Meanings Without Species

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

In this paper, I critically assess Mark Richard’s interesting and important development of the claim that linguistic meanings can be fruitfully analogized with biological species. I argue that linguistic meanings qua cluster of interpretative presuppositions need not and often do not display the population-level independence and reproductive isolation that is characteristic of the biological species concept. After developing these problems in some detail, I close with a discussion of their implications for the picture that Richard paints concerning the dangers of conceptual engineering and the prospects for dynamic notions of semantic stability.

Author's Profile

Josh Armstrong
University of California, Los Angeles

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