Corporeal Substances and True Unities: Abstract

The Leibniz Review 4:9-10 (1994)
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In the correspondence with Arnauld, Leibniz contends that each corporeal substance has a substantial form. In support he argues that to be real a corporeal substance must be one and indivisible, a true unity. I will show how this argument precludes a tempting interpretation of corporeal substances as composite unities. Rather it mandates the interpretation that each corporeal substance is a single monad.

Author's Profile

Donald L. M. Baxter
University of Connecticut


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