Expert Opinion and Second‐Hand Knowledge

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Expert testimony figures in recent debates over how best to understand the norm of assertion and the domain-specific epistemic expectations placed on testifiers. Cases of experts asserting with only isolated second-hand knowledge (Lackey 2011, 2013) have been used to shed light on whether knowledge is sufficient for epistemically permissible assertion. I argue that relying on such cases of expert testimony introduces several problems concerning how we understand expert knowledge, and the sharing of such knowledge through testimony. Refinements are needed to clarify exactly what principles are being tested by such cases; but once refined, such cases raise more questions than they answer.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
First archival date: 2014-03-30
Latest version: 3 (2016-04-28)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Knowledge in an Uncertain World.Fantl, Jeremy & McGrath, Matthew
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Knowing Full Well.Sosa, Ernest

View all 32 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Epistemology Personalized.Benton, Matthew A.
Hedged Assertion.Benton, Matthew A. & Van Elswyk, Peter

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
435 ( #7,243 of 42,959 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
21 ( #27,295 of 42,959 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.