Deliberators Must Be Imperfect

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):321-347 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper argues that, with certain provisos, predicting one's future actions is incompatible with rationally deliberating about whether to perform those actions. It follows that fully rational omniscient agents are impossible, since an omniscient being could never rationally deliberate about what to do . Consequently, theories that explain practical reasons in terms of the choices of a perfectly rational omniscient agent must fail. The paper considers several ways of defending the possibility of an omniscient agent, and concludes that while some of these may work, they are inconsistent with the aim of explaining practical normativity by appeal to such an agent.

Author's Profile

Derek Baker
Frankfurt School of Finance and Management

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-04-05

Downloads
1,336 (#10,953)

6 months
136 (#31,608)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?