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  1. Thoughts about Thoughts: The Structure of Fregean Propositions.Nathan Bice - 2019 - Dissertation, Columbia University
    This dissertation is about the structure of thought. Following Gottlob Frege, I define a thought as the sort of content relevant to determining whether an assertion is true or false. The historical component of the dissertation involves interpreting Frege’s actual views on the structure of thought. I argue that Frege did not think that a thought has a unique decomposition into its component senses, but rather the same thought can be decomposed into senses in a variety of distinct ways. I (...)
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  2. Frege's Puzzle and the Meaning of Words.Graham Seth Moore - 2020 - 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology.
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  3. Frege and the Logic of Sense and Reference.Kevin C. Klement - 2001 - New York: Routledge.
    This book aims to develop certain aspects of Gottlob Frege’s theory of meaning, especially those relevant to intensional logic. It offers a new interpretation of the nature of senses, and attempts to devise a logical calculus for the theory of sense and reference that captures as closely as possible the views of the historical Frege. (The approach is contrasted with the less historically-minded Logic of Sense and Denotation of Alonzo Church.) Comparisons of Frege’s theory with those of Russell and others (...)
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  4. Solving Frege's puzzle.Richard Heck - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (1-2):728-732.
    So-called 'Frege cases' pose a challenge for anyone who would hope to treat the contents of beliefs (and similar mental states) as Russellian propositions: It is then impossible to explain people's behavior in Frege cases without invoking non-intentional features of their mental states, and doing that seems to undermine the intentionality of psychological explanation. In the present paper, I develop this sort of objection in what seems to me to be its strongest form, but then offer a response to it. (...)
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  5. An analysis of two accounts on the sense of singular terms.Alan Schwerin - 1988 - Dialectica 42 (3):221-231.
    This paper is a critical investigation of Gottlob Frege's and Bertrand Russell's views on the sense or meaning of singular terms. In his famous "On denoting" Russell erects his case on objections that he raises against Frege. I suggest that Russell's criticisms of Frege are seriously misguided, due in large measure to the uneven applications of his terminology when addressing Frege's views.
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  6. Are Frege cases exceptions to intentional generalizations?Murat Aydede & Philip Robbins - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):1-22.
    This piece criticizes Fodor's argument (in The Elm and the Expert, 1994) for the claim that Frege cases should be treated as exceptions to (broad) psychological generalizations rather than as counterexamples.
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  7. Fodor on concepts and Frege puzzles.Murat Aydede - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):289-294.
    ABSTRACT. Fodor characterizes concepts as consisting of two dimensions: one is content, which is purely denotational/broad, the other the Mentalese vehicle bearing that content, which Fodor calls the Mode of Presentation (MOP), understood "syntactically." I argue that, so understood, concepts are not interpersonally sharable; so Fodor's own account violates what he calls the Publicity Constraint in his (1998) book. Furthermore, I argue that Fodor's non-semantic, or "syntactic," solution to Frege cases succumbs to the problem of providing interpersonally applicable functional roles (...)
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  8. Russell's Paradox in Appendix B of the Principles of Mathematics : Was Frege's response adequate?Kevin C. Klement - 2001 - History and Philosophy of Logic 22 (1):13-28.
    In their correspondence in 1902 and 1903, after discussing the Russell paradox, Russell and Frege discussed the paradox of propositions considered informally in Appendix B of Russell’s Principles of Mathematics. It seems that the proposition, p, stating the logical product of the class w, namely, the class of all propositions stating the logical product of a class they are not in, is in w if and only if it is not. Frege believed that this paradox was avoided within his philosophy (...)
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Frege: Sinn
  1. Frege on the Tolerability of Sense Variation: A Reply to Michaelson and Textor.Bryan Pickel & J. Adam Carter - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    In several passages, Frege suggests that successful communication requires that speaker and audience understand the uttered words and sentences to have the same sense. On the other hand, Frege concedes that, in many ordinary cases, variation in sense is tolerable. In a recent article in this journal, Michaelson and Textor (2023) offer a new interpretation of Frege on the tolerability of sense variation according to which variation in sense is tolerable when the conversation aims at joint action, but not when (...)
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  2. Tolerating Sense Variation.Eliot Michaelson & Mark Textor - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):182-196.
