Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (4-5):442-461 (2015)
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Abstract
In this article, I argue that a capacity for mindreading conceived along the line of simulation theory provides the cognitive basis for forming we-centric representations of actions and goals. This explains the plural first personal stance displayed by we-intentions in terms of the underlying cognitive processes performed by individual minds, while preserving the idea that they cannot be analyzed in terms of individual intentional states. The implication for social ontology is that this makes sense of the plural subjectivity of joint actions without making group agents require either a corporate body or the unity of consciousness.
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First archival date: 2016-01-13
Latest version: 2 (2016-01-14)
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Self-Projection and the Brain.Buckner, Randy L. & Carroll, Daniel C.
Plural Self-Awareness.Schmid, Hans Bernhard

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