Ambivalence for Cognitivists: A Lesson from Chrysippus?

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):147-156 (2017)
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Ambivalence—where we experience two conflicting emotional responses to the same object, person or state of affairs—is sometimes thought to pose a problem for cognitive theories of emotion. Drawing on the ideas of the Stoic Chrysippus, I argue that a cognitivist can account for ambivalence without retreating from the view that emotions involve fully-fledged evaluative judgments. It is central to the account I offer that emotions involve two kinds of judgment: one about the object of emotion, and one about the subject's response.
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Fearing Fictions.Walton, Kendall L.
Arational Actions.Hursthouse, Rosalind

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