering system of the Tractatus lets us see how it was constructed, in two closely related senses of that term. First, it tells us a great deal about the genesis of the book, for the numbering system was used to assemble and rearrange a series of drafts, as recorded in MS 104. Second, it helps us understand the structure of the published book, as cryptically summarized in the opening footnote. I also discuss an unpublished letter from (...) Anscombe to von Wright from 1948 which contains the very first sketch of a tree-structured reading, and what I believe is Stenius’s response to Anscombe’s proposal. The paper critically evaluates previous work on tree-structured readings and contends that we need to read the Tractatus in both the number order used in the published book and the tree order that Wittgenstein used to draft it. It also considers some of the main ways of turning this complex branching structure into a linear, printed text, and so serves as an introduction to the three tree-structured editions of the Tractatus that accompany this paper (the German text, and the translations by Ogden/Ramsey and Pears & McGuinness). (shrink)

In his Tractatus, Wittgenstein maintained that arithmetic consists of equations arrived at by the practice of calculating outcomes of operations$\Omega ^{n}(\bar {\xi })$defined with the help of numeral exponents. Since$Num$(x) and quantification over numbers seem ill-formed, Ramsey wrote that the approach is faced with “insuperable difficulties.” This paper takes Wittgenstein to have assumed that his audience would have an understanding of the implicit general rules governing his operations. By employing the Tractarian logicist interpretation that theN-operator$N(\bar {\xi })$and recursively defined arithmetic (...) operators$\Omega ^{n}(\bar {\xi })$are not different in kind, we can address Ramsey’s problem. Moreover, we can take important steps toward better understanding how Wittgenstein might have imagined emulating proof by mathematical induction. (shrink)

Ethics was the major issue in Wittgenstein’s writings from 1916 to the time of publication of the Tractatus Logico-philosophicus. He explicates the notion of “good” in terms of “happiness” and the latter as “accepting the world as it is.” Nonetheless, this reductionistic philosophical program could not get off the ground unless there is a pretty clear conception of the notion of “accepting the world.” In this paper, I shall explore two alternative accounts of this concept. According to the first account, (...) which I dub “the actual world hypothesis,” Wittgenstein had meant accepting the actual world by the term “being good.” The alternative account, “the substance of the world hypothesis,” suggests accepting the substance of the world as the best reading of the Tractatus. Morris and Graver have endorsed the actual world hypothesis, as opposed to the substance of the world hypothesis. In this paper I try to show that they fail to provide good arguments for the former and against the latter. Additionally, I use ideas from McGuinness to illustrate “accepting the substance of the world” in a way that it avoids Graver’s objections. I argue that acceptance of the world ought to be interpreted as “accepting the fact that the world exists.” Finally, I shall point out that despite of his insight about the acceptance of the world, McGuinness misrepresents the relation between accepting the actual world and accepting its substance. (shrink)

Drawing on recent work on the nature of the numbering system of the _Tractatus_ and Wittgenstein’s use of that system in his composition of the _Prototractatus_, the paper sets out the rationale for the online tool called__ __ The University of Iowa Tractatus Map. The map consists of a website with a front page that links to two separate subway-style maps of the hypertextual numbering system Wittgenstein used in his _Tractatus_. One map displays the structure of the published _Tractatus_; the (...) other lays out the structure of the _Prototractatus_. The site makes available the full text of the German and the two canonical English translations.__ __While we envisage the map as a tool that we would like a wide variety of readers to find helpful, we argue that our website amounts to a radically new edition of Wittgenstein’s early masterpiece, with far-reaching implications for the interpretation of that text. In particular, we claim that our visually compelling presentation of the book’s overall structure delivers on Wittgenstein’s cryptic claim in a letter to his publisher that it is the numbers that “make the book surveyable and clear”. (shrink)

After giving a short outline and interpretation of the Tractatus, I give reasons why we should view the Wittgenstein of the Tracatus as a kind of Kantian philosopher.

The main argument in Parmenides’ didactic poem begins with these remarks by the unnamed goddess who delivers the revelation (B2 in Diels-KranzDie Fragmente der Vorsokratiker):Come now and I shall tell you, and you listen to the account and carry it forth, which routes of inquiry (ơδοί…διζησιος, B2.2) alone are for knowing: the one (μέν, B2.3), that (…) is and that it is not possible (for …) not to be ὅπως ἔστιν τε ϰαὶ ὼς οὐϰ ἔστι μὴ είναι, B2.3) is the (...) course of Persuasion, for it attends truth; the other ἠδ; B2.5 that (…) is not and that it is right (for …) not to be (ὡς οὐϰ ἔστιυ τε ϰαὶ ὡς χρεών ἐστι μὴ εἶναι, B2.5) that one I mark for you as being a byway from which no tidings ever come (παναπευθέα ἔμμεν άταρπόυ, B2.6) For you could neither come to know (Υυοίμς, aorist, B2.7) the thing itself which is not (τό Υε μὴ έόυ), for it cannot be consummated (οὐ Υὰρ ἀνυστόυ), nor could you point it out (φράσαις, aorist, B2.8). (shrink)