Results for 'Sensation'

420 found
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  1. Sensation as participation in visual art.Clive Cazeaux - 2012 - Aesthetic Pathways 2 (2):2-30.
    Can an understanding be formed of how sensory experience might be presented or manipulated in visual art in order to promote a relational concept of the senses, in opposition to the customary, capitalist notion of sensation as a private possession, as a sensory impression that is mine? I ask the question in the light of recent visual art theory and practice which pursue relational, ecological ambitions. As Arnold Berleant, Nicolas Bourriaud, and Grant Kester see it, ecological ambition and artistic (...)
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  2. Could Sensation be a Bodily Act?Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
    Hylomorphists claim that sensation is a bodily act. In this essay, I attempt to make sense of this notion but conclude that sensation is not a bodily act, but a mental one occurring in an intentional field of awareness.
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  3. Sensations, Natural Properties, and the Private Language Argument.William Child - 2017 - In Kevin M. Cahill & Thomas Raleigh (eds.), Wittgenstein and Naturalism. New York: Routledge. pp. 79-95.
    Wittgenstein’s philosophy involves a general anti-platonism about properties or standards of similarity. On his view, what it is for one thing to have the same property as another is not dictated by reality itself; it depends on our classificatory practices and the standards of similarity they embody. Wittgenstein’s anti-platonism plays an important role in the private language sections and in his discussion of the conceptual problem of other minds. In sharp contrast to Wittgenstein’s views stands the contemporary doctrine of natural (...)
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  4. Sensations as Representations in Kant.Tim Jankowiak - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (3):492-513.
    This paper defends an interpretation of the representational function of sensation in Kant's theory of empirical cognition. Against those who argue that sensations are ?subjective representations? and hence can only represent the sensory state of the subject, I argue that Kant appeals to different notions of subjectivity, and that the subjectivity of sensations is consistent with sensations representing external, spatial objects. Against those who claim that sensations cannot be representational at all, because sensations are not cognitively sophisticated enough to (...)
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  5. Understanding sensations.Nicholas Maxwell - 1968 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):127-146.
    My aim in this paper is to defend a version of the brain process theory, or identity thesis, which differs in one important respect from the theory put forward by J.J.C. Smart. I shall argue that although the sensations which a person experiences are, as a matter of contingent fact, brain processes, nonetheless there are facts about sensations which cannot be described or understood in terms of any physical theory. These 'mental' facts cannot be described by physics for the simple (...)
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  6. Brentano on Sensations and Sensory Qualities.Olivier Massin - 2017 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge.
    This chapter has three sections. The first introduces Brentano’s view of sensations by presenting the intentional features of sensations irreducible to features of the sensory objects. The second presents Brentano’s view of sensory objects —which include sensory qualities— and the features of sensations that such objects allow to explain, such as their intensity. The third section presents Brentano’s approach to sensory pleasures and pains, which combines both appeal to specific modes of reference and to specific sensory qualities.
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  7. Spatial content of painful sensations.Błażej Skrzypulec - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (4):554-569.
    Philosophical considerations regarding experiential spatial content have focused on exteroceptive sensations presenting external entities, and not on interoceptive experiences that present states of our own body. A notable example is studies on interoceptive touch, in which it is argued that interoceptive tactile experiences have rich spatial content such that tactile sensations are experienced as located in a spatial field. This paper investigates whether a similarly rich spatial content can be attributed to experiences of acute, cutaneous pain. It is argued that (...)
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  8. Kant on Inner Sensations and the Parity between Inner and Outer Sense.Yibin Liang - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7:307-338.
    Does inner sense, like outer sense, provide inner sensations or, in other words, a sensory manifold of its own? Advocates of the disparity thesis on inner and outer sense claim that it does not. This interpretation, which is dominant in the preexisting literature, leads to several inconsistencies when applied to Kant’s doctrine of inner experience. Yet, while so, the parity thesis, which is the contrasting view, is also unable to provide a convincing interpretation of inner sensations. In this paper, I (...)
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  9.  20
    Kant’s Definition of Sensation.Apaar Kumar - 2014 - Kant Studies Online 2014:262-311.
    My aim in this essay is to clarify certain issues relating to Kant’s definition of sensation. I will argue that even though sensation can occur in Kant’s system only if the subject is physiologically affected by some kind of object, Kant defines sensation non-referentially, that is, as relating entirely to the subject without reference to the affecting object. In the process, I will also demonstrate that sensation for Kant is the feeling accompanying the non-durational and obscurely (...)