    Frege famously claimed that variations in the sense of a proper name can sometimes be ‘tolerated’. In this paper, we offer a novel explanation of this puzzling claim. Frege, we argue, follows Trendelenburg in holding that we think in language—sometimes individually and sometimes together. Variations in sense can be tolerated in just those cases where we are using language to coordinate our actions but are not engaged in thinking together about an issue.
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  3. Frege, Sentence-questions, Questions, and Thoughts: a dialogue.Nathan William Davies - manuscript
    In the last forty years Dummett, Hanks, Künne, and Bobzien have claimed that when Frege wrote ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, he thought that the sense of a sentence-question [Satzfrage] was not a thought [Gedanke] ((Dummett 1981: 307–308); (Hanks 2007: 142–143); (Künne 2010: 427–429); (Bobzien 2021: 163–164)). Recently, Textor has claimed that when Frege wrote ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, he thought that the sense of a sentence-question was not a question [Frage] (Textor 2021: 227 fn.2). I think it is possible that (...)
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  4. Frege and saving substitution.Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2687-2697.
    Goodman and Lederman (2020) argue that the traditional Fregean strategy for preserving the validity of Leibniz’s Law of substitution fails when confronted with apparent counterexamples involving proper names embedded under propositional attitude verbs. We argue, on the contrary, that the Fregean strategy succeeds and that Goodman and Lederman’s argument misfires.
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  5. On the notion of Meaning that Dummett accredits to Frege.Leonardo Gomes de Soutello Videira - 2018 - Analytica. Revista de Filosofia 22 (1):165-176.
    In this paper I will discuss Dummett’s interpretation of Frege’s “On sense and reference” that takes place in his Frege: Philosophy of Language, where he attributes a notion of meaning to Frege that is not explicit on the text of “On sense and reference”. I believe that this attribution is incompatible with what Frege is really saying in the article and with the partition of the notion that Dummett himself exposes.
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  6. On Frege's Supposed Hierarchy of Senses.Nicholas Georgalis - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper argues against the claim that Frege is committed to an infinite hierarchy of senses. Carnap and Kripke, along with many others, argue the contrary; I expose where all such arguments go astray. Invariably these arguments assume (without citation) that Frege holds that sense and reference are always distinct. This is the fulcrum upon which the hierarchy is hoisted. The counter to this assumption is based on two important but neglected passages. The locution ‘indirect sense’ has no ontological significance (...)
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  7. Frege Cases and Bad Psychological Laws.Mahrad Almotahari & Aidan Gray - 2021 - Mind 130 (520):1253-1280.
    We draw attention to a series of implicit assumptions that have structured the debate about Frege’s Puzzle. Once these assumptions are made explicit, we rely on them to show that if one focuses exclusively on the issues raised by Frege cases, then one obtains a powerful consideration against a fine-grained conception of propositional-attitude content. In light of this consideration, a form of Russellianism about content becomes viable.
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  8. The Diversity of Sense: An Appreciation of Frege’s Theory of Sense.Dr Sanjit Chakraborty - 2011 - Indian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 4 (2):79-96.
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  9. Objects of Thought.Ian Rumfitt - 2016 - In Gary Ostertag (ed.), Meanings and Other Things: Essays on the Philosophy of Stephen Schiffer. Oxford University Press.
    In his book The Things We Mean, Stephen Schiffer advances a subtle defence of what he calls the ‘face-value’ analysis of attributions of belief and reports of speech. Under this analysis, ‘Harold believes that there is life on Venus’ expresses a relation between Harold and a certain abstract object, the proposition that there is life on Venus. The present essay first proposes an improvement to Schiffer’s ‘pleonastic’ theory of propositions. It then challenges the face-value analysis. There will be such things (...)
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  10. Frege's Paradise and the Paradoxes.Sten Lindström - 2003 - In Krister Segerberg & Rysiek Sliwinski (eds.), A Philosophical Smorgasbord: Essays on Action, Truth and Other Things in Honour of Fredrick Stoutland. Uppsala Philosophical Studies 52.
    The main objective of this paper is to examine how theories of truth and reference that are in a broad sense Fregean in character are threatened by antinomies; in particular by the Epimenides paradox and versions of the so-called Russell-Myhill antinomy, an intensional analogue of Russell’s more well-known paradox for extensions. Frege’s ontology of propositions and senses has recently received renewed interest in connection with minimalist theories that take propositions (thoughts) and senses (concepts) as the primary bearers of truth and (...)
