Others matter. The failure of the autonomous approach to ethics

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Abstract
The critical target of my paper is the normativist stance of Kantian meta ethics. After a very short introduction, I develop a characterization of contemporary mainstream Kantism as a conjunction of a normativist claim, a rationalist claim and a proceduralist claim. In the subsequent section I make the case against the normativist claim by drawing a counterexample, and defend the relevance of such counterexample as a reason that defeats the appeal of the Kantian approach to meta ethics. I finally conclude by highlighting the main reasons why the challenge my counterexample rises are not answerable within a Kantian framework.
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Archival date: 2016-11-07
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2016-11-07

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