Sharing as speech act

Versus 127:243-258 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Social media platforms allow users to perform different speech acts: status updates could be assertives, a like is an expressive, a friendship request is a directive, and so on. But sharing (or "retweeting") seems to lack a fixed illocutive status: this explains why present controversies concerning the sharing of misinformation have been debated in legal procedure and discussed from the point of view of personal responsibility without reaching a general consensus. The premise of this paper is that the diffusion of false or unwarranted information could be better analyzed if we consider sharing a precisely definable speech act. I will describe some dominant interpretations of the act of sharing that are not, however, sufficient to fully explain it. As an alternative, it will be shown that there is a specific illocutive structure of the act of sharing, which not only consists in asserting the "shareworthiness" or the relevance of a content, but is primarily comparable to an "attention-orienting" directive.

Author's Profile

Emanuele Arielli
Istituto Universitario di Architettura (Venezia)


Added to PP

654 (#26,886)

6 months
204 (#15,599)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?