Thing causation

Noûs 58 (4):1050-1072 (2024)
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Abstract

According to orthodoxy, the most fundamental kind of causation involves one event causing another event. I argue against this event‐causal view. Instead, the most fundamental kind of causation is thing causation, which involves a thing causing a thing to do something. Event causation is reducible to thing causation, but thing causation is not reducible to event causation, because event causation cannot accommodate cases of fine‐grained causation. I defend my view from objections, including C. D. Broad's influential “timing” argument, and I conclude with implications for agent‐causal theories of free will.

Author's Profile

Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt
Center for Advanced Studies, Berlin: Human Abilities & Freie Universität Berlin

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