TRUTH: A Concept Unlike Any Other

Synthese:1-26 (forthcoming)
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This paper explores the nature of the concept of truth. It does not offer an analysis or definition of truth, or an account of how it relates to other concepts. Instead, it explores what sort of concept truth is by considering what sorts of thoughts it enables us to think. My conclusion is that truth is a part of each and every propositional thought. The concept of truth is therefore best thought of as the ability to token propositional thoughts. I explore what implications this view has for existing accounts of concepts (such as prototypes, exemplars, and theories), and argue that truth is a concept unlike any other.
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Archival date: 2017-12-15
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References found in this work BETA
A Study of Concepts.PEACOCKE, Christopher
Doing Without Concepts.Machery, Edouard
Truth and Objectivity.Wright, Crispin
Truth.Horwich, Paul

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