Abstract

It is widely assumed that hallucinations are not a type of perception. Coupled with the idea that hallucinations possess phenomenal character, hallucinations raise a problem for naive realism, which maintains that phenomenal character is at least partly constituted by perceived worldly objects. While naive realists have typically responded by adopting a disjunctive view of phenomenal character, I argue that to resolve this conflict we should instead reject the idea that hallucinations are not a type of perception. I defend this view by considering six alleged differences between hallucination and perception that are thought to support the idea that we do not perceive worldly objects when hallucinating. I argue that these differences are all accommodated for in a particular type of perception, picture perception. Drawing on picture perception's resources, I offer an account of hallucinations and their idiosyncrasies, in a way that is plausible in our world, that accounts for the variety of hallucination types, and that is compatible with naive realism.