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Truth and objectivity

Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (1992)

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  1. Generic truth and mixed conjunctions: Some alternatives.Aaron Cotnoir - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):473-479.
    Christine Tappolet posed a problem for alethic pluralism: either deny the truth of conjunctions whose conjuncts are from distinct domains of inquiry, or posit a generic global truth property thus making other truth properties redundant. Douglas Edwards has attempted to solve the problem by avoiding the horns of Tappolet's dilemma. After first noting an unappreciated consequence of Edwards's view regarding a proliferation of truth properties, I show that Edwards's proposal fails to avoid Tappolet's original dilemma. His response is not successful, (...)
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  • Virtue -based epistemology and the centrality of truth (towards a strong virtue-epistemology).Nenad Miscevic - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (3):239--266.
    A strong, strictly virtue- based , and at the same time truth-centered framework for virtue epistemology (VE) is proposed that bases VE upon a clearly motivating epistemic virtue, inquisitiveness or curiosity in a very wide sense, characterizes the purely executive capacities-virtues as a means for the truth-goal set by the former, and, finally, situates the remaining, partly motivating and partly executive virtues in relation to this central stock of virtues. Character-trait epistemic virtues are presented as hybrids, partly moral, partly purely (...)
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  • Two arguments against disquotationalism.Douglas Patterson - 2002 - Dialectica 56 (2):99–108.
    Attempts to argue that the disquotational theory of truth is somehow self‐refuting have appeared largely unchallenged in the literature for some time now. Focusing on presentations by Anil Gupta and Crispin Wright, I contend that such arguments only undermine a view that nobody endorses. This done, I explain why it is fruitless to focus, as these arguments do, on deflationary accounts of the expressive function of the truth‐predicate. I then suggest a strategy for arguing against disquotationalism and other forms of (...)
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  • Truth or meaning? A question of priority.John Collins - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):497-536.
    There is an incompatibility between the deflationist approach to truth, which makes truth transparent on the basis of an antecedent grasp of meaning, and the traditional endeavour, exemplified by Davidson, to explicate meaning through of truth. I suggest that both parties are in the explanatory red: deflationist lack a non-truth-involving theory of meaning and Davidsonians lack a non-deflationary account of truth. My focus is on the attempts of the latter party to resolve their problem. I look in detail at Davidson's (...)
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  • Mind, Davidson and reality.Daniel Laurier - 2005 - Principia 9 (1-2):125-157.
    The aim of this article is to show that the prospects for intentional irrealism are much brighter than it is generally thought. In the first section, I provide a general haracterization of some of the various forms that the realism/irrealism debates might take. In the second, I ask whether there is any defensible form of realism about intentional states. I show that most candidates are nearly trivially false, and that the only form of intentional realism which is not, is a (...)
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  • Can truth relativism account for the indeterminacy of future contingents?Corine Besson & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-23.
    John MacFarlane has recently argued that his brand of truth relativism provides the best solution to the puzzle of future contingents: assertions about the future that express propositions that are metaphysically neither necessary nor impossible. In this paper, we show that even if we grant all of the metaphysical, semantic and pragmatic assumptions in terms of which MacFarlane sets and aims to solve the puzzle, his truth relativism is not apt to solve the problem of future contingents. We argue that (...)
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  • Prueba legítima y verdad en el proceso penal I: la independencia metafísica de la verdad.Gabriel Pérez Barberá - 2020 - Isonomía. Revista de Teoría y Filosofía Del Derecho 52:5-29.
    En el presente trabajo intento demostrar que, dadas ciertas condiciones, puede haber una relación de necesidad epistémica entre prueba y verdad. Esa es la tesis principal, desarrollada en la segunda parte de la investigación y publicada también en este volumen. Pero tiene apoyo en algunas tesis secundarias, que son expuestas y fundamentadas aquí, en esta primera parte. Las más relevantes son: no es correcto interpretar la fórmula de Tarski como una definición sofisticada de la noción correspondentista de verdad; la verdad, (...)
