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  1. Filosofia emoțiilor.Nicolae Sfetcu - manuscript
    Emoția a fost exclusă din cunoaștere încă din antichitate, când Democrit afirma că „Medicamentul vindecă bolile corpului, înțelepciunea eliberează sufletul de emoții”. O astfel de opinie spune că „rațiunea ar trebui să fie maestrul pasiunii”. Cea mai cunoscută declarație inversată aparține lui Hume, conform căruia rațiunea este și ar trebui să fie sclavul pasiunilor. Emoțiile au fost recunoscute ca amenințări la luarea deciziilor raționale și epistemice, corelându-se emoțiile cu voința sau dorința (emoțiile ar fi un mijloc prin care voința sau (...)
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  2. Inteligența emoțională în organizații.Nicolae Sfetcu - manuscript
    În prezent, organizațiile trebuie să facă față, pe lângă o concurență sporită, și unei dezvoltări și inovații tehnologice exponențiale, și unor procese de schimbare care afectează toate stările emoționale ale angajaților. Toate aceste provocări, împreună cu schimbările impuse și complexitatea sarcinilor organizaționale și manageriale, implică noi exigențe emoționale și acțiuni mai eficiente la nivel corporativ, inclusiv prin gestionarea emoțiilor în cele mai multe circumstanțe. Astfel, emoțiile reprezintă „resurse” valoroase pentru inovație și valoare adăugată într-un proces economic. Emoțiilor li s-a acordat (...)
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  3. Critica inteligenței emoționale în organizații.Nicolae Sfetcu - manuscript
    Se consideră conceptul de inteligență emoțională ca fiind invalid, atât pentru că nu este o formă de inteligență, cât și pentru că este definit atât de larg și incluziv încât nu are un sens inteligibil. Extinderea termenului de „inteligență” distorsionează sensul conceptului. Motivul final ar fi egalitarismul, astfel încât toată lumea să fie considerată egală în inteligență. Iinteligența emoțională nu ar fi, în fapt, o altă formă sau tip de inteligență, ci inteligența (capacitatea de a înțelege abstracțiunile) aplicată unui anumit (...)
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  4. Jadedness: A philosophical analysis.Andreas Elpidorou - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 1:1-24.
    The essay contributes to the philosophical literature on emotions by advancing a detailed analysis of jadedness and by investigating whether jadedness can be subject to the various standards that are often thought to apply to our emotional states. The essay argues that jadedness is the affective experience of weariness, lack of care, and mild disdain with some object, and that it crucially involves the realisation that such an object was previously, but is no longer, significant to us. On the basis (...)
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  5. Why fittingness is only sometimes demand-like.James Fritz - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2597-2616.
    Sometimes, the fact that an attitude is fitting seems like a demand to have that attitude. But in other cases, the fact that an attitude is fitting seems more like a permission to have the attitude. I defend a proposal that can accommodate both of these appearances. I argue that there is a kind of emotionlessness, which I call apathy, that can be fitting or unfitting in just the same way that emotion can. I further argue that, in some cases, (...)
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  6. Textos Selecionados de Filosofia das Emoções.Felipe Nogueira de Carvalho & Flavio Williges - 2023 - Pelotas: Editora UFPel.
    Esse volume consiste em traduções de verbetes da Enciclopédia Stanford de Filosofia que dizem respeito à Filosofia das Emoções. Trata-se de um volume de orientação história, que visa desfazer o mito de que emoções foram objetos menores de análise filosófica antes da contemporaneidade, resgatando assim a grande riqueza de teorias e reflexões sobre emoções e afetos na filosofia antiga, medieval, renascentista, moderna e indiana.
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  7. How shallow is fear? Deepening the waters of emotion with a social/externalist account.Felipe Nogueira de Carvalho - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology (4):725-733.
    In The Deep History of Ourselves, Joseph LeDoux distinguishes between behavioral and physiological responses caused by the activation of defense circuits, and the emotion of fear. Although the former is found in nearly all bilateral animals, the latter is supposedly a unique human adaptation that requires language, reflective self-awareness, among other cognitive capacities. In this picture, fear is an autonoetic conscious experience that happens when defense circuit activation is integrated into self-awareness and the experience labeled with the “fear” concept. In (...)
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  8. Grief, Continuing Bonds, and Unreciprocated Love.Becky Millar & Pilar Lopez-Cantero - 2022 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):413-436.
