Are Frege cases exceptions to intentional generalizations?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):1-22 (2001)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This piece criticizes Fodor's argument (in The Elm and the Expert, 1994) for the claim that Frege cases should be treated as exceptions to (broad) psychological generalizations rather than as counterexamples.
Categories
ISBN(s)
0045-5091
PhilPapers/Archive ID
AYDAFC
Upload history
Archival date: 2011-02-11
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
602 ( #7,039 of 53,589 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
32 ( #20,989 of 53,589 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.