A non-dualistic reply to Moore's refutation of idealism

Indian Philosophical Quarterly 5 (4):661-668 (1978)
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Abstract

As a counter-argument to Moore's "Refutation of Idealism," this article explains how the application of non-dualistic idealism reveals the underlying problem in both narrowly defined "esse is principi" brands of idealism and Moore's realism. The issue at hand, this article suggests, is the presupposition that experience naturally forks off into subjective consciousness and particular objects of consciousness. Rather than agree with either Moore or dualistic forms of idealism, the Vedanta-inspired view set forth in this article provides a third option to reject the ontological commitments of the former two philosophical stances. This third stance suggests that reality amounts to consciousness, and, thus, motivates the conclusion that modes of consciousness are what differentiate experience, not the bifurcation of experience into subject and object.

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Robert E. Allinson
Soka University

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