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  1. Frege's equivalence thesis and reference failure.Nathan Hawkins - 2021 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 28 (1):198-222.
    Frege claims that sentences of the form ‘A’ are equivalent to sentences of the form ‘it is true that A’ (The Equivalence Thesis). Frege also says that there are fictional names that fail to refer, and that sentences featuring fictional names fail to refer as a result. The thoughts such sentences express, Frege says, are also fictional, and neither true nor false. Michael Dummett argues that these claims are inconsistent. But his argument requires clarification, since there are two ways The (...)
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  2. Truth in Frege.Richard Heck & Robert May - 2018 - In Michael Glanzberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 193-213.
    A general survey of Frege's views on truth, the paper explores the problems in response to which Frege's distinctive view that sentences refer to truth-values develops. It also discusses his view that truth-values are objects and the so-called regress argument for the indefinability of truth. Finally, we consider, very briefly, the question whether Frege was a deflationist.
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  3. Primitive Truth.Jamin Asay - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):503-519.
    Conceptual primitivism is the view that truth is among our most basic and fundamental concepts. It cannot be defined, analyzed, or reduced into concepts that are more fundamental. Primitivism is opposed to both traditional attempts at defining truth (in terms of correspondence, coherence, or utility) and deflationary theories that argue that the notion of truth is exhausted by means of the truth schema. Though primitivism might be thought of as a view of last resort, I believe that the view is (...)
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  4. (2 other versions)Frege's Contribution to Philosophy of Language.Richard Heck & Robert May - 2005 - In Ernie Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 3-39.
    This paper discusses the question to what extent Frege made serious use of semantical notions such as reference and truth. It focuses on his apparent uses of these notions in his apparently semantical discussions of his formal system in Grundgesetze der Arithmetik and defends the view that they are to be taken at face value. This paper is in some ways a companion to "Grundgesetze der Arithmetik I §§29-32", in which there is an extended, but mostly technical, discussion of Frege's (...)
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  5. (2 other versions)Frege's Contribution to Philosophy of Language.Richard Heck & Robert May - 2005 - In Ernie Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 3-39.
    An investigation of Frege’s various contributions to the study of language, focusing on three of his most famous doctrines: that concepts are unsaturated, that sentences refer to truth-values, and that sense must be distinguished from reference.
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