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  10. Brentano on Sensations and Sensory Qualities.Massin Olivier - 2017 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 87-96.
    This chapter has three sections. The first introduces Brentano’s view of sensations by presenting the intentional features of sensations irreducible to features of the sensory objects. The second presents Brentano’s view of sensory objects —which include sensory qualities— and the features of sensations that such objects allow to explain, such as their intensity. The third section presents Brentano’s approach to sensory pleasures and pains, which combines both appeal to specific modes of reference and to specific sensory qualities.
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  11. Shepherd’s Claim that Sensations Are too Fleeting to Stand in Causal Relations with Other Sensations.David Landy - forthcoming - Journal of Scottish Philosophy.
    Shepherd argues that we can know that there exists a universe external to the mind because that universe is the only possible cause of our sensations. As a part of that argument, Shepherd eliminates the possibility that sensations might be caused by other sensations on the grounds that sensations are merely momentary existences and so not capable of standing in causal relations with each other. And yet she claims that sensations do stand in causal relations to other objects, both as (...)
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  12. Consciousness as Inner Sensation: Crusius and Kant.Jonas Jervell Indregard - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.
    What is it that makes a mental state conscious? Recent commentators have proposed that for Kant, consciousness results from differentiation: A mental state is conscious insofar as it is distinguished, by means of our conceptual capacities, from other states and/or things. I argue instead that Kant’s conception of state consciousness is sensory: A mental state is conscious insofar as it is accompanied by an inner sensation. Interpreting state consciousness as inner sensation reveals an underappreciated influence of Crusius on (...)
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  13. Strong Representationalism and Bodily Sensations: Reliable Causal Covariance and Biological Function.Coninx Sabrina - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (2):210-232.
    Bodily sensations, such as pain, hunger, itches, or sexual feelings, are commonly characterized in terms of their phenomenal character. In order to account for this phenomenal character, many philosophers adopt strong representationalism. According to this view, bodily sensations are essentially and entirely determined by an intentional content related to particular conditions of the body. For example, pain would be nothing more than the representation of actual or potential tissue damage. In order to motivate and justify their view, strong representationalists often (...)
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  14. Phantom Sensations: What's a Brain to Do? A Critical Review of the Re-mapping Hypothesis.Daniel DeFranco - 2018 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 5 (1):1-25.
    I will review the most widely held account of phantom sensations; the “re-mapping hypothesis.” According to the re-mapping hypothesis, amputation is followed by significant neural reorganization that, over time, restores the alignment between the brain’s representation of and the actual condition of the body. Implicit in the re-mapping hypothesis is the view that the brain’s primary function is to accurately represent the body. In response, I propose an alternative theory, the “preservation hypothesis.” The preservation hypothesis argues that the primary function (...)
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  15. The Myth of Color Sensations, or How Not to See a Yellow Banana.Pete Mandik - 2017 - Topics in Cognitive Science 9 (1):228-240.
    I argue against a class of philosophical views of color perception, especially insofar as such views posit the existence of color sensations. I argue against the need to posit such nonconceptual mental intermediaries between the stimulus and the eventual conceptualized perceptual judgment. Central to my arguments are considerations of certain color illusions. Such illusions are best explained by reference to high-level, conceptualized knowledge concerning, for example, object identity, likely lighting conditions, and material composition of the distal stimulus. Such explanations obviate (...)
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  16. Sensation and the Grammar of Life: Anscombe’s Procedure and her Purpose.Clare Mac Cumhaill & Rachael Wiseman - 2021 - In Heather Logue & Louise Richardson (eds.), Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Anscombe’s published writings, lectures and notes on sensation point toward a sophisticated critique of sense-data, representationalist and direct realist theories of perception (in both their historical and contemporary forms), and a novel analysis of the concept of sensation. Her philosophy of perception begins with the traditional question, ‘What are the objects of sensation?’, but the response is a grammatical rather than ontological enquiry. What, she asks, are the characteristics of the grammatical object of sensation verbs? Anscombe’s (...)
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  17. Sensation-growth equations for non-zero threshold sensation, evaluated using non-traditional, bounded Fechnerian integration, for Fechner’s Law and for Ekman’s Law, using 12 different Weber Fractions.Lance Nizami - 2020 - In InterNoise 2020. Seoul, South Korea: pp. 1-16.