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  • Fragmented Truth.Andy Demfree Yu - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Oxford
    This thesis comprises three main chapters—each comprising one relatively standalone paper. The unifying theme is fragmentalism about truth, which is the view that the predicate “true” either expresses distinct concepts or expresses distinct properties. -/- In Chapter 1, I provide a formal development of alethic pluralism. Pluralism is the view that there are distinct truth properties associated with distinct domains of subject matter, where a truth property satisfies certain truth-characterizing principles. On behalf of pluralists, I propose an account of logic (...)
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  • Justification, truth, and the development of science.Stephen Gaukroger - 1998 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 29 (1):97-112.
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  • Compositionality and the Manifestation Challenge.Darragh Byrne - 2005 - Synthese 144 (1):101-136.
    I address the question whether Dummetts manifestation challenge to semantic realism can be disarmed by reflection on the compositionality of meaning. Building on work of Dummett and Wright, I develop in §§12 what I argue to be the most formidable version of the manifestation challenge. Along the way I review attempts by previous authors to deploy considerations about compositionality in realisms favour, and argue that they are unsuccessful. The formulation of the challenge I develop renders explicit something which I argue (...)
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  • Truth and Justification: A Difference that Makes a Difference.Giorgio Volpe - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):217-232.
    Apparently, aiming to comply with the norm ‘Believe that P if and only if the proposition that P is true’ can hardly differ from aiming to comply with the norm ‘Believe that P if and only if the proposition that P is epistemically justified’. So one may be tempted to agree with Richard Rorty that the distinction between truth and justification is pragmatically useless because it cannot make any difference ‘when the question is about what I should believe now’. I (...)
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  • What is Tarski's Theory of Truth?Sher Gila - 1999 - Topoi 18 (2):149-166.
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  • Published in Philosophical Topics 28 (2000): pp. 211-244.Falsity Truth & Borderline Cases - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28:211-244.
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  • The liar and the new t-schema.Stephen Read - 2010 - Discusiones Filosóficas 11 (17):119-137.
    Desde que Tarski publicó su estudio sobreel concepto de verdad en los años 30, hasido una práctica ortodoxa el considerarque t oda i nst anci a del esquema T esverdadera. Sin embargo, algunas instanciasdel esquema son falsas. Éstas incluyen lasi nst anci as paradój i cas ej empl i f i cadaspor la oración del mentiroso. Aquí sedemuestra que un esquema mejor permiteun tratamiento uniforme de la verdad enel que las paradojas semánticas resultanser simplemente falsas.Si nc e Ta r s (...)
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  • What does it take to enter into the circumstance?Dan López de Sa - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (1):147 - 153.
    In the recent literature on contextualism and relativism, one often finds disputes as to which kind of consideration would be relevant for positing a feature of a context as a parameter in the ‘‘circumstance of evaluation’: via the presence of an operator in the language which shifts that feature (Stanley) or by being a feature of a context with respect to which the truth of ‘‘propositions’’ expressed in the context is relative (McFarlane). This kind of dispute arises from two different (...)
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  • The Many Faces of Truth: A Response to Some Critics.Michael Patrick Lynch - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (2):255-269.
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 20, Issue 2, Page 255-269, May 2012.
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  • Truth-conditions and the nature of truth: Re-solving mixed conjunctions.Douglas Edwards - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):684-688.
    Alethic pluralism, on one version of the view , is the idea that truth is to be identified with different properties in different domains of discourse. 1 Whilst we operate with a univocal concept of truth, and a uniform truth predicate, the thought is that the truth property changes from one domain to the next. So the truth property for talk about the nature and state of the material world may be different from the truth property for moral discourse .Tappolet (...)
