A Probabilistic Defense of Proper De Jure Objections to Theism

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
A common view among nontheists combines the de jure objection that theism is epistemically unacceptable with agnosticism about the de facto objection that theism is false. Following Plantinga, we can call this a “proper” de jure objection—a de jure objection that does not depend on any de facto objection. In his Warranted Christian Belief, Plantinga has produced a general argument against all proper de jure objections. Here I first show that this argument is logically fallacious (it makes subtle probabilistic fallacies disguised by scope ambiguities), and proceed to lay the groundwork for the construction of actual proper de jure objections.
Reprint years
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-04-23
View other versions
Added to PP

368 (#22,164)

6 months
24 (#35,749)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?