    An ongoing mystery in sensory science is how sensation magnitude F(I), such as loudness, increases with increasing stimulus intensity I. No credible, direct experimental measures exist. Nonetheless, F(I) can be inferred algebraically. Differences in sensation have empirical (but non-quantifiable) minimum sizes called just-noticeable sensation differences, ∆F, which correspond to empirically-measurable just-noticeable intensity differences, ∆I. The ∆Is presumably cumulate from an empirical stimulus-detection threshold I_th up to the intensity of interest, I. Likewise, corresponding ∆Fs cumulate from the (...) at the stimulus-detection threshold, F(I_th ), up to F(I). Regarding the ∆Is, however, it is unlikely that all of them will be known experimentally; the procedures are too lengthy. The customary approach, then, is to find ∆I at a few widely-spaced intensities, and then use those ∆Is to interpolate all ∆Is using some smooth continuous function. The most popular of those functions is Weber’s Law, ∆I⁄I=K. But that is often not even a credible approximation to the data. However, there are other equations for ∆I⁄I. Any such equation for ∆I⁄I can be combined with any equation for ∆F, through calculus, to altogether obtain F(I). Here, two assumptions for ∆F are considered: ∆F=B (Fechner’s Law) and (∆F⁄F)=g (Ekman’s Law). The respective integrals involve lower bounds I_th and F(I_th ). This stands in broad contrast to the literature, which heavily favors non-bounded integrals. We, hence, obtain 24 new, alternative equations for sensation magnitude F(I) (12 equations for (∆I⁄I) × 2 equations for ∆F). (shrink)
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  18. Sensation, Introspection, and the Phenomenal.Jonathan Ellis - 2012 - In Jonathan Ellis & Daniel Guevara (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind. , US: Oxford University Press.
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  19. Emotional sensations and the moral imagination in Malebranche.Jordan Taylor - 2013 - In Henry Martyn Lloyd (ed.), The Discourse of Sensibility: The Knowing Body in the Enlightenment. Springer Cham.
    This paper explores the details of Malebranche‘s philosophy of mind, paying particular attention to the mind-body relationship and the roles of the imagination and the passions. I demonstrate that Malebranche has available an alternative to his deontological ethical system: the alternative I expose is based around his account of the embodied aspects of the mind and the sensations experienced in perception. I briefly argue that Hume, a philosopher already indebted to Malebranche for much inspiration, read Malebranche in the positive way (...)
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  20. Leibniz on Sensation and the Limits of Reason.Walter Ott - 2016 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 33 (2):135-153.
    I argue that Leibniz’s doctrine of sensory representation is intended in part to close an explanatory gap in his philosophical system. Unlike the twentieth century explanatory gap, which stretches between neural states on one side and phenomenal character on the other, Leibniz’s gap lies between experiences of secondary qualities like color and taste and the objects that cause them. The problem is that the precise arrangement and distribution of such experiences can never be given a full explanation. In response, Leibniz (...)
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  21. Hermann Cohen on Kant, Sensations, and Nature in Science.Charlotte Baumann - 2019 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 57 (4):647-674.
    The neo-Kantian Hermann Cohen is famously anti-empiricist in that he denies that sensations can make a definable contribution to knowledge. However, in the second edition of Kant’s Theory of Experience (1885), Cohen considers a proposition that contrasts with both his other work and that of his followers: a Kantian who studies scientific claims to truth—and the grounds on which they are made—cannot limit himself to studying mathematics and logical principles, but needs to also investigate underlying presuppositions about the empirical element (...)
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  22. Ecological Psychology and Enactivism: Perceptually-Guided Action vs. Sensation-Based Enaction1.Catherine Read & Agnes Szokolszky - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11:532803.
    Ecological Psychology and Enactivism both challenge representationist cognitive science, but the two approaches have only begun to engage in dialogue. Further conceptual clarification is required in which differences are as important as common ground. This paper enters the dialogue by focusing on important differences. After a brief account of the parallel histories of Ecological Psychology and Enactivism, we cover incompatibility between them regarding their theories of sensation and perception. First, we show how and why in ecological theory perception is, (...)
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  23. Deleuze’s Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian Duality.Daniel W. Smith - 1991 - In Paul Patton (ed.), Deleuze: A Critical Reader. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 29-56.
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  24. Is Pleasure Sensation? And does that Matter?Jiyao Tang - 2020 - Journal of Human Cognition 4 (2):23-40.
    The goal of this essay is a twofold one. My first task is mainly negative: I want to show that the heated debate over whether pleasure is a sensation misallocates the central task in understanding pleasure and has been based on an unexamined conception of sensation, despite the long philosophical tradition and topical opinions that hold the opposite . My second task is to bring out attention to a relatively uncharted territory in our investigation of pleasure. I shall (...)
