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  1. Epistemic logic with partial grasp.Francisca Silva - 2024 - Synthese 204 (92):1-27.
    We have to gain from recognizing a relation between epistemic agents and the parts of subject matters that play a role in their cognitive lives. I call this relation “grasping”. Namely, I zone in on one notion of having a partial grasp of a subject matter—that of agents grasping part of the subject matter that they are attending to—and characterize it. I propose that giving up the idealization that we fully grasp the subject matters we attend to allows one to (...)
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  • The problem of closure and questioning attitudes.Richard Teague - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-19.
    The problem of closure for the traditional unstructured possible worlds model of attitudinal content is that it treats belief and other cognitive states as closed under entailment, despite apparent counterexamples showing that this is not a necessary property of such states. One solution to this problem, which has been proposed recently by several authors (Schaffer 2005; Yalcin 2018; Hoek forthcoming), is to restrict closure in an unstructured setting by treating propositional attitudes as question-sensitive. Here I argue that this line of (...)
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  • Questions in Action.Daniel Hoek - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (3):113-143.
    Choices confront us with questions. How we act depends on our answers to those questions. So the way our beliefs guide our choices is not just a function of their informational content, but also depends systematically on the questions those beliefs address. This paper gives a precise account of the interplay between choices, questions and beliefs, and harnesses this account to obtain a principled approach to the problem of deduction. The result is a novel theory of belief-guided action that explains (...)
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  • Can probability theory explain why closure is both intuitive and prone to counterexamples?Marcello Di Bello - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2145-2168.
    Epistemic closure under known implication is the principle that knowledge of "p" and knowledge of "p implies q", together, imply knowledge of "q". This principle is intuitive, yet several putative counterexamples have been formulated against it. This paper addresses the question, why is epistemic closure both intuitive and prone to counterexamples? In particular, the paper examines whether probability theory can offer an answer to this question based on four strategies. The first probability-based strategy rests on the accumulation of risks. The (...)
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  • At the threshold of knowledge.Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):449-460.
    We explore consequences of the view that to know a proposition your rational credence in the proposition must exceed a certain threshold. In other words, to know something you must have evidence that makes rational a high credence in it. We relate such a threshold view to Dorr et al.’s :277–287, 2014) argument against the principle they call fair coins: “If you know a coin won’t land tails, then you know it won’t be flipped.” They argue for rejecting fair coins (...)
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  • Minimal Rationality and the Web of Questions.Daniel Hoek - 2025 - In Peter van Elswyk, Dirk Kindermann, Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini & Andy Egan (eds.), Unstructured Content. Oxford University Press.
    This paper proposes a new account of bounded or minimal doxastic rationality (in the sense of Cherniak 1986), based on the notion that beliefs are answers to questions (à la Yalcin 2018). The core idea is that minimally rational beliefs are linked through thematic connections, rather than entailment relations. Consequently, such beliefs are not deductively closed, but they are closed under parthood (where a part is an entailment that answers a smaller question). And instead of avoiding all inconsistency, minimally rational (...)
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  • Epistemic Closure and Epistemological Optimism.Claudio de Almeida - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (1):113-131.
    Half a century later, a Dretskean stance on epistemic closure remains a minority view. Why? Mainly because critics have successfully poked holes in the epistemologies on which closure fails. However, none of the familiar pro-closure moves works against the counterexamples on display here. It is argued that these counterexamples pose the following dilemma: either accept that epistemic closure principles are false, and steal the thunder from those who attack classical logic on the basis of similarly problematic cases—specifically, relevance logicians and (...)
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  • Replies to Comments on If-Thenism.Stephen Yablo - 2017 - Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (2):212-227.
    I am hugely grateful for these provocative and illuminating comments. My thanks to all N commentators (N ≈ 13). I will have something to say about each contribution, but the overall organization wi...
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  • (1 other version)Knowledge is closed under analytic content.Samuel Z. Elgin - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5339-5353.
    I am concerned with epistemic closure—the phenomenon in which some knowledge requires other knowledge. In particular, I defend a version of the closure principle in terms of analyticity; if an agent S knows that p is true and that q is an analytic part of p, then S knows that q. After targeting the relevant notion of analyticity, I argue that this principle accommodates intuitive cases and possesses the theoretical resources to avoid the preface paradox.
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  • (1 other version)Subject-Matter and Intensional Operators II: Applications to the Theory of Topic-Sensitive Intentional Modals.Thomas Macaulay Ferguson - 2023 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 52 (6):1673-1701.
    In frameworks in which _topic-__theoretic_ considerations—_e.g._, tracking _subject-matter_ or _topic_—are given equal importance with _veridical_ considerations, assigning topics to formulae in a satisfactory way is of critical importance. While intuitions are more-or-less solid for _extensional_ formulae in a propositional language, arriving at a compelling account of the subject-matter of _intensional_ formulae, _i.e._, formulae including intensional operators, is more challenging. This paper continues previous work on modeling topics of intensional formulae in William Parry’s logic of analytic implication, adapting the general techniques (...)
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  • A Truthmaker-based Epistemic Logic.Vita Saitta - 2024 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 53 (4):1067-1107.
    The aim of this work is to investigate the problem of Logical Omniscience in epistemic logic by means of truthmaker semantics. We will present a semantic framework based on $$\varvec{W}$$ W -models extended with a partial function, which selects the body of knowledge of the agents, namely the set of verifiers of the agent’s total knowledge. The semantic clause for knowledge follows the intuition that an agent knows some information $$\varvec{\phi }$$ ϕ, when the propositional content that $$\varvec{\phi }$$ ϕ (...)
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  • Getting a little closure for closure.James Simpson - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12331-12361.
    In this paper, I’ll survey a number of closure principles of epistemic justification and find them all wanting. However, it’ll be my contention that there’s a novel closure principle of epistemic justification that has the virtues of its close cousin closure principles, without their vices. This closure principle of epistemic justification can be happily thought of as a multi-premise closure principle and it cannot be used in Cartesian skeptical arguments that employ a closure principle of epistemic justification. In this way, (...)
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