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  • Aiming at truth.Nicholas Unwin - 2007 - New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    The author argues that is not obvious what it means for our beliefs and assertions to be "truth-directed", and that we need to weaken our ordinary notion of a belief if we are to deal with radical scepticism without surrendering to idealism. Topics examined also include whether there could be alien conceptual schemes and what might happen to us if we abandoned genuine belief in place of mere pragmatic acceptance. A radically new "ecological" model of knowledge is defended.
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  • Siding with euthyphro: Response-dependence and conferred properties.Ásta Kristjana Sveinsdóttir - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):108-125.
    : I argue that a response‐dependence account of a concept can yield metaphysical results, and not merely epistemological or semantical results, which has been a prevalent view in the literature on response‐dependence. In particular, I show how one can argue for a conferralist account of a certain property by arguing that the concept of the property is response‐dependent, if certain assumptions are made.
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  • Reading the περιτροπή: "Theaetetus" 170c-171c. Chappell - 2006 - Phronesis 51 (2):109 - 139.
    Two readings of the much-discussed περιτροπή argument of "Theaetetus" 170c-171c have dominated the literature. One I call "the relativity reading". On this reading, the argument fails by ignoratio elenchi because it "carelessly" omits "the qualifications 'true for so-and-so' which [Protagoras'] theory insists on" (Bostock 1988: 90). The other reading I call "the many-worlds interpretation". On this view, Plato's argument succeeds in showing that "Protagoras' position becomes utterly self-contradictory" because "he claims that everyone lives in his own relativistic world, yet at (...)
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  • Naturalizing the human or humanizing nature: Science, nature and the supernatural.David Macarthur - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (1):29-51.
    The present paper challenges the narrow scientistic conception of Nature that underlies current projects of naturalization involving, say, evaluative or intentional discourse. It is more plausible to hold that science provides only a partial characterization of the natural world. I consider McDowell's articulation of a more liberal naturalism, one which recognizes autonomous normative facts about reasons, meanings and values, as genuine constituents of Nature on a more liberal conception of it. Several critics have claimed that this account is vitiated by (...)
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  • Deflating the correspondence intuition.Igor Douven & Frank Hindriks - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (3):315–329.
    A common objection against deflationist theories of truth is that they cannot do justice to the correspondence intuition, i.e. the intuition that there is an explanatory relationship between, for instance, the truth of ‘Snow is white’ and snow's being white. We scrutinize two attempts to meet this objection and argue that both fail. We then propose a new response to the objection which, first, sheds doubt on the correctness of the correspondence intuition and, second, seeks to explain how we may (...)
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  • Farewell to states of affairs.Julian Dodd - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):146 – 160.
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  • Recent Faces of Moral Nonnaturalism.Terence Cuneo - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (6):850-879.
    Despite having occupied a peripheral position in contemporary metaethics, moral nonnaturalism has recently experienced a revival of sorts. But what is moral nonnaturalism? And what is there to be said in favor of it? In this article, I address these two questions. In the first place, I offer an account of what moral nonnaturalism is. According to the view I propose, nonnaturalism is better viewed not as a position, but as a theoretical stance. And, second, I critically engage with three (...)
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  • Moral underdetermination and a new skeptical challenge.Marius Baumann - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-22.
    In this paper, I introduce a new challenge to moral realism: the skeptical argument from moral underdetermination. The challenge arises as a consequence of two recent projects in normative ethics. Both Parfit and a group called consequentializers have independently claimed that the main traditions of normative theories can agree on the set of correct particular deontic verdicts. Nonetheless, as Dietrich and List :421–479, 2017) and myself :191–221, 2018; Australas J Philos 97:511–527, 2019; Ethical Theory Moral Pract 24:999–1018, 2021a) have argued, (...)