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  25. Affine geometry, visual sensation, and preference for symmetry of things in a thing.Birgitta Dresp-Langley - 2016 - Symmetry 127 (8).
    Evolution and geometry generate complexity in similar ways. Evolution drives natural selection while geometry may capture the logic of this selection and express it visually, in terms of specific generic properties representing some kind of advantage. Geometry is ideally suited for expressing the logic of evolutionary selection for symmetry, which is found in the shape curves of vein systems and other natural objects such as leaves, cell membranes, or tunnel systems built by ants. The topology and geometry of symmetry is (...)
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  26. (1 other version)The Intentionality of Sensation and the Problem of Classification of Philosophical Sciences in Brentano’s empirical Psychology.Tănăsescu Ion - 2017 - Axiomathes 27 (3):243-263.
    In the well-known intentionality quote of his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano characterises the mental phenomena through the following features: (i) the intentional inexistence of an object, (ii) the relation to a content, and (iii) the direction toward an object. The text argues that this characterisation is not general because the direction toward an object does not apply to the mental phenomena of sensation. The second part of the paper analyses the consequences that ensue from here for the (...)
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  27. Everyday Thinking about Bodily Sensations.Todd Ganson & Dorit Ganson - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):523-534.
    In the opening section of this paper we spell out an account of our na ve view of bodily sensations that is of historical and philosophical significance. This account of our shared view of bodily sensations captures common ground between Descartes, who endorses an error theory regarding our everyday thinking about bodily sensations, and Berkeley, who is more sympathetic with common sense. In the second part of the paper we develop an alternative to this account and discuss what is at (...)
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  28. What role does sensation play in our awareness of bodily position?Emilia Sandilands - 2011 - Dissertation, Edinburgh
    I attempt to draw out some difficulties with what may at first seem an intuitive and uncontroversial picture of tactile sensation - a picture of tactile sensation as perception of spatial locations where these spatial locations serve as the units out of which we build our awareness of bodily position. Given these shortcomings, rather than continue to labour under this overall picture of tactile sensation as the epistemic foundation of our awareness of bodily position, I reverse the (...)
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  29. Reid and Condillac on Sensation and Perception.Giovanni B. Grandi - 2008 - Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):191-200.
    In order to illustrate the difference between sensation and perception, Reid imagines a blind man that by ‘some strange distemper’ has lost all his notions of external objects, but has retained the power of sensation and reasoning. Reid argues that since sensations do not resemble external objects, the blind man could not possibly infer from them any notion of primary qualities. Condillac proposed a similar thought experiment in the Treatise on Sensations. I argue that Condillac can reach a (...)
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  30. Anscombe on Sensations of Position.Wenqi Yin - 2020 - Journal of Human Cognition 4 (2):4-22.
    Anscombe introduces the notion of "non-observational knowledge" by taking the knowledge one usually has of the position of his limbs as an example. According to her definition two requirements need to be met when we speak of "observing something": first, we can speak of separately describable sensations (call it the SD condition); second, having such sensations is in some sense our criterion for saying something (call it the CS condition). The "sensations of position"-so called by Anscombe-play a central role in (...)
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  31. Beyond the ‘Last Phenomenology’: Rhythmic Modulations in Gilles Deleuze’s The Logic of Sensation.Iain Campbell - 2023 - Deleuze and Guattari Studies 17 (3):301-325.
    This article reconstructs Gilles Deleuze’s engagement with phenomenology, and with the phenomenological problematic of sensation, in his Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation. Considering Deleuze’s adoption, from the phenomenology of art, of notions of sensation and rhythm, it examines how Deleuze complexifies these phenomenological notions by aligning them with his profoundly non-phenomenological notion of the body without organs, as well as with the concepts of modulation and the diagram. In mapping Deleuze’s complexification of rhythm and his development (...)
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  32. Visual Perception as Patterning: Cavendish against Hobbes on Sensation.Marcus Adams - 2016 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 33 (3):193-214.
    Many of Margaret Cavendish’s criticisms of Thomas Hobbes in the Philosophical Letters (1664) relate to the disorder and damage that she holds would result if Hobbesian pressure were the cause of visual perception. In this paper, I argue that her “two men” thought experiment in Letter IV is aimed at a different goal: to show the explanatory potency of her account. First, I connect Cavendish’s view of visual perception as “patterning” to the “two men” thought experiment in Letter IV. Second, (...)
