The Current Epistemic Status of the Indispensability Arguments in the Philosophy of Science

Analele Universitatii Din Craiova 36 (2):108-132 (2016)
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Abstract
The predisposition of the Indispensability Argument to objections, rephrasing and versions associated with the various views in philosophy of mathematics grants it a special status of a “blueprint” type rather than a debatable theme in the philosophy of science. From this point of view, it follows that the Argument has more an epistemic character than ontological.
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