Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. On behalf of phenomenological parity for the attitudes.Keith Gunderson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):46-47.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • How directly do we know our minds?Maria Czyzewska & Pawel Lewicki - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):37-38.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The anthropology of folk psychology.Steven Daniel - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):38-39.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The naked truth about first-person knowledge.Michael Chandler & Jeremy Carpendale - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):36-37.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Species as individuals: Logical, biological, and philosophical problems.Michael Ruse - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (2):299-300.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • Metaphysics and common usage.David L. Hull - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (2):290-291.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Plea for more exploration of cross-cultural cognitive space.David Piggins - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (1):91-92.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Whither cross-cultural perception?Daniel W. Smothergill - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (1):93-94.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Are false beliefs representative mental states?Karen Bartsch & David Estes - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):30-31.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Towards an ecology of mind.George Butterworth - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):31-32.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Causes are perceived and introspected.D. M. Armstrong - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):29-29.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Things and pictures of things: Are perceptual processes invariant across cultures?Diane F. Halpern - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (1):84-85.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Understanding and integration.Jerry Samet - 1982 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (2):341-342.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Steps toward an ethological science.Mark S. Seidenberg - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):377-377.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • Intentionality, theoreticity and innateness.Deborah Zaitchik & Jerry Samet - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):87-89.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • The developmental history of an illusion.Keith E. Stanovich - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):80-81.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Private states and animal communication.Chris Mortensen - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):658-659.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Pigeons as communicators and thinkers: Mon oncle d'Amerique deux?Robert W. Mitchell - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):655-656.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A human model for animal behavior.Richard Garrett - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):648-649.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Communication versus discrimination.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):649-650.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Behaviorism is alive and well.Lloyd G. Humphreys - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):651-652.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Should we return to the laboratory to find out about learning?J. M. E. Moravcsik - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):529-529.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Behavior, theories, and the inner.Ernest Sosa - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):537-539.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • To dream is not to (intend to) do.Jean Requin - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (2):218-219.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Of what use categories?Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4):663-664.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Category differences/automaticity.Edward E. Smith - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4):667-667.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Rejecting induction: Using occam's razor too soon.J. T. Tolliver - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4):669-670.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Blindsight, orgasm, and representational overlap.Michael Tye - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):268-269.
    It is argued that there is no fallacy in the reasoning in the example of the thirsty blindsight subject, on one reconstruction of that reasoning. Neither the case of orgasm nor the case of a visual versus an auditory experience as of something overheard shows that phenomenal content is not representational.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Blocking out the distinction between sensation and perception: Superblindsight and the case of Helen.Nicholas Humphrey - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):257-258.
    Block's notion of P-consciousness catches too much in its net. He would do better to exclude all states that do not have a sensory component. I question what he says about my work with the “blind” monkey, Helen.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Triangulating phenomenal consciousness.Patricia Kitcher - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):259-260.
    This commentary offers two criticisms of Block's account of phenomenal consciousness and a brief sketch of a rival account. The negative points are that monitoring consciousness also involves the possession of certain states and that phenomenal consciousness inevitably involves some sort of monitoring. My positive suggestion is that “phenomenal consciousness” may refer to our ability to monitor the rich but preconceptual states that retain perceptual information for complex processing.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Universal Grammar and second language acquisition: The null hypothesis.Samuel David Epstein, Suzanne Flynn & Gita Martohardjono - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (4):746-758.
    The target article advanced the null, unified and widely misinterpreted generative hypothesis regarding second language (L2) acquisition. Postulating that UG (Universal Grammar) constrains L2 knowledge growth does not entail identical developmental trajectories for L2 and first language (LI) acquisition; nor does it preclude a role for the L1. In embracing this hypothesis, we maintain a distinction between competence and performance. Those who conflate the two repeat fundamental and by no means unprecedented misconstruals of the generative enterprise, and more specifically, of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Some incorrect implications of the fullaccess hypothesis.Frederick J. Newmeyer - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (4):736-737.