    The widely accepted “continuing bonds” model of grief tells us that rather than bereavement necessitating the cessation of one’s relationship with the deceased, very often the relationship continues instead in an adapted form. However, this framework appears to conflict with philosophical approaches that treat reciprocity or mutuality of some form as central to loving relationships. Seemingly the dead cannot be active participants, rendering it puzzling how we should understand claims about continued relationships with them. In this article, we resolve this (...)
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  9. Absence experience in grief.Louise Richardson - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):163-178.
    In this paper, I consider the implications of grief for philosophical theorising about absence experience. I argue that whilst some absence experiences that occur in grief might be explained by extant philosophical accounts of absence experience, others need different treatment. I propose that grieving subjects' descriptions of feeling as if the world seems empty or a part of them seems missing can be understood as referring to a distinctive type of absence experience. In these profound absence experiences, I will argue, (...)
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  10. Reactance, morality, and disgust: The relationship between affective dispositions and compliance with official health recommendations during the COVID-19 pandemic.Rodrigo Díaz & Florian Cova - 2021 - Cognition and Emotion (1).
    Emergency situations require individuals to make important changes in their behavior. In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, official recommendations to avoid the spread of the virus include costly behaviors such as self-quarantining or drastically diminishing social contacts. Compliance (or lack thereof) with these recommendations is a controversial and divisive topic, and lay hypotheses abound regarding what underlies this divide. This paper investigates which cognitive, moral, and emotional traits separate people who comply with official recommendations from those who don't. In (...)
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  11. Affective injustice and fundamental affective goods.Francisco Gallegos - 2021 - Journal of Social Philosophy 53 (2):185-201.
    Although previous treatments of affective injustice have identified some particular types of affective injustice, the general concept of affective injustice remains unclear. This article proposes a novel articulation of this general concept, according to which affective injustice is defined as a state in which individuals or groups are deprived of “affective goods” which are owed to them. On this basis, I sketch an approach to the philosophical investigation of affective injustice that begins by establishing which affective goods are fundamental, and (...)
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  12. Is boredom one or many? A functional solution to the problem of heterogeneity.Andreas Elpidorou - 2020 - Mind and Language 36 (3):491-511.
    Despite great progress in our theoretical and empirical investigations of boredom, a basic issue regarding boredom remains unresolved: it is still unclear whether the construct of boredom is a unitary one or not. By surveying the relevant literature on boredom and arousal, the paper makes a case for the unity of the construct of boredom. It argues, first, that extant empirical findings do not support the heterogeneity of boredom, and, second, that a theoretically motivated and empirically grounded model of boredom (...)
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  13. Emotions, Language and the (Un-)making of the Social World.Frédéric Minner - 2019 - Emotions and Society 1 (2):215-230.
    What are the motivational bases that help explain the various normative judgements that social agents make, and the normative reasoning they employ? Answering this question leads us to consider the relationships between thoughts and emotions. Emotions will be described as thought-dependent and thought-directing, and as being intimately related to normativity. They are conceived as the grounds that motivate social agents to articulate their reasoning with respect to the values and norms they face and/or share in their social collective. It is (...)
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  14. The elements of emotion.Chad Brockman - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):163-186.
    I join the growing ranks of theorists who reject the terms of traditional debates about the nature of emotion, debates that have long focused on the question of whether emotions should be understood as either cognitive or somatic kinds of states. Here, I propose and defend a way of incorporating both into a single theory, which I label the “Integrated Representational Theory” of emotion. In Section 2 I begin to construct the theory, defining and explaining emotions in terms of three (...)
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  15. La vertu.Christine Tappolet - 2018 - In Julien A. Deonna & Emma Tieffenbach (eds.), Petit traité des valeurs. [Genève, Switzerland]: Fondation Ernst et Lucie Schmidheiny.
    I argue on the basis of a discussion of Aristotelian and Humean accounts of virtue that virtue is fundamentally a disposition to undergo appropriate emotions.
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  16. More Than A Feeling: The Communicative Function of Regret.Benjamin Matheson - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (5):664-681.
    Rüdiger Bittner argues that regret is not useful and so it is always unreasonable to feel and express it. In this paper, I argue that regret is often reasonable because regret has a communicative function: it communicates where we stand with respect to things we have done and outcomes that we have caused. So, I not only argue that Bittner’s argument is unsuccessful, I also shed light on the nature and purpose of regret.
