Fondazione del problema del pensare

Segni E Comprensione 21 (62):124-140 (2007)
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Abstract
My main claim is that, in order to account for the nature of human mind, philosophy of mind should embody topics usually treated by disciplines as ethics or applied philosophy so as to enrich the pure notion of cognitive experience to the extent of treating the whole of human experience. I begin with considering the Cartesian approach to the "cogito". I argue for the claim that cartesian-like dualists (Descartes and Locke, Kant and Husserl) fail in treating the opposition of internalism and externalism concerning experience. This failure commits them to a form of epistemological idealism unable to manage the "veil of perception" objection. I then settle a provisional account for the mind, mainly dependent on a Berkeleyan-Humean deflationist approach to it, showing the necessity to incorporate in it robust practical topics from an ontological point of view.
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Archival date: 2014-06-11
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