Assertion, knowledge and predictions

Analysis 72 (1):102-105 (2012)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
John N. Williams (1994) and Matthew Weiner (2005) invoke predictions in order to undermine the normative relevance of knowledge for assertions; in particular, Weiner argues, predictions are important counterexamples to the Knowledge Account of Assertion (KAA). I argue here that they are not true counterexamples at all, a point that can be agreed upon even by those who reject KAA.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BENAKA
Upload history
First archival date: 2011-06-20
Latest version: 5 (2020-01-03)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2011-06-20

Total views
607 ( #6,408 of 51,441 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
67 ( #7,626 of 51,441 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.