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  • Discussion. Applied constructive mathematics: on Hellman's 'mathematical constructivism in spacetime'.H. Billinge - 2000 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (2):299-318.
    claims that constructive mathematics is inadequate for spacetime physics and hence that constructive mathematics cannot be considered as an alternative to classical mathematics. He also argues that the contructivist must be guilty of a form of a priorism unless she adopts a strong form of anti-realism for science. Here I want to dispute both claims. First, even if there are non-constructive results in physics this does not show that adequate constructive alternatives could not be formulated. Secondly, the constructivist adopts a (...)
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  • Disagreement about Taste and Alethic Suberogation.Filippo Ferrari - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264):516-535.
    I present a novel strategy to account for two thoughts concerning disagreements about taste: (i) that they need not involve any substantive fault (faultlessness); (ii) that the faultlessness of a contrary opinion can be coherently appreciated from within a committed perspective (parity). Under the assumption that judgments of taste are truth-apt and governed by the truth-norm, I argue that understanding how exactly truth is normative offers a strategy for accounting for both thoughts. I distinguish between different ways in which truth (...)
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  • An Old Solution to the Problem of Mixed Atomics.Adam Stewart-Wallace - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (4):363-372.
    This paper examines a difficulty for various forms of truth pluralism, known in the literature as the problem of ‘mixed atomics’. It is argued that two prominent attempts to respond to the difficulty—those of Jeremy Wyatt and Gila Sher—fail. In their place, an alternative is offered based on parts of Crispin Wright’s Truth and Objectivity programme. It is argued that the Wrightian approach works because it substitutes traditional conceptions of truth-relevant properties, for example correspondence and coherence, for criteria of objectivity (...)
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  • Truth, Demonstration and Knowledge.Elia Zardini - 2015 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 30 (3):365-392.
    After introducing semantic anti-realism and the paradox of knowability, the paper offers a reconstruction of the anti-realist argument from understanding. The proposed reconstruction validates an unrestricted principle to the effect that truth requires the existence of a certain kind of “demonstration”. The paper shows that that principle fails to imply the problematic instances of the original unrestricted feasible-knowability principle but that the overall view underlying the new principle still has unrestricted epistemic consequences. Appealing precisely to the paradox of knowability, the (...)
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  • A Diagnosis and Resolution to the Generality Problem.Klemens Kappel - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):525-560.
    The purpose of this paper is to offer a diagnosis and a resolution to generality problem. I state the generality problem and suggest a distinction between criteria of relevance and what I call a theory of determination. The generality problem may concern either of these. While plausible criteria of relevance would be convenient for the externalist, he does not need them. I discuss various theories of determination, and argue that no existing theory of determination is plausible. This provides a case (...)
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  • 'The Good Man is the Measure of All Things': Objectivity without World-Centredness in Aristotle's Moral Epistemology.Timothy Chappell - 2005 - In Christopher Gill (ed.), Virtue, norms, and objectivity: issues in ancient and modern ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Is Moral Projectivism Empirically Tractable?Richard Joyce - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):53 - 75.
    Different versions of moral projectivism are delineated: minimal, metaphysical, nihilistic, and noncognitivist. Minimal projectivism (the focus of this paper) is the conjunction of two subtheses: (1) that we experience morality as an objective aspect of the world and (2) that this experience has its origin in an affective attitude (e.g., an emotion) rather than in perceptual faculties. Both are empirical claims and must be tested as such. This paper does not offer ideas on any specific test procedures, but rather undertakes (...)
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  • Against Truth-value gaps.Michael Glanzberg - 2003 - In J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and heaps: new essays on paradox. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 151--94.
    ∗Thanks to J. C. Beall, Alex Byrne, Jason Decker, Tyler Doggett, Paul Elbourne, Adam Elga, Warren Goldfarb, Delia Graff, Richard Heck, Charles Parsons, Mark Richard, Susanna Siegel, Jason Stanley, Judith Thomson, Carol Voeller, Brian Weatherson, Ralph Wedgwood, Steve Yablo, Cheryl Zoll, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments and discussions. Versions of this material were presented in my seminar at MIT in the Fall of 2000, and at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County. Parts of this paper also derive from (...)
