A number of high-profile mislabeling incidents have led to many studies exploring the decision-making processes that firms make around performing illegal acts. However, it remains unclear why the proportion of firms conducting these acts constantly fluctuates and never disappears. Therefore, this study investigated this by carrying out a longitudinal analysis of food labeling in the Taiwanese rice industry. Drawing on the institutional isomorphism theory, it was found that the degree of mislabeling is negatively correlated with both the level of control (...) of inspection regulations and public attention toward food regulations, and positively correlated with the previous proportion of firms mislabeling their products. Thus, there is a feedback loop between regulatory control, public attention, and the amount of mislabeling, with the amount of mislabeling not only being affected by the former degree of regulatory control, public attention, and mislabeling, but also modifying the future status of each of these. These findings further our understanding of the causal effects of illegal actions in the institutional agricultural environment. (shrink)

This study focuses on a traditional business ethics question and aims to use advanced techniques to improve the performance of corporate fraud prediction. Based on the GONE framework, we adopt the machine learning model to predict the occurrence of corporate fraud in China. We first identify a comprehensive set of fraud-related variables and organize them into each category (i.e., Greed, Opportunity, Need, and Exposure) of the GONE framework. Among the six machine learning models tested, the Random Forest (RF) model outperforms (...) the other five models in corporate fraud prediction. Based on the RF model, we show that Exposure variables play a more important role in predicting corporate fraud than other input variables. These results highlight the importance of Exposure variables in corporate fraud prediction and promote the practical use of the machine learning model in solving business ethics questions. (shrink)

Taking advantage of the China’s recent anti-corruption campaign, we attempt to examine the effect of public governance on a firm’s incentive to commit fraud. Using enforcement actions data from the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) from 2004 to 2014, we find that, due to enhanced public governance, firms are less likely to commit fraud in the post-campaign period than in the pre-campaign period. We further show that the effect of public governance is more evident in privately held listed firms, in (...) firms with weak legal environment, and in firms in areas with poor local economies. In addition, we find that older CEOs respond less actively to the public governance caused by anti-corruption regulations. This paper offers clear policy implications for business ethics by indicating that public governance provides external monitoring of corporate decisions. (shrink)

The relationship between analysts' forecasts and corporate fraud is a vital theoretical and practical question that needs to be clarified. Based on a strict distinction between negative performance gaps relative to analyst forecasts (negative forecast gaps hereinafter) and analyst coverage, this study investigates the influence of analyst forecasts on corporate fraud from a panoramic perspective. Using panel data on listed companies in China from 2008 to 2019, we find that short-term performance pressure caused by negative forecast gaps is significantly positively (...) correlated with firms’ possibility for fraudulent behavior. However, this positive correlation is weaker in state-owned enterprises than in their non-state-owned counterparts. Further, as a key external governance mechanism, analyst coverage enhances the negative moderator effect of state ownership on the positive relationship between negative forecast gaps and the likelihood of corporate fraud. (shrink)

Financial misconduct has come into the spotlight in recent years, causing market regulators to increase the reach and severity of interventions. We show that at times the economic benefits of illicit financial activity outweigh the costs of litigation. We illustrate our argument with data from the US Securities and Exchanges Commission and a case of investment misconduct. From the neoclassical economic paradigm, which follows utilitarian thinking, it is rational to engage in misconduct. Still, the majority of professionals refrain from misconduct, (...) foregoing economic rewards. We suggest financial activity could be reimagined taking into account intrinsic and prosocial motivations. A virtue ethics framework could also be applied, linking financial behavior to the quest for moral excellence and shared flourishing. By going beyond utilitarian thinking and considering alternative models, we offer a fuller account of financial behavior and a better perspective from which to design deterrence methods. (shrink)

There is a lack of research about the political strategies used by firms in emerging countries, mainly because the literature often assumes that Western-oriented corporate political activity has universal application. Drawing on resource-dependency logics, we explore why and how firms orchestrate CPA in the institutionally challenging context of Nigeria. Our findings show that firms deploy four context-fitting but ethically suspect political strategies: affective, financial, pseudo-attribution and kinship strategies. We leverage this understanding to contribute to CPA in emerging countries by arguing (...) that corporate political strategies are shaped by the reciprocity and duality of dependency relationships between firms and politicians, and also by advancing that these strategies reflect institutional weaknesses and unique industry-level opportunities. Importantly, we shed light on the muttered dark side of CPA. We develop a CPA framework and discuss the research, practical and policy implications of our findings. (shrink)

