Primitive Truth

Dialectica 67 (4):503-519 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Conceptual primitivism is the view that truth is among our most basic and fundamental concepts. It cannot be defined, analyzed, or reduced into concepts that are more fundamental. Primitivism is opposed to both traditional attempts at defining truth (in terms of correspondence, coherence, or utility) and deflationary theories that argue that the notion of truth is exhausted by means of the truth schema. Though primitivism might be thought of as a view of last resort, I believe that the view is independently attractive, and can be argued for directly. In this paper I offer what I take to be the strongest argument in favor of conceptual primitivism, which relies upon the Fregean doctrine of the omnipresence of truth.
Reprint years
2013
PhilPapers/Archive ID
ASAPT
Upload history
Archival date: 2013-11-17
View other versions
Added to PP index
2013-11-17

Total views
584 ( #6,744 of 51,208 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
38 ( #15,100 of 51,208 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.