Theoretical studies suggest that, when determining the workplace safety level, CEOs face a trade-off between ex ante safety-improving expenditures and the expected losses due to ex post injury and illness occurrences. We examine whether firms with higher CEO inside debt holdings have safer workplaces. Using establishment-level employee workplace injury and illness data, we find that CEOs’ inside debt holdings are negatively associated with employee workplace injury and illness cases. This relationship is more pronounced if workers’ compensation premiums are more sensitive (...) to injury claims and for firms with more government business and less pronounced for firms with higher levels of secured debt. We provide some evidence that our main result stems from CEOs increasing safety investments. Our empirical results are shown to be robust under a batch of robustness tests and when considering potential endogeneity problems. Our findings suggest that CEOs with higher levels of inside debt holdings are more sensitive to wealth loss due to employee injury and illness, leading to a safer workplace. (shrink)

Environmental, health, and safety management systems have become common in research settings to improve laboratory safety through systematic observation and self-regulation. However, there is scant empirical evidence assessing whether these surveillance and inspection systems meet their intended objectives. Using data from safety inspections in research laboratories at a large university, we investigate whether conducting inspections, and recording and reporting findings back to the formally responsible actors (i.e., principal investigator scientists) lead to the improvement of regulatory compliance. Our analyses identify a (...) population of well-funded, high-status, tenured researchers whose non-compliant practices persist. Our interviews with environmental, health, and safety personnel suggest that higher-status actors disengage from the regulatory system, the compliance officers, and the system’s feedback process by their variable recognition and acknowledgment of relevant regulations, attention to the inspection reports, and responses to the feedback concerning repair of the unsafe situation. This study extends previous literature on regulatory compliance by providing evidence for the role of power and status in explaining actor-level non-compliant behavior. (shrink)

The allocation of resources among different stakeholders is an ethical dilemma for chief executive officers (CEOs). In this study, we investigate the association between CEO power and workplace injuries and illnesses. We use an establishment-level dataset comprising 31,924 establishment-year observations between 2002 and 2011. Our main result shows that employees at firms with structurally powerful CEOs experience fewer workplace injuries and illnesses and days away from work. We reason that CEOs derive a private benefit from low injury and illness rates (...) and that powerful CEOs are better at influencing employees to take workplace safety and health seriously. Additional analyses reveal fewer injuries and illnesses in firms led by CEOs with expertise power. However, increased injuries and illnesses were linked to firms controlled by CEOs with ownership power. Moreover, we find that structurally powerful CEOs mitigate injury and illness differences in relation to geographical proximity to corporate headquarters. We contribute with both research and practical implications on the topics of CEO power and corporate social responsibility (CSR) in general and workplace safety and health in particular. (shrink)