    If Epstein et al. are right that adult second language learners have full access to UG, then all of the following should be true: adults should be able to consciously transform their I-Language; adults should be able to transform pidgins into Creoles; adults should be as likely as children to restructure their grammars on the basis of “functional” pressure. All the foregoing are false, however, which seriously calls into question the correctness of their hypothesis.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Are blind babies delayed in achieving social understanding?Carol Slater - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):141-142.
    Barresi & Moore's account predicts that infants deprived of visual input will be delayed in achieving social understanding, a hypothesis that receives some support from studies of language use. by blind children. It is proposed that recently developed false belief and appearance/reality tasks be used to explore this issue further. Three possibly distracting conceptual issues are also discussed.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • What we have to explain in foreign language learning.Robert Bley-Vroman - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (4):718-718.
    While child language development theory must explain invariant “success,” foreign language learning theory must explain variation and lack of success. The fundamental difference hypothesis (FDH) outlines such a theory. Epstein et al. ignore the explanatory burden, mischaracterize the FDH, and underestimate the resources of human cognition. The field of second language acquisition is not divided into camps by views on “access” to UG.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Moral competence is cognitive but (perhaps) nonmodular.Susan Dwyer - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):128-129.
    Barresi & Moore's account has at least two implications for moral psychology. First, it appears to provide support for cognitive theories of moral competence. Second, their claim that the development of social understanding depends upondomain-generalchanges in cognitive ability appears to oppose the idea that moral competence is under-pinned by a moral module.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Four-year-old humans are different: Why?Katherine Nelson - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):134-135.
    The intentionality schema is an abstraction that relates phylogenetic and ontogenetic sequences of social understanding, but it also obscures the differences between humans and other primates. In particular, it ignores human social developmental and communicative history and the important roles that language plays in human understanding of others' intentional states.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Social relations and understanding the intentional self.Annerieke Oosterwegel - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):136-136.
    Although Barresi & Moore could have grounded their framework more explicitly in existing models, they offer a provocative testbed for the assumptions of symbolic interactionism and further thinking about self-regulation, especially in autistics.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Comparative cognitive studies, not folk phylogeny, please.Colin Allen - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):122-123.
    Barresi & Moore (B&M) provide a useful tool for the comparative study of social cognition that could, however, be improved by more subtle analysis of first person information about intentional relations. Knowledge of misrepresentation also needs to be better handled within the theory. I urge skepticism about B&M's sweeping phylogenetic claims.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Can children with autism integrate first and third person representations?Simon Baron-Cohen - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):123-124.
    Barresi & Moore contrast two theories of autism: (1) in autism there is a general inability to integrate first and third person information (of any kind), and (2) in autism there is a specific inability to represent an agent's perceptual or volitional mental state being about another agents mental state. Two lines of experimental evidence suggest that the first of these is too broad, favoring instead the more specific “theory of mind” account.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The elusive quale.Howard Rachlin - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):692-693.
    If sensations were behaviorally conceived, as they should be, as complex functional patterns of interaction between overt behavior and the environment, there would be no point in searching for them as instantaneous psychic elements within the brain or as internal products of the brain.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations  
  • Human consciousness: One of a kind.R. E. Lubow - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):689-689.
    To avoid teleological interpretations, it is important to make a distinction between functions and uses of consciousness, and to address questions concerning the consequences of consciousness. Assumptions about the phylogenetic distribution of consciousness are examined. It is concluded that there is some value in identifying consciousness an exclusively human attribute.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • (1 other version)Ambiguity and Belief.S. G. Williams - 2002 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51:253-278.
    This paper is concerned with the notion of ambiguity—or what I shall refer to more generally as homonymy—and its bearing upon various familiar puzzles about intensional contexts. It would hardly of course be a novel claim that the unravelling of such puzzles may well involve recourse to something like ambiguity. After all, Frege, who bequeathed to us one of the most enduring of the puzzles, proposed as part of his solution an analysis of intensional contexts according to which all expressions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • A Conceptual and Moral Analysis of Suffering.Franco A. Carnevale - 2009 - Nursing Ethics 16 (2):173-183.