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  11. Arguing for Frege's Fundamental Principle.Bryan Frances - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (3):341–346.
    Saul Kripke's puzzle about belief demonstrates the lack of soundness of the traditional argument for the Fregean fundamental principle that the sentences 'S believes that a is F' and 'S believes that b is F' can differ in truth value even if a = b. This principle is a crucial premise in the traditional Fregean argument for the existence of semantically relevant senses, individuative elements of beliefs that are sensitive to our varying conceptions of what the beliefs are about. Joseph (...)
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  12. The number of senses.Kevin C. Klement - 2003 - Erkenntnis 58 (3):303 - 323.
    Many philosophers still countenance senses or meanings in the broadly Fregean vein. However, it is difficult to posit the existence of senses without positing quite a lot of them, including at least one presenting every entity in existence. I discuss a number of Cantorian paradoxes that seem to result from an overly large metaphysics of senses, and various possible solutions. Certain more deflationary and nontraditional understanding of senses, and to what extent they fare better in solving the problems, are also (...)
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Frege: Criteria for Sense Identity
  1. الثقافة بين الأنا والآخر-مقاربات للتفكير.الصديق الصادقي العماري & Seddik Sadiki Amari - 2021 - Errostomiya Journal مجلة الرستومية 1:27-49.
    عنوان المقالة: الثقافة بين الأنا والآخر-مقاربات للتفكير.. الاسم الكامل: الصديق الصادقي العماري... .جامعة سيدي محمد بن عبد الله، فاس، المغرب.... ....التخصص: علم الاجتماع...... ...ملخص: .... لكل أمة ثقافة تعبر عن كينونتها، وتعكس طبيعتها، وتسجل إنتاجاتها المتراكمة عبر التاريخ، فتخلق منها أمة ذات تفردات تميزها عن غيرها من الأمم. وكذلك هي الثقافة في تميزها عن الثقافات السائدة، سواء في الزمن الواحد، أو في أزمنة متطاولة، وإن كانت تأخذ عنها، وتقتبس منها، وتتلاقح معها، فتتقارب، وتتحاور، وتتفاعل بطرق متباينة، فتكتسب قوة في المناعة، (...)
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  2. Listy Gottloba Fregego. Uwagi o polskim wydaniu [rec. Gottlob Frege: Korespondencja naukowa]. [REVIEW]Krystian Bogucki - 2023 - Folia Philosophica 48:1-24. Translated by Andrzej Painta, Marta Ples-Bęben, Mateusz Jurczyński & Lidia Obojska.
    The present article reviews the Polish-language edition of Gottlob Frege’s scientific correspondence. In the article, I discuss the material hitherto unpublished in Polish in relation to the remainder of Frege’s works. First of all, I inquire into the role and nature of definitions. Then, I consider Frege’s recognition criteria for sameness of thoughts. In the article’s third part, I study letters devoted to the principle of semantic compositionality, while in the fourth part I discuss Frege’s remarks concerning the context principle.
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  3. Frege’s Epistemic Criterion of Thought Individuation.Nathan Hawkins - 2022 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (3):420-448.
    Frege believes that the content of declarative sentences divides into a thought and its ‘colouring’, perhaps combined with assertoric force. He further thinks it is important to separate the thought from its colouring. To do this, a criterion which determines sameness of sense between sentences must be deployed. But Frege provides three criteria for this task, each of which adjudicate on different grounds. In this article, rather than expand on criticisms levelled at two of the criteria offered, the author focuses (...)
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  4. Sense, reference, and computation.Bruno Bentzen - 2020 - Perspectiva Filosófica 47 (2):179-203.
    In this paper, I revisit Frege's theory of sense and reference in the constructive setting of the meaning explanations of type theory, extending and sharpening a program–value analysis of sense and reference proposed by Martin-Löf building on previous work of Dummett. I propose a computational identity criterion for senses and argue that it validates what I see as the most plausible interpretation of Frege's equipollence principle for both sentences and singular terms. Before doing so, I examine Frege's implementation of his (...)
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  5. Freges Kriterien der Sinngleichheit.Thorsten Sander - 2016 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 98 (4):395-432.