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  17. How (Not) to Think of Emotions as Evaluative Attitudes.Jean Moritz Müller - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):281-308.
    It is popular to hold that emotions are evaluative. On the standard account, the evaluative character of emotion is understood in epistemic terms: emotions apprehend or make us aware of value properties. As this account is commonly elaborated, emotions are experiences with evaluative intentional content. In this paper, I am concerned with a recent alternative proposal on how emotions afford awareness of value. This proposal does not ascribe evaluative content to emotions, but instead conceives of them as evaluative at the (...)
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  18. Ambivalence for Cognitivists: A Lesson from Chrysippus?Bill Wringe - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):147-156.
    Ambivalence—where we experience two conflicting emotional responses to the same object, person or state of affairs—is sometimes thought to pose a problem for cognitive theories of emotion. Drawing on the ideas of the Stoic Chrysippus, I argue that a cognitivist can account for ambivalence without retreating from the view that emotions involve fully-fledged evaluative judgments. It is central to the account I offer that emotions involve two kinds of judgment: one about the object of emotion, and one about the subject's (...)
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  19. Is the Paradox of Fiction Soluble in Psychology?Florian Cova & Fabrice Teroni - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):930-942.
    If feeling a genuine emotion requires believing that its object actually exists, and if this is a belief we are unlikely to have about fictional entities, then how could we feel genuine emotions towards these entities? This question lies at the core of the paradox of fiction. Since its original formulation, this paradox has generated a substantial literature. Until recently, the dominant strategy had consisted in trying to solve it. Yet, it is more and more frequent for scholars to try (...)
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  20. Extended emotions.Joel Krueger & Thomas Szanto - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):863-878.
    Until recently, philosophers and psychologists conceived of emotions as brain- and body-bound affairs. But researchers have started to challenge this internalist and individualist orthodoxy. A rapidly growing body of work suggests that some emotions incorporate external resources and thus extend beyond the neurophysiological confines of organisms; some even argue that emotions can be socially extended and shared by multiple agents. Call this the extended emotions thesis. In this article, we consider different ways of understanding ExE in philosophy, psychology, and the (...)
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  21. On being attached.Monique Lisa Wonderly - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):223-242.
    We often use the term “attachment” to describe our emotional connectedness to objects in the world. We become attached to our careers, to our homes, to certain ideas, and perhaps most importantly, to other people. Interestingly, despite its import and ubiquity in our everyday lives, the topic of attachment per se has been largely ignored in the philosophy literature. I address this lacuna by identifying attachment as a rich “mode of mattering” that can help to inform certain aspects of agency (...)
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  22. Scaffoldings of the affective mind.Giovanna Colombetti & Joel Krueger - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (8):1157-1176.
    In this paper we adopt Sterelny's framework of the scaffolded mind, and his related dimensional approach, to highlight the many ways in which human affectivity is environmentally supported. After discussing the relationship between the scaffolded-mind view and related frameworks, such as the extended-mind view, we illustrate the many ways in which our affective states are environmentally supported by items of material culture, other people, and their interplay. To do so, we draw on empirical evidence from various disciplines, and develop phenomenological (...)
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  23. Le paradoxe de la fiction: le retour.Florian Cova & Fabrice Teroni - 2015 - L'expression des Émotions: Mélanges En l'Honneur de Patrizia Lombardo.
    Tullmann et Buckwalter (2014) ont récemment soutenu que le paradoxe de la fiction tenait plus de l’illusion que de la réalité. D’après eux, les théories contemporaines des émotions ne fourniraient aucune raison d’adopter une interprétation du terme « existence » qui rende les prémisses du paradoxe incompatibles entre elles. Notre discussion a pour but de contester cette manière de dissoudre le paradoxe de la fiction en montrant qu’il ne prend pas sa source dans les théories contemporaines des émotions. Bien plutôt, (...)
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  24. Looking into meta-emotions.Christoph Jäger & Eva Bänninger-Huber - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):787-811.
    There are many psychic mechanisms by which people engage with their selves. We argue that an important yet hitherto neglected one is self-appraisal via meta-emotions. We discuss the intentional structure of meta-emotions and explore the phenomenology of a variety of examples. We then present a pilot study providing preliminary evidence that some facial displays may indicate the presence of meta-emotions. We conclude by arguing that meta-emotions have an important role to play in higher-order theories of psychic harmony.
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  25. Dewey's Rejection of the Emotion/Expression Distinction.Joel Krueger - 2014 - In Tibor