    This analysis presents an epistemological and moral examination of suffering. It addresses the specific questions: (1) What is suffering? (2) Can one's suffering be assessed by another? and (3) What is the moral significance of suffering? The epistemological analysis is orientated by Peter Hacker's framework for the investigation of emotions, demonstrating that suffering is an emotion. This leads to a discussion of whether suffering is a phenomenon that can be evaluated objectively by another person who is not experiencing the suffering, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Was wittgenstein a fideist? two views.Ken McGovern & Béla Szabados - 2002 - Sophia 41 (2):41-54.
    Kai Nielsen and Felicity McCutcheon have each in their own way taken issue with the received view that Wittgenstein’s remarks on religious language are to be construed as a form of “fideism”. They each provide sharply divergent views on Wittgenstein’s remarks on the meaning of religious language and, indeed, the importance of religion itself. These differences, however, serve to bring into relief both Wittgenstein’s recognition of the genuinely descriptive nature of ordinary religious discourse and his underlying political sensitivity. The paper (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • (1 other version)Life-form and Idealism.Derek Bolton - 1982 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 13:269-284.
    In this paper I shall suggest that philosophy which bases itself firmly inlife is incompatible with idealism. The example of such a philosophy to be discussed is the later work of Wittgenstein, and I shall define in what sense this is ‘based in life’, with particular reference to his concept of ‘Lebensform’, or ‘life-form’. I shall understand idealism to be, in general terms, the doctrine that idea is the primary, or the only, category of being. Various kinds of idealism may (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Desires, Dispositions and Deviant Causal Chains.John Hyman - 2014 - Philosophy 89 (1):83-112.
    Recent work on dispositions offers a new solution to the long-running dispute about whether explanations of intentional action are causal explanations. The dispute seemed intractable because of a lack of percipience about dispositions and a commitment to Humean orthodoxies about causation on both sides.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • (1 other version)The Return of the New Flesh: Body Memory in David Cronenberg and Merleau-Ponty.Dylan Trigg - 2011 - Film-Philosophy 15 (1):82-99.
    From the “psychoplasmic” offspring in The Brood (1979) to the tattooed encodings in Eastern Promises (2007), David Cronenberg presents a compelling vision of embodiment, which challenges traditional accounts of personal identity and obliges us to ask how human beings persist through different times, places, and bodily states while retaining their sameness. Traditionally, the response to this question has emphasised the importance of cognitive memory in securing the continuity of consciousness. But what has been underplayed in this debate is the question (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Solidarity, objectivity, and the human form of life: Wittgenstein vs. Rorty.Greg Hill - 1997 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 11 (4):555-580.
    Reason, objectivity, and human nature are now suspect ideas. Among postmodern thinkers, Richard Rorty has advanced an especially forceful critique of these notions. Drawing partly on Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, Rorty contends that objectivity is no more than a metaphysical name for intersubjective agreement, and that “human nature” is an empty category, there being nothing beneath history and culture. Wittgenstein himself, however, recognized within the world's many civilizations “the common behavior of mankind,” without which Rorty's ethnocentric “solidarity” would be inconceivable. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • What Makes Natural Language “Natural”? A Phenomenological Proposal.Horst Ruthrof - forthcoming - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology:1-19.
    The paper answers the title question via its methodological commitment to a Husserlian description of the acts of consciousness which we cannot but perform when we engage in linguistic communication. Familiarizing the reader with the central terms of the German Vorstellung and Vorstellbarkeit (imaginability) and their prominence in phenomenological inquiry in the Introduction, the paper addresses major uses of Vorstellung from Kant to Husserl, before identifying imaginability as the hidden core of natural language, captured in a re-definition of language and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Internalism, Active Externalism, and Nonconceptual Content: The Ins and Outs of Cognition.Terry Dartnall - 2007 - Cognitive Science 31 (2):257-283.
    Active externalism (also known as the extended mind hypothesis) says that we use objects and situations in the world as external memory stores that we consult as needs dictate. This gives us economies of storage: We do not need to remember that Bill has blue eyes and wavy hair if we can acquire this information by looking at Bill. I argue for a corollary to this position, which I call ‘internalism.’ Internalism says we can acquire knowledge on a need‐to‐know basis (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations