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  1. added 2018-06-21
    Seeing the Invisible: How to Perceive, Imagine, and Infer the Minds of Others.Luke Roelofs - 2017 - Erkenntnis (2):1-25.
    The psychology and phenomenology of our knowledge of other minds is not well captured either by describing it simply as perception, nor by describing it simply as inference. A better description, I argue, is that our knowledge of other minds involves both through ‘perceptual co-presentation’, in which we experience objects as having aspects that are not revealed. This allows us to say that we perceive other minds, but perceive them as private, i.e. imperceptible, just as we routinely perceive aspects of (...)
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  2. added 2017-10-27
    THE IMAGINATIVE REHEARSAL MODEL – DEWEY, EMBODIED SIMULATION, AND THE NARRATIVE HYPOTHESIS.Italo Testa - 2017 - Pragmatism Today 8 (1):105-112.
    In this contribution I outline some ideas on what the pragmatist model of habit ontology could offer us as regards the appreciation of the constitutive role that imagery plays for social action and cognition. Accordingly, a Deweyan understanding of habit would allow for an understanding of imagery in terms of embodied cognition rather than in representational terms. I first underline the motor character of imagery, and the role its embodiment in habit plays for the anticipation of action. Secondly, I reconstruct (...)
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  3. added 2017-04-03
    Do You See What I See? How Social Differences Influence Mindreading.Spaulding Shannon - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):4009-4030.
    Disagreeing with others about how to interpret a social interaction is a common occurrence. We often find ourselves offering divergent interpretations of others’ motives, intentions, beliefs, and emotions. Remarkably, philosophical accounts of how we understand others do not explain, or even attempt to explain such disagreements. I argue these disparities in social interpretation stem, in large part, from the effect of social categorization and our goals in social interactions, phenomena long studied by social psychologists. I argue we ought to expand (...)
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  4. added 2016-12-21
    Are We Theorising or Simulating? Interview with Robert Gordon.Jorrit Kiel & Anco Peeters - 2008 - Splijtstof 37 (2):40-43.
    Interview with Robert Gordon (Ph.D., Columbia). Discussed topics include his academic career in philosophy and views on the simulation theory of mind.
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  5. added 2016-06-14
    Hume and the Recreative Imagination.Fabian Dorsch - 2013 - Rivista di Estetica 53:25-54.
    Two particular approaches to the imagination as a recreative capacity have recently gained prominence: neo-Humeanism and simulationatism. According to neo-Humeanism, imaginings have cognitions as a constitutive part of their representational contents; while simulationalists maintain that, in imagining, we essentially simulate the occurrence of certain cognitive states. Two other kinds of constitutive dependence, that figure regularly in the debate, concern the necessity of cogni­tions for, respectively, the causation and the semantic power of imaginings. In what follows, I dis­cuss each of these (...)
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  6. added 2016-06-14
    Hume e l’immaginazione ricreativa.Fabian Dorsch - 2013 - Rivista di Estetica 53:25-54.
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  7. added 2016-05-08
    If the Motor System is No Mirror'.Maria Brincker - 2012 - In Payette (ed.), Connected Minds: Cognition and Interaction in the Social World. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 158--182.
    Largely aided by the neurological discovery of so-called “ mirror neurons,” the attention to motor activity during action observation has exploded over the last two decades. The idea that we internally “ mirror ” the actions of others has led to a new strand of implicit simulation theories of action understanding[1][2]. The basic idea of this sort of simulation theory is that we, via an automatic covert activation of our own action representations, can understand the action and possibly the goal (...)
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  8. added 2015-09-15
    Imagining Oneself Being Someone Else: The Role of the Self in the Shoes of Another.Ylwa Wirling - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (9-10):205-225.
    Proceeding from a distinction between imagining oneself in another person’s situation and imagining oneself being someone else, this article attempts to elucidate what the latter type of imagining consists in. Previous attempts at spelling out the phenomenon fail to properly account for the role of the self, or rather every individual’s unique point of view. An alternative view is presented, where the concept of imagining oneself being someone else is explained in terms of a distinction between and a co-running of (...)
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  9. added 2015-09-02
    Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons.Matteo Bianchin - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (4-5):442-461.
    In this article, I argue that a capacity for mindreading conceived along the line of simulation theory provides the cognitive basis for forming we-centric representations of actions and goals. This explains the plural first personal stance displayed by we-intentions in terms of the underlying cognitive processes performed by individual minds, while preserving the idea that they cannot be analyzed in terms of individual intentional states. The implication for social ontology is that this makes sense of the plural subjectivity of joint (...)
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  10. added 2015-02-27
    Simulation Theory.Shannon Spaulding - 2016 - In Amy Kind (ed.), Handbook of Imagination. Routledge Press. pp. 262-273.
    This is a penultimate draft of a paper that will appear in Handbook of Imagination, Amy Kind (ed.). Routledge Press. Please cite only the final printed version.
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  11. added 2014-07-31
    Why Desire Reasoning is Developmentally Prior to Belief Reasoning.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & John Michael - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (5):526-549.
