Epistemological Aspects of Hope

In Claudia Blöser & Titus Stahl (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Hope. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Hope is an attitude with a distinctive epistemological dimension: it is incompatible with knowledge. This chapter examines hope as it relates to knowledge but also to probability and inductive considerations. Such epistemic constraints can make hope either impossible, or, when hope remains possible, they affect how one’s epistemic situation can make hope rational rather than irrational. Such issues are especially relevant to when hopefulness may permissibly figure in practical deliberation over a course of action. So I consider cases of second-order inductive reflection on when one should, or should not, hope for an outcome with which one has a long record of experience: in other words, what is the epistemology behind when one should, if ever, stop hoping for outcomes which have failed one many times in the past?
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BENEAO-4
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-04-15
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2019-04-15

Total views
40 ( #31,525 of 38,902 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
40 ( #10,786 of 38,902 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.