    Frege's mature writings apparently contain two different criteria of sense identity. While in "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" (1892) and in "Kurze Übersicht meiner logischen Lehren" (1906?) he seems to advocate a psychological criterion, his letter to Husserl of December 12, 1906 offers a thoroughly logical criterion of sense identity. It is argued that the latter proposal is not a "momentary aberration", but rather Frege's official criterion; his psychological criteria only serve as a way of illustrating questions of sense identity by (...)
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  6. Slicing Thoughts.Vojislav Bozickovic - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (1):3-13.
    According to a criterion of difference for thoughts derived from Frege, two thoughts are different if it is at the same time possible for a rational subject to take conflicting epistemic attitudes toward them. But applying this criterion to perception-based demonstrative thoughts seems to slice thoughts too finely and lead to their proliferation which makes the criterion implausible. I argue that such a proliferation of thoughts is blocked by transforming this criterion into a related one that is shown to be (...)
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  7. Sameness of Fregean sense.Susanna Schellenberg - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):163-175.
    This paper develops a criterion for sameness of Fregean senses. I consider three criteria: logical equivalence, intensional isomorphism, and epistemic equipollence. I reject the first two and argue for a version of the third.
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  8. Frege, sense and limited rationality.Carlo Penco - 2003 - History of Modern Logic 9:53-65.
    In this paper, I will discuss a well-known oscillation in Frege’s conception of sense. My point is only partially concerned with his two different criteria of sense identity, and touches upon a more specific point: what happens if we apply Frege’s intuitive criterion for the difference of thoughts to logically equivalent sentences? I will try to make a schematic argument here that will preempt any endeavor to make Frege more coherent than he really is. In sections A and B, I (...)
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  9. Frege: Two theses, two senses.Carlo Penco - 2003 - History and Philosophy of Logic 24 (2):87-109.
    One particular topic in the literature on Frege’s conception of sense relates to two apparently contradictory theses held by Frege: the isomorphism of thought and language on one hand and the expressibility of a thought by different sentences on the other. I will divide the paper into five sections. In (1) I introduce the problem of the tension in Frege’s thought. In (2) I discuss the main attempts to resolve the conflict between Frege’s two contradictory claims, showing what is wrong (...)
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Frege: Thoughts
  1. Do Thoughts Have Parts? Peter Abelard: Yes! Alberic of Paris: No!Boaz Faraday Schuman - 2024 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-25.
    Spoken sentences have parts. Therefore they take time to speak. For instance, when you say, “Socrates is running”, you begin by uttering the subject term ("Socrates"), before carrying on to the predicate. But are the corresponding predications in thought also composite? And are such thoughts extended across time, like their spoken counterparts? Peter Abelard gave an affirmative response to both questions. Alberic of Paris denied the first and, as a corollary, denied the second. Here, I first set out Abelard’s account. (...)
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  2. Metaphysical separatism and epistemological autonomy in Frege’s philosophy and beyond.Jim Hutchinson - 2022 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 30 (6):1096-1120.
    Commentators regularly attribute to Frege realist, idealist, and quietist responses to metaphysical questions concerning the abstract objects he calls ‘thoughts’. But despite decades of effort, the evidence offered on behalf of these attributions remains unconvincing. I argue that Frege deliberately avoids commitment to any of these positions, as part of a metaphysical separatist policy motivated by the fact that logic is epistemologically autonomous from metaphysics. Frege’s views and arguments prove relevant to current attempts to argue for epistemological autonomy, particularly that (...)
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  3. Demythologizing the Third Realm: Frege on Grasping Thoughts.B. Scot Rousse - 2015 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 3 (1).
    In this paper, I address some puzzles about Frege’s conception of how we “grasp” thoughts. I focus on an enigmatic passage that appears near the end of Frege’s great essay “The Thought.” In this passage Frege refers to a “non-sensible something” without which “everyone would remain shut up in his inner world.” I consider and criticize Wolfgang Malzkorn’s interpretation of the passage. According to Malzkorn, Frege’s view is that ideas [Vorstellungen] are the means by which we grasp thoughts. My counter-proposal (...)
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  4. Frege's Paradise and the Paradoxes.Sten Lindström - 2003 - In Krister Segerberg & Rysiek Sliwinski (eds.), A Philosophical Smorgasbord: Essays on Action, Truth and Other Things in Honour of Fredrick Stoutland. Uppsala Philosophical Studies 52.
