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Intervening agents and moral responsibility

Michael J. Zimmerman

Philosophical Quarterly 35 (141):347-358 (1985)

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Mutually Enhancing Responsibility: A Theoretical Exploration of the Interaction Mechanisms Between Individual and Corporate Moral Responsibility.Muel Kaptein & Mihaela Constantinescu - 2015 - Journal of Business Ethics 129 (2):325-339.details Moral responsibility for outcomes in corporate settings can be ascribed either to the individual members, the corporation, or both. In the latter case, the relationship between individual and corporate responsibility has been approached as inversely proportional, such that an increase in individual responsibility leads to a corresponding decrease in corporate responsibility and vice versa. In this article, we develop a non-proportionate approach, where, under specific conditions, individual and corporate moral responsibilities interact dynamically, leading to a mutual enhancement of responsibility: the (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 14 citations
Defensive Wars and the Reprisal Dilemma.Saba Bazargan - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):583-601.details I address a foundational problem with accounts of the morality of war that are derived from the Just War Tradition. Such accounts problematically focus on ‘the moment of crisis’: i.e. when a state is considering a resort to war. This is problematic because sometimes the state considering the resort to war is partly responsible for wrongly creating the conditions in which the resort to war becomes necessary. By ignoring this possibility, JWT effectively ignores, in its moral evaluation of wars, certain (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Killing Minimally Responsible Threats.Saba Bazargan - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):114-136.details Minimal responsibility threateners are epistemically justified but mistaken in thinking that imposing a nonnegligible risk on others is permissible. On standard accounts, an MRT forfeits her right not to be defensively killed. I propose an alternative account: an MRT is liable only to the degree of harm equivalent to what she risks causing multiplied by her degree of responsibility. Harm imposed on the MRT above that amount is justified as a lesser evil, relative to allowing the MRT to kill her (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 30 citations
Scandal and Moral Demandingness in the Late Scholastics.Daniel Schwartz - 2015 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (2):256-276.details This paper examines the views of a number of late scholastic moral theologians, with emphasis on Francisco Suárez, about the limits of the duty to refrain from those otherwise permissible actions which make it difficult for people to choose uprightly. In so doing, the paper singles out and analyses a number circumstantial factors capable of excusing ordinary agents for giving others an occasion of sin. Download Export citation Bookmark
Responsibility and the ‘Pie Fallacy’.Alex Kaiserman - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3597-3616.details Much of our ordinary thought and talk about responsibility exhibits what I call the ‘pie fallacy’—the fallacy of thinking that there is a fixed amount of responsibility for every outcome, to be distributed among all those, if any, who are responsible for it. The pie fallacy is a fallacy, I argue, because how responsible an agent is for some outcome is fully grounded in facts about the agent, the outcome and the relationships between them; it does not depend, in particular, (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 12 citations
Blame It on the AI? On the Moral Responsibility of Artificial Moral Advisors.Mihaela Constantinescu, Constantin Vică, Radu Uszkai & Cristina Voinea - 2022 - Philosophy and Technology 35 (2):1-26.details Deep learning AI systems have proven a wide capacity to take over human-related activities such as car driving, medical diagnosing, or elderly care, often displaying behaviour with unpredictable consequences, including negative ones. This has raised the question whether highly autonomous AI may qualify as morally responsible agents. In this article, we develop a set of four conditions that an entity needs to meet in order to be ascribed moral responsibility, by drawing on Aristotelian ethics and contemporary philosophical research. We encode (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 6 citations
Accountability and Intervening Agency: An Asymmetry between Upstream and Downstream Actors.Saba Bazargan-Forward - 2017 - Utilitas 29 (1):110-114.details Suppose someone (P1) does something that is wrongful only in virtue of the risk that it will enable another person (P2) to commit a wrongdoing. Suppose further that P1’s conduct does indeed turn out to enable P2’s wrongdoing. The resulting wrong is agentially mediated: P1 is an enabling agent and P2 is an intervening agent. Whereas the literature on intervening agency focuses on whether P2’s status as an intervening agent makes P1’s conduct less bad, I turn this issue on its (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
(When) Are Authors Culpable for Causing Harm?Marcus Arvan - 2023 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 20 (1-2):47-78.details To what extent are authors morally culpable for harms caused by their published work? Can authors be culpable even if their ideas are misused, perhaps because they failed to take precautions to prevent harmful misinterpretations? Might authors be culpable even if they do take precautions—if, for example, they publish ideas that others can be reasonably expected to put to harmful uses, precautions notwithstanding? Although complete answers to these questions depend upon controversial views about the right to free speech, this paper (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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