According to rational will views of paternalism, the wrongmaking feature of paternalism is that paternalists disregard or fail to respect the rational will of the paternalized, in effect substituting their own presumably superior judgments about what ends the paternalized ought to pursue or how they ought to pursue them. Here I defend a version of the rational will view appealing to three rational powers that constitute rational agency, which I call recognition, discrimination, and satisfaction. By appealing to these powers, my (...) version of the rational will view can rank the wrongfulness of paternalistic acts in terms of the extent to which such acts (a) amount to supplanting the paternalized individual’s identity as a rational agent with that of the paternalist, and (b) the degree of mistrust the paternalistic act shows in the paternalized individual’s rational agency. My rational powers account thus provides a more complete account of why paternalism is a powerful, but not decisive or absolute, objection to an act or policy. My rational powers account also provides powerful explanations of why rational suasion deflects charges of paternalism; why consenting to intercessions in one’s rational agency negates paternalism; why we ordinarily believe that strong paternalism is more objectionable than weak paternalism; and why we ordinarily believe that hard paternalism is more objectionable than soft paternalism. (shrink)

The overwhelmingly dominant view of epistemic normativity has been an extreme form of deontology. I argue that although the pull towards deontology is quite understandable, given the traditional concerns of epistemology, there is no good reason for not also adopting a complementary consequentialist notion of epistemic normativity, which can be put to use in applied epistemology. I further argue that this consequentialist notion is not, despite appearances and popular sentiment to the contrary, any less genuinely epistemic than the deontological notion (...) and that it may even be considered more genuinely normative. (shrink)

Quine’s “Epistemology Naturalized” is the locus classicus of naturalism in epistemology. Many traditional epistemologists criticized the naturalization of epistemology specifically targeting this article. The critics argue that Quine abolishes the normativity of epistemology. For he proposes epistemology as a chapter of psychology. Laudan, like Quine, believes that epistemology should be naturalized. However, he criticizes Quine’s project of naturalization for similar reasons as Quine’s critics. Instead, he proposes a new project that he calls “normative naturalism”. In this work, I will first (...) argue against the critics of Quine and then argue that both Quine’s and Laudan’s naturalized epistemologies are hypothetically normative. -/- Quine’ın “Epistemology Naturalized” başlıklı makalesi epistemolojide doğallaştırma düşüncesinin klasik yapıtıdır. Pek çok geleneksel bilgi kuramcısı özellikle bu makaleyi hedef alarak epistemolojinin doğallaştırılmasını eleştirmiştir. Eleştirilerin odağında Quine’ın, psikolojinin bir alt bölümü haline getirerek, epistemolojinin normatifliğini ortadan kaldırdığı savı yer almaktadır. Laudan epistemolojide doğallaştırmanın gerekli olduğunu savunmasına karşın Quine’a yöneltilen bu eleştiriye katılmakta ve “normatif doğalcılık” adını verdiği yeni bir epistemolojik yaklaşım önermektedir. Bu çalışmada Quine’a yöneltilen eleştirinin yersiz ve Quine’ın doğallaştırılmış epistemolojisinin Laudan’ın normatif doğalcılığı gibi hipotetik normatif olduğunu tartışacağım. (shrink)

According to a common objection to epistemological naturalism, no empirical, scientific theory of knowledge can be normative in the way epistemological theories need to be. In response, such naturalists as W.V. Quine have claimed naturalized epistemology can be normative by emulating engineering disciplines and addressing the relations of causal efficacy between our cognitive means and ends. This paper evaluates that "engineering reply" and finds it a mixed success. Based on consideration of what it might mean to call a theory "normative," (...) seven versions of the normativity objection to epistemological naturalism are formulated. The engineering reply alone is sufficient to answer only the four least sophisticated versions. To answer the others, naturalists must draw on more resources than their engineering reply alone provides. (shrink)

I give a biological account of epistemic normativity. My account explains the sense in which it is true that belief is subject to a standard of correctness, and reduces epistemic norms to there being doxastic strategies which guide how best to meet that standard. Additionally, I give an explanation of the mistakes we make in our epistemic discourse, understood as either taking epistemic properties and norms to be sui generis and irreducible, and/or as failing to recognize the reductive base of (...) epistemic normativity. This explanation will appeal to the claim that the beliefs which constitute our epistemic discourse are false but adaptive, and are the outcome of a non-truth tracking process. The opponents of my position are philosophers who take epistemic normativity not to be reducible in this way, and to involve sui generis properties and norms governing belief. The aim of the paper is to show that epistemic normativity can be explained by appeal to the biological functions of our mechanisms of belief-production. (shrink)

Normativity of naturalized epistemology is one of the most extensively and hotly debated topics in contemporary epistemology. In order to reveal the relationship between normativity and naturalized epistemology, we firstly conduct an analysis of “Epistemology Naturalized,” the article on which the naturalized epistemology was founded. Then we compare the views which argue that normativity goes by the board with those which defend that normativity is conserved if epistemology is naturalized. Finally, based especially on Quine’s own views, we argue that naturalized (...) epistemology is hypothetically normative. -/- Doğallaştırılmış epistemolojinin normatifliği çağdaş epistemolojide çok tartışılan konulardan birisidir. Biz bu çalışmada önce doğallaştırılmış epistemoloji yaklaşımının normatiflikle ilişkisini ortaya çıkarmak amacıyla doğallaştırılmış epistemolojinin temelinin atıldığı “Epistemology Naturalized” makalesinin bir çözümlemesini yapıyoruz. Daha sonra doğallaştırma ile epistemolojinin normatifliğinin ortadan kalktığını ya da tam tersine korunduğunu savunan kimi bilgi kuramcılarının argümanlarını karşılaştırıyor ve Quine’ın yapıtlarında yer alan görüşleri esas alarak doğallaştırılmış epistemolojinin koşullu ya da hipotetik olarak normatif olduğunu savunuyoruz. (shrink)