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  33. Consciousness and Mental Qualities for Auditory Sensations.Adriana Renero - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (9-10):179-204.
    The contribution of recent theories of sound and audition has been extremely significant for the development of a philosophy of auditory perception; however, none tackle the question of how our consciousness of auditory states arises. My goal is to show how consciousness about our auditory experience gets triggered. I examine a range of auditory mental phenomena to show how we are able to capture qualitative distinctions of auditory sensations. I argue that our consciousness of auditory states consists in having thoughts (...)
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  34. Par-delà les Mémoires et le roman : dispositif fictionnel et vérité philosophique dans le Traité des sensations de Condillac.Mitia Rioux-Beaulne - 2023 - In Marc-André Bernier & Zeina Hakim (eds.), Mémoires et roman. Les rapports entre vérité et fiction au XVIIIe siècle. Hermann.
    L’étude proposée ici se déroulera en trois moments. Il s’agit, dans un premier temps, de revenir sur la manière dont la question du rapport entre vérité et fiction est posée dans le Traité des sensations de Condillac. Il faut rappeler la justification du recours à la fiction d’une statue gagnant un sens à la fois dans le cadre d’une analyse portant sur l’origine des idées, c’est-à-dire du recours à l’imagination dans le contexte d’une enquête métaphysique ressortissant à la raison. Dans (...)
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  35. Malebranche and the Riddle of Sensation.Walter Ott - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):689-712.
    Like their contemporary counterparts, early modern philosophers find themselves in a predicament. On one hand, there are strong reasons to deny that sensations are representations. For there seems to be nothing in the world for them to represent. On the other hand, some sensory representations seem to be required for us to experience bodies. How else could one perceive the boundaries of a body, except by means of different shadings of color? I argue that Nicolas Malebranche offers an extreme -- (...)
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  36. On small differences in sensation.Charles Peirce & Joseph Jastrow - 1884 - Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences 3:75-83.
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  37. The Interpersonal Variability of Gustatory Sensation and the Prospects for an Alimentary Aesthetics.Vaughn Bryan Baltzly - 2020 - Intervalla 7 (1):6-16.
    We all have different “tastes” for different tastes: some of us have a sweet tooth, while others prefer more subtle flavors; some crave spicy foods, while others cannot stand them. As Bourdieu and others have pointed out, these varying judgments seem to be more than mere preferences; often they reflect (and partially constitute) differences of class and culture. But I want to suggest that we’ve possibly overlooked another important source of these divergent gastronomic evaluations, other than hierarchy and caste: mere (...)
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  38. A framework for the first‑person internal sensation of visual perception in mammals and a comparable circuitry for olfactory perception in Drosophila.Kunjumon Vadakkan - 2015 - Springerplus 4 (833):1-23.
    Perception is a first-person internal sensation induced within the nervous system at the time of arrival of sensory stimuli from objects in the environment. Lack of access to the first-person properties has limited viewing perception as an emergent property and it is currently being studied using third-person observed findings from various levels. One feasible approach to understand its mechanism is to build a hypothesis for the specific conditions and required circuit features of the nodal points where the mechanistic operation (...)
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  39. Thinking with Sensations.Boyd Millar - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (3):134-154.
    If we acknowledge that a perceptual experience’s sensory phenomenology is not inherently representational, we face a puzzle. On the one hand, sensory phenomenology must play an intimate role in the perception of ordinary physical objects; but on the other hand, our experiences’ purely sensory element rarely captures our attention. I maintain that neither indirect realism nor the dual component theory provides a satisfactory solution to this puzzle: indirect realism is inconsistent with the fact that sensory phenomenology typically goes unnoticed by (...)
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  40. Précis of William S. Robinson's Epiphenomenal Mind: An Integrated Outlook on Sensations, Beliefs and Pleasure.William Robinson - manuscript
    This précis summarizes the main topics, arguments and conclusions of the book. Many interesting arguments and critiques have, of course, been omitted in order to make this summary appropriately brief.
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  41. Sensitive Knowledge: Locke on Sensation and Skepticism.Jennifer Nagel - 2016 - In Matthew Stuart (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Locke. Blackwell. pp. 313-333.
    In the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke insists that all knowledge consists in perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. However, he also insists that knowledge extends to outer reality, claiming that perception yields ‘sensitive knowledge’ of the existence of outer objects. Some scholars have argued that Locke did not really mean to restrict knowledge to perceptions of relations within the realm of ideas; others have argued that sensitive knowledge is not strictly speaking a form of knowledge for Locke. (...)
