Primitive Truth

Dialectica 67 (4):503-519 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Conceptual primitivism is the view that truth is among our most basic and fundamental concepts. It cannot be defined, analyzed, or reduced into concepts that are more fundamental. Primitivism is opposed to both traditional attempts at defining truth (in terms of correspondence, coherence, or utility) and deflationary theories that argue that the notion of truth is exhausted by means of the truth schema. Though primitivism might be thought of as a view of last resort, I believe that the view is independently attractive, and can be argued for directly. In this paper I offer what I take to be the strongest argument in favor of conceptual primitivism, which relies upon the Fregean doctrine of the omnipresence of truth.
Reprint years
2013
PhilPapers/Archive ID
ASAPT
Revision history
Archival date: 2013-11-17
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy

View all 33 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2013-11-17

Total views
446 ( #5,320 of 38,069 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
68 ( #5,329 of 38,069 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.