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  • Extensions in Flux : An Essay on Vagueness and Context Sensitivity.Jonas Åkerman - 2009 - Dissertation, Stockholm University
    The extensions of vague predicates like ‘is bald’, ‘is tall’, and ‘is a heap’ apparently lack sharp boundaries, and this makes such predicates susceptible to soritical reasoning, i.e. reasoning that leads to some version of the notorious sorites paradox. This essay is concerned with a certain kind of theory of vagueness, according to which the symptoms and puzzles of vagueness should be accounted for in terms of a particular species of context sensitivity exhibited by vague expressions. The basic idea is (...)
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  • Truth and Falsity in Communication: Assertion, Denial, and Interpretation.Kensuke Ito - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (2):1-18.
    Our linguistic communication is, in part, the exchange of truths. It is an empirical fact that in daily conversation we aim at truths, not falsehoods. This fact may lead us to assume that ordinary, assertion-based communication is the only possible communicative system for truth-apt information exchange, or at least has priority over any alternatives. This assumption is underwritten in three traditional doctrines: that assertion is a basic notion, in terms of which we define denial; that to predicate truth of a (...)
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  • On the normative variability of truth and logic.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):236-257.
    ABSTRACTThis paper discusses the normativity of truth and logic. The paper has three objectives. First, I argue that logic is normative for thought in the sense of underwriting instrumental rationality. Logic is a good instrument for achieving truth, the goal of cognition. In recent work, Filippo Ferrari has argued that the normative nature of truth may vary across domains. My second aim is to extend this idea to logic, against the background of the idea that logic serves to underwrite instrumental (...)
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  • Talking with Vultures.Filippo Ferrari & Crispin Wright - 2017 - Mind 126 (503):911-936.
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  • Ultramaximalist minimalism!A. Weir - 1996 - Analysis 56 (1):10-22.
    There has been much debate recently as to whether the notion of truth, as applied to one's home language, is metaphysically neutral, the interesting metaphysical questions arising elsewhere (in relation to such notions as mind-independence or objectivity or existence). ' On one side, the minimalists, as they have come to be known, favour deflationary accounts of truth such as the redundancy or disquotational theories and conclude that the notion of truth is applicable to declarative sentences in general - at least (...)
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  • How to account for the oddness of missing-link conditionals.Igor Douven - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5).
    Conditionals whose antecedent and consequent are not somehow internally connected tend to strike us as odd. The received doctrine is that this felt oddness is to be explained pragmatically. Exactly how the pragmatic explanation is supposed to go has remained elusive, however. This paper discusses recent philosophical and psychological work that attempts to account semantically for the apparent oddness of conditionals lacking an internal connection between their parts.
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  • Truth as a Substantive Property.Douglas Edwards - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):279-294.
    One of the many ways that ‘deflationary’ and ‘inflationary’ theories of truth are said to differ is in their attitude towards truth qua property. This difference used to be very easy to delineate, with deflationists denying, and inflationists asserting, that truth is a property, but more recently the debate has become a lot more complicated, owing primarily to the fact that many contemporary deflationists often do allow for truth to be considered a property. Anxious to avoid inflation, however, these deflationists (...)
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  • Against the Judgment-Dependence of Mathematics and Logic.Alexander Paseau - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (1):23-40.
    Although the case for the judgment-dependence of many other domains has been pored over, surprisingly little attention has been paid to mathematics and logic. This paper presents two dilemmas for a judgment-dependent account of these areas. First, the extensionality-substantiality dilemma: in each case, either the judgment-dependent account is extensionally inadequate or it cannot meet the substantiality condition (roughly: non-vacuous specification). Second, the extensionality-extremality dilemma: in each case, either the judgment-dependent account is extensionally inadequate or it cannot meet the extremality condition (...)