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  42. Sensations, Perceptions and Conceptions. Remarks on Assessability for Accuracy.Carlos Mario Muñoz-Suárez - 2009 - In V. Munz, J. Wang & K. Puhl (eds.), Language and World. [Frankfurt]: Niederösterreichkultur.
    I shall specify about what we are thinking when we are talking about regulating something by specifying accuracy conditions. The main thesis is that we couldn’t describe representational relations as perceptual relationships if we lack a normative conception of relationships between representing and represented. Hence, searching for what it is assessable for accuracy depends on specifying the kind of intentional content which is normatively individuated and attributed.
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  43. Technologies of artificial sensations.Alexey S. Bakhirev - manuscript
    Technologies based on emergence will allow to reproduce sensations on non-biological carriers by making devices feel. These technologies will change fundamentally not only the approach to the creation of artificial intelligence, but also create artificial worlds of a totally different level. Which, unlike virtual models, will really exist for themselves. This approach differs completely from the methods currently used in digital technologies. Possibly the principles described herein will give a rise to many new trends.
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  44. From the Separateness of Space to the Ideality of Sensation. Thoughts on the Possibilities of Actualizing Hegel's Philosophy of Nature.Dieter Wandschneider - 2000 - Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 41 (1-2):86-103.
    The Cartesian concept of nature, which has determined modern thinking until the present time, has become obsolete. It shall be shown that Hegel's objective-idealistic conception of nature discloses, in comparison to that of Descartes, new perspectives for the comprehension of nature and that this, in turn, results in possibilities of actualizing Hegel's philosophy of nature. If the argumentation concerning philosophy of nature is intended to catch up with the concrete Being-of-nature and to meet it in its concretion, then this is (...)
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  45. Bullfighting, Sex and Sensation.Hélène Frichot - 2001 - Colloquy 5.
    The investigation that follows will flex in four directions, backwards and forwards, along the elastic threadthat ties the event of the bullfight to sex and thence a warm spill of sensation. In order to enter the fraythat is the bullfight, I will appropriate a term from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari by way of which eachof the four thrusts I advance, or fights I present, can be read as asignifying ruptures [1] . With thisconcept we are encouraged to question (...)
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  46. Sensory qualities, sensible qualities, sensational qualities.Alex Byrne - 2007 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Philosophers of mind have distinguished (and sometimes conflated) various qualities. This article tries to sort things out.
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  47. Representation and Sensation—A Defence of Deleuze’s Philosophy of Painting.Henry Somers-Hall - 2016 - Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology 3 (1):55-65.
    Deleuze’s philosophy of painting can be seen to pose certain challenges to a phenomenological approach to philosophy. While a phenomenological response to Deleuze’s philosophy is clearly needed, I show in this article how an approach taken in a recent paper by Christian Lotz proves inadequate. Lotz argues that through Deleuze’s refusal to accept the place of representation in art, he is unable to distinguish art from decoration, or to give a coherent account of how the content of art can be (...)
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  48. Somatic aphasia: Mismatch of body sensations with autonomic stress reactivity in psychopathy.Yu Gao, Adrian Raine & Robert A. Schug - 2012 - Biological Psychology 90:228–233.
    Background— Although one of the main characteristics of psychopaths is a deficit in emotion, it is unknown whether they show a fundamental impairment in appropriately recognizing their own body sensations during an emotion-inducing task. Method— Skin conductance and heart rate were recorded in 138 males during a social stressor together with subjective reports of body sensations. Psychopathic traits were assessed using the Psychopathy Checklist – Revised (PCL-R) 2nd edition (Hare, 2003). Results— Nonpsychopathic controls who reported higher body sensations showed higher (...)
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  49. Normativity and Concepts of Bodily Sensations.Kevin Reuter - forthcoming - Studia Philosophica: Jahrbuch Der Schweizerischen Philosoph Ischen Gesellschaft, Annuaire de la Société Suisse de Philosphie .
    This paper challenges the philosophical assumption that bodily sensations are free from normative constraints. It examines the normative status of bodily sensations through two studies: a corpus-linguistic analysis and an experimental investigation. The corpus analysis shows that while emotions are frequently subject to normative judgments concerning their appropriateness, similar attitudes are less evident towards bodily sensations like feelings of pain, hunger and cold. In contrast, however, the experimental study reveals notable differences in conceptions of bodily sensations. It finds that sensations (...)
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  50. Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation (translation).Daniel W. Smith (ed.) - 2003 - London: Continuum.
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