    The main objective of this paper is to examine how theories of truth and reference that are in a broad sense Fregean in character are threatened by antinomies; in particular by the Epimenides paradox and versions of the so-called Russell-Myhill antinomy, an intensional analogue of Russell’s more well-known paradox for extensions. Frege’s ontology of propositions and senses has recently received renewed interest in connection with minimalist theories that take propositions (thoughts) and senses (concepts) as the primary bearers of truth and (...)
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  5. The composition of Fregean thoughts.Harold T. Hodes - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 41 (2):161 - 178.
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  6. Does Frege have too many thoughts? A Cantorian problem revisited.Kevin C. Klement - 2005 - Analysis 65 (1):45–49.
    This paper continues a thread in Analysis begun by Adam Rieger and Nicholas Denyer. Rieger argued that Frege’s theory of thoughts violates Cantor’s theorem by postulating as many thoughts as concepts. Denyer countered that Rieger’s construction could not show that the thoughts generated are always distinct for distinct concepts. By focusing on universally quantified thoughts, rather than thoughts that attribute a concept to an individual, I give a different construction that avoids Denyer’s problem. I also note that this problem for (...)
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Frege: Parts of Thoughts
  1. Frege on thoughts and their structure.José Luis Bermúdez - 2001 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 4:87-105.
    The idea that thoughts are structured is essential to Frege's understanding of thoughts. A basic tenet of his thinking was that the structure of a sentence can serve as a model for the structure of a thought. Recent commentators have, however, identified tensions between that principle and certain other doctrines Frege held about thoughts. This paper suggests that the tensions identified by Dummett and Bell are not really tensions at all. In establishing the case against Dummett and Bell the paper (...)
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  2. The Composition of Thoughts.Richard Heck & Robert May - 2010 - Noûs 45 (1):126-166.
    Are Fregean thoughts compositionally complex and composed of senses? We argue that, in Begriffsschrift, Frege took 'conceptual contents' to be unstructured, but that he quickly moved away from this position, holding just two years later that conceptual contents divide of themselves into 'function' and 'argument'. This second position is shown to be unstable, however, by Frege's famous substitution puzzle. For Frege, the crucial question the puzzle raises is why "The Morning Star is a planet" and "The Evening Star is a (...)
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Frege: Bedeutung
  1. Tolerating Sense Variation.Eliot Michaelson & Mark Textor - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):182-196.
    Frege famously claimed that variations in the sense of a proper name can sometimes be ‘tolerated’. In this paper, we offer a novel explanation of this puzzling claim. Frege, we argue, follows Trendelenburg in holding that we think in language—sometimes individually and sometimes together. Variations in sense can be tolerated in just those cases where we are using language to coordinate our actions but are not engaged in thinking together about an issue.
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  2. On Frege's Supposed Hierarchy of Senses.Nicholas Georgalis - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper argues against the claim that Frege is committed to an infinite hierarchy of senses. Carnap and Kripke, along with many others, argue the contrary; I expose where all such arguments go astray. Invariably these arguments assume (without citation) that Frege holds that sense and reference are always distinct. This is the fulcrum upon which the hierarchy is hoisted. The counter to this assumption is based on two important but neglected passages. The locution ‘indirect sense’ has no ontological significance (...)
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  3. Frege and Husserl: The Ontology of Reference.Barry Smith - 1978 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 9 (2):111–125.
    Analytic philosophers apply the term ‘object’ both to concreta and to abstracta of certain kinds. The theory of objects which this implies is shown to rest on a dichotomy between object-entities on the one hand and meaning-entities on the other, and it is suggested that the most adequate account of the latter is provided by Husserl’s theory of noemata. A two-story ontology of objects and meanings (concepts, classes) is defended, and Löwenheim’s work on class-representatives is cited as an indication of (...)
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Frege: Indirect Reference
  1. Frege, "that"-clauses, underlining.Nathan William Davies - manuscript
    I draw attention to two questions which arise from: Frege’s underlining in a letter to Russell, some of his remarks in ‘Meine grundlegenden logischen Einsichten’/‘My basic logical insights’, and a plausible thesis regarding indirect Bedeutungen. Addressing these questions is necessary for a proper understanding of Frege’s account of „dass“-sentences/“that”-clauses.
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  2. Frege’s Infinite Hierarchy of Senses.Lukas Skiba - 2022 - The Reasoner 16 (7):63-64.