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  • Minding one's manners: Revisiting moral explanations.Robert N. Johnson - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 90 (2):181-203.
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  • Truth as an epistemic ideal.John Nolt - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (3):203 - 237.
    Several philosophers—including C. S. Peirce, William James, Hilary Putnam and Crispin Wright—have proposed various versions of the notion that truth is an epistemic ideal. More specifically, they have held that a proposition is true if and only if it can be fixedly warranted by human inquirers, given certain ideal epistemic conditions. This paper offers a general critique of that idea, modeling conceptions of ideality and fixed warrant within the semantics that Kripke developed for intuitionistic logic. It is shown that each (...)
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  • A Defense Of Explanation-First Truthmaking: Some Thoughts On Jamin Asay’s A Theory Of Truthmaking.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-6.
    Jamin Asay’s A Theory of Truthmaking is one of the most important books on truthmaking, full of important ideas from beginning to end. One of the most interesting parts of the book is Asay's attack on the explanation-first truthmaking. Explanation-first truthmaking is the explanatory project of explaining why truths are true. This is in contrast with ontology-first truthmaking, the project defended by Asay, and which is the project of answering the fundamental ontological question “What is there?”. Asay thinks explanation-first truthmaking (...)
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  • Fictionalism and mathematical explanations.Pamela Ann Jose Boongaling - 2019 - Filosofia Unisinos 20 (3).
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  • A minimalist explanation of truth’s asymmetry.Julian Dodd - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (4):389-404.
    Suppose that Eleanor is drowsy. Truth's asymmetry is illustrated by the following fact: while we accept that <Eleanor is drowsy> is true because Eleanor is drowsy, we do not accept that Eleanor is drowsy because <Eleanor is drowsy> is true. This asymmetry requires an explanation, but it has been alleged, notably by David Liggins, that the minimalist about truth cannot provide one. This paper counteracts this pessimism by arguing that the minimalist can successfully explain the asymmetry conceptually, rather than metaphysically. (...)
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  • Investigating illocutionary monism.Casey Rebecca Johnson - 2019 - Synthese 196 (3):1151-1165.
    Suppose I make an utterance, intending it to be a command. You don’t take it to be one. Must one of us be wrong? In other words, must each utterance have, at most, one illocutionary force? Current debates over the constitutive norm of assertion and over illocutionary silencing, tend to assume that the answer is yes—that each utterance must be either an assertion, or a command, or a question, but not more than one of these. While I think that this (...)
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  • What is it to “B” a relation?Jonathan Tallant - 2008 - Synthese 162 (1):117-132.
    The purpose of this paper is two fold: first, I look to show Oaklander’s theory of time to be false. Second, I show that the only way to salvage the B-theory is via the adopting of the causal theory of time, and allying this to Oaklander’s claim that tense is to be eliminated. I then raise some concerns with the causal theory of time. My conclusion is that, if one adopts eternalism, the unreality of time looks a better option than (...)
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  • Rethinking Bivalence.A. Iacona - 2005 - Synthese 146 (3):283-302.
    Classical logic rests on the assumption that there are two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive truth values. This assumption has always been surrounded by philosophical controversy. Doubts have been raised about its legitimacy, and hence about the legitimacy of classical logic. Usually, the assumption is stated in the form of a general principle, namely the principle that every proposition is either true or false. Then, the philosophical controversy is often framed in terms of the question whether every proposition is either (...)
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  • Deflationism, Conceptual Explanation, and the Truth Asymmetry.David Liggins - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):84-101.
    Ascriptions of truth give rise to an explanatory asymmetry. For instance, we accept ‘ is true because Rex is barking’ but reject ‘Rex is barking because is true’. Benjamin Schnieder and other philosophers have recently proposed a fresh explanation of this asymmetry : they have suggested that the asymmetry has a conceptual rather than a metaphysical source. The main business of this paper is to assess this proposal, both on its own terms and as an option for deflationists. I offer (...)
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