Appropriate Belief Without Evidence

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Abstract
ABSTRACT In this paper I defend a version of Wittgensteininan contextualism. This is a view about justification on which some beliefs are epistemically appropriate because evidence cannot be adduced in their favour. I trace the history of the view from Wittgenstein and Ortega to the present day, defend one version from the charge of relativism, and suggest some applications of the view both within and without philosophy.
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Archival date: 2019-07-23
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2019-07-23

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