The current study investigates whether tournament incentives motivate chief executive officer to be socially responsible. Furthermore, it explores the role of sub-national institutional contingencies [i.e., state-owned enterprises vs. non-SOEs, foreign-owned entities vs. non-FOEs, cross-listed vs. non-cross-listed, developed region] in CEO tournament incentives and the corporate social responsibility performance relationship. Data were collected from all A-shared companies listed in the stock exchanges of China from 2014 to 2019. The study uses the baseline methodology of ordinary least squares and cluster OLS regression. (...) Moreover, firm-fixed effects regression, two-stage least squares regression, and propensity score matching deal with the endogeneity problem and check the robustness of the results. The results provide reliable evidence that tournament incentives motivate CEOs to be more socially responsible. On the other hand, sub-national institutional contingencies positively affect the association between CEO tournament incentives and CSRP. The findings have important implications for companies and regulators who wish to enhance CSP by providing incentives to top managers. (shrink)

On 19 October 2013, the Chinese government issued the Opinions on Further Regulation on Party and Political Leaders and Cadres Working Part-Time in Enterprises, also known as the 18th Decree, to regulate government officials’ employment with businesses. The 18th Decree is widely perceived as having had a significant impact on the use of independent directors with political backgrounds by firms, given the prevalence of this business practice. This paper examines the market reaction to the 18th Decree to ascertain the value (...) effect of political connections in China. We note a negative relationship between the political connections of independent directors and market reaction. We also note that the negative relationship between political connections and market reaction is moderated by ownership type and state of regional development. Specifically, we find that the negative relationship holds only for private firms in less developed regions. These results support our prediction that political connections add value to Chinese firms and that the value effect of political connection is contingent on institutional factors. (shrink)

Using data from China, where the identity of engagement auditors is disclosed, we find significant relationships between engagement auditors’ negative experiences and the costs of corporate bonds. Further tests differentiate field and review auditors’ experiences, and we find that both field and review auditors’ negative experiences are significantly related to higher costs of corporate bonds. In addition, we find that the above results are significant only when the engagement auditors are affiliated with non-Big10 audit firms. Using path analysis, we find (...) that credit rating is a possible channel through which information on engagement auditors’ negative experiences can transfer to bond investors. Regarding non-price terms, we conclude that engagement auditors with negative experiences are associated with smaller bond sizes, shorter bond maturities, a higher likelihood of requiring collateral, and more restrictive covenants. Further analyses also show that the effects of engagement auditors’ negative experiences on the costs of corporate bonds are less pronounced for well-governed firms. To show that our results obtained from China’s corporate bond market are relevant to loan markets, we replicate the above tests using a Chinese sample, and the results from the loan market are consistent with those from the corporate bond market. Overall, our empirical results suggest that investors are indeed concerned with engagement auditors’ negative experiences. (shrink)

This study investigates the key factors that elicit financial reporting fraud among companies in Malaysia. Using enforcement action releases issued by the Security Commission of Malaysia and Bursa Malaysia, we identify a sample of 76 firms that had committed financial reporting fraud during the period of 1996–2016. We use the fraud triangle framework and the Malaysian International Standards on Auditing 240 to identify the factors. Since the simple probit model fails to address the identification problem, we estimate our results using (...) a bivariate probit model. The new model estimates the effects of pressure, opportunity, and rationalization on the probability of fraud likelihood by disentangling the detection probability of fraud. Among several proxies used for pressure, our results suggest that aggressive tax reporting and financial difficulties increase the likelihood of fraud commission. In regard to opportunity, we find that dedicated institutional investors, independence of the board, effective audit committee, and the presence of a female on the board provide active monitoring and oversight in reducing fraud occurrence. Results for rationalization suggest that prior violations and frequent changes of external auditors increase the chances of fraud occurrence. This research offers possible insights to auditors, managers, and regulators to prevent, detect, and react to fraud. Specifically, it highlights the specific factors that may exacerbate the fraudulent intentions of firms. (shrink)

This study uses insights from the political perspective on corporate governance to investigate the influence of geographic concentration of institutional blockholders on workplace safety violations. When institutional investors who have a blockholding stake (i.e., institutional blockholders) are geographically concentrated, corporate managers are more likely to pursue efficiency at the expense of employee interests because these blockholders may find it easier to coordinate their actions, strengthening their power over corporate managers and ultimately giving rise to more workplace safety violations. We also (...) contend that the influence of institutional blockholders’ geographic concentration on workplace safety violations hinges upon the ownership of employees, socially responsible investment funds, and the CEO. Findings from a longitudinal sample of 1316 U.S. firms support our arguments. This study contributes to a nascent stream of research examining the influence of capital market participants on workplace safety by highlighting the role of institutional blockholders’ geographic concentration as a new channel through which investors can shape employee outcomes. (shrink)