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  3. Frege on indirect sense: a reply to Georgalis.Nathan William Davies - manuscript
    Georgalis claimed that when Frege wrote ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’ Frege thought that the indirect [ungerade] sense of an expression was identical to its normal [gewöhnlich] sense (Georgalis 2022: e.g. 4, 5, 13). In this paper, I present five arguments for the falsity of Georgalis’ claim which are based on three pieces of apparent counterevidence: a passage from Frege’s letter to Russell dated 28.12.1902; a passage from Frege’s letter to Russell dated 20.10.1902; and a passage from ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’. (...)
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  4. Frege, Sentence-questions, Questions, and Thoughts: a dialogue.Nathan William Davies - manuscript
    In the last forty years Dummett, Hanks, Künne, and Bobzien have claimed that when Frege wrote ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, he thought that the sense of a sentence-question [Satzfrage] was not a thought [Gedanke] ((Dummett 1981: 307–308); (Hanks 2007: 142–143); (Künne 2010: 427–429); (Bobzien 2021: 163–164)). Recently, Textor has claimed that when Frege wrote ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, he thought that the sense of a sentence-question was not a question [Frage] (Textor 2021: 227 fn.2). I think it is possible that (...)
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  5. Frege and saving substitution.Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2687-2697.
    Goodman and Lederman (2020) argue that the traditional Fregean strategy for preserving the validity of Leibniz’s Law of substitution fails when confronted with apparent counterexamples involving proper names embedded under propositional attitude verbs. We argue, on the contrary, that the Fregean strategy succeeds and that Goodman and Lederman’s argument misfires.
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  6. On Frege's Supposed Hierarchy of Senses.Nicholas Georgalis - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper argues against the claim that Frege is committed to an infinite hierarchy of senses. Carnap and Kripke, along with many others, argue the contrary; I expose where all such arguments go astray. Invariably these arguments assume (without citation) that Frege holds that sense and reference are always distinct. This is the fulcrum upon which the hierarchy is hoisted. The counter to this assumption is based on two important but neglected passages. The locution ‘indirect sense’ has no ontological significance (...)
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  7. Frege Cases and Bad Psychological Laws.Mahrad Almotahari & Aidan Gray - 2021 - Mind 130 (520):1253-1280.
    We draw attention to a series of implicit assumptions that have structured the debate about Frege’s Puzzle. Once these assumptions are made explicit, we rely on them to show that if one focuses exclusively on the issues raised by Frege cases, then one obtains a powerful consideration against a fine-grained conception of propositional-attitude content. In light of this consideration, a form of Russellianism about content becomes viable.
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  8. The myth of occurrence-based semantics.Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern - 2021 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44:813-837.
    The principle of compositionality requires that the meaning of a complex expression remains the same after substitution of synonymous expressions. Alleged counterexamples to compositionality seem to force a theoretical choice: either apparent synonyms are not synonyms or synonyms do not syntactically occur where they appear to occur. Some theorists have instead looked to Frege’s doctrine of “reference shift” according to which the meaning of an expression is sensitive to its linguistic context. This doctrine is alleged to retain the relevant claims (...)
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  9. A Problem in the Frege-Church Theory of Sense and Denotation.Nathan Salmon - 1993 - Noûs 27 (2):158-166.
    There is an inconsistency among claims made (or apparently made) in separate articles by Alonzo Church concerning Frege's distinction between sense and denotation taken together with plausible assertions by Frege concerning his notion of ungerade Sinn-i.e., the sense that an expression allegedly takes on in positions in which it has ungerade Bedeutung, denoting its own customary sense. As with any inconsistency, the difficulty can be avoided by relinquishing one of the joint assumptions from which contradiction may be derived. Yet what (...)
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Frege: Sinn and Bedeutung, Misc
  1. Relational approaches to Frege's puzzle.Aidan Gray - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (10):e12429.
    Frege's puzzle is a fundamental challenge for accounts of mental and linguistic representation. This piece surveys a family of recent approaches to the puzzle that posit representational relations. I identify the central commitments of relational approaches and present several arguments for them. I also distinguish two kinds of relationism—semantic relationism and formal relationism—corresponding to two conceptions of representational relations. I briefly discuss the consequences of relational approaches for foundational questions about propositional attitudes, intentional explanation, and compositionality.
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