Assertion, knowledge and predictions

Analysis 72 (1):102-105 (2012)
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Abstract

John N. Williams (1994) and Matthew Weiner (2005) invoke predictions in order to undermine the normative relevance of knowledge for assertions; in particular, Weiner argues, predictions are important counterexamples to the Knowledge Account of Assertion (KAA). I argue here that they are not true counterexamples at all, a point that can be agreed upon even by those who reject KAA.

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Matthew A. Benton
Seattle Pacific University

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