Character, Will, and Agency

In Jonathan Webber & Alberto Masala (eds.), From Personality to Virtue: Essays on the Philosophy of Character. Oxford University Press. pp. 62-80 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Character and the will are rarely discussed together. At most, philosophers working on the one mention the other in an eliminativist vein—if character is represented as something chosen, for example, it can be chalked up to the work of the will; if the will consists merely of a certain arrangement of mental states, it can be seen as little more than a manifestation of character. This mutual neglect appears perfectly justified. If both character and will are determinants of action, to treat them separately would be to overdetermine agency at best, and at worst to fragment it. While defending this reasoning, I argue that things are not so simple, because character and will serve distinct explanatory and normative functions, respectively. The difference in function, however, does not prove that character and will must be ontologically distinct sources of agency; only that our discourse about them must keep them apart.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2016-01-26
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
The Sources of Normativity.Korsgaard, Christine M.

View all 32 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
354 ( #12,531 of 50,265 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
45 ( #13,238 of 50,265 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.