    The predominant view in developmental psychology is that young children are able to reason with the concept of desire prior to being able to reason with the concept of belief. We propose an explanation of this phenomenon that focuses on the cognitive tasks that competence with the belief and desire concepts enable young children to perform. We show that cognitive tasks that are typically considered fundamental to our competence with the belief and desire concepts can be performed with the concept (...)
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  12. added 2014-01-21
    The Private Language Argument and a Second-Person Approach to Mindreading.Joshua Johnson - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (4):75--86.
    I argue that if Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument is correct, then both Theory Theory and Simulation Theory are inadequate accounts of how we come to know other minds since both theories assume the reality of a private language. Further, following the work of a number of philosophers and psychologists, I defend a ‘Second-Person Approach’ to mindreading according to which it is possible for us to be directly aware of at least some of the mental states of others. Because it is (...)
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  13. added 2013-07-14
    After All, It’s Still Replication: A Reply to Jacob on Simulation and Mirror Neurons.Luca Barlassina - 2011 - Res Cogitans 8 (1):92-111.
    Mindreading is the ability to attribute mental states to other individuals. According to the simulation theory (ST), mindreading is based on the ability the mind has of replicating others' mental states and processes. Mirror neurons (MNs) are a class of neurons that fire both when an agent performs a goal-directed action and when she observes the same type of action performed by another individual. Since MNs appear to form a replicative mechanism in which a portion of the observer's brain replicates (...)
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  14. added 2013-06-21
    Imagination Through Knowledge.Shannon Spaulding - 2016 - In Amy Kind & Peter Kung (eds.), Knowledge Through Imagination. Oxford University Press. pp. 207-226.
    Imagination seems to play an epistemic role in philosophical and scientific thought experiments, mindreading, and ordinary practical deliberations insofar as it generates new knowledge of contingent facts about the world. However, it also seems that imagination is limited to creative generation of ideas. Sometimes we imagine fanciful ideas that depart freely from reality. The conjunction of these claims is what I call the puzzle of knowledge through imagination. This chapter aims to resolve this puzzle. I argue that imagination has an (...)
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  15. added 2013-04-18
    Embodied Cognition and Theory of Mind.Shannon Spaulding - 2014 - In Lawrence Shapiro (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition. Routledge. pp. 197-206.
    According to embodied cognition, the philosophical and empirical literature on theory of mind is misguided. Embodied cognition rejects the idea that social cognition requires theory of mind. It regards the intramural debate between the Theory Theory and the Simulation Theory as irrelevant, and it dismisses the empirical studies on theory of mind as ill conceived and misleading. Embodied cognition provides a novel deflationary account of social cognition that does not depend on theory of mind. In this chapter, l describe embodied (...)
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  16. added 2013-04-17
    Modulation of Motor Cortex Activity When Observing Rewarding and Punishing Actions.Elliot Clayton Brown, Jan Roelf Wiersema, Gilles Pourtois & Martin Brüne - 2013 - Neuropsychologia 51 (1):52-58.
    Interpreting others' actions is essential for understanding the intentions and goals in social interactions. Activity in the motor cortex is evoked when we see another person performing actions, which can also be influenced by the intentions and context of the observed action. No study has directly explored the influence of reward and punishment on motor cortex activity when observing others' actions, which is likely to have substantial relevance in different social contexts. In this experiment, EEG was recorded while participants watched (...)
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  17. added 2012-02-21
    Simulation is Not Enough: A Hybrid Model of Disgust Attribution on the Basis of Visual Stimuli.Luca Barlassina - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):401-419.
    Mindreading is the ability to attribute mental states to other individuals. According to the Theory-Theory (TT), mindreading is based on one's possession of a Theory of Mind. On the other hand, the Simulation Theory (ST) maintains that one arrives at the attribution of a mental state by simulating it in one's own mind. In this paper, I propose a ST-TT hybrid model of the ability to attribute disgust on the basis of visual stimuli such as facial expressions, body postures, etc. (...)
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  18. added 2011-09-03
    The Heterogeneity of the Imagination.Amy Kind - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):141-159.
    Imagination has been assigned an important explanatory role in a multitude of philosophical contexts. This paper examines four such contexts: mindreading, pretense, our engagement with fiction, and modal epistemology. Close attention to each of these contexts suggests that the mental activity of imagining is considerably more heterogeneous than previously realized. In short, no single mental activity can do all the explanatory work that has been assigned to imagining.
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  19. added 2008-12-31
    Reply to Jean Decety: Perceiving Actions and Understanding Agency.Christoph Hoerl - 2002 - In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action. John Benjamins. pp. 45--73.
    Decety presents evidence for the claim that neural mechanisms involved in the generation of actions are also recruited in the observation and mental simulation of actions. This paper explores the relationship between such neuropsychological findings and our common-sense understanding of what it is for a person to imitate or imagine performing an action they have observed. A central question is whether imitation and imagination necessarily involve the ability to distinguish between one's own actions and those of others. It is argued (...)
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