Missing Entities: Has Panpsychism Lost the Physical World?

Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (9-10):194-211 (2021)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Panpsychists aspire to explain human consciousness, but can they also account for the physical world? In this paper, I argue that proponents of a popular form of panpsychism cannot. I pose a new challenge against this form of panpsychism: it faces an explanatory gap between the fundamental experiences it posits and some physical entities. I call the problem of explaining the existence of these physical entities within the panpsychist framework “the missing entities problem.” Spacetime, the quantum state, and quantum gravitational entities constitute three explanatory gaps as instances of the missing entities problem. Panpsychists are obliged to solve all instances of the missing entities problem; otherwise, panpsychism cannot be considered a viable theory of consciousness.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2021-08-17
Latest version: 7 (2021-10-21)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
520 ( #14,546 of 71,186 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
140 ( #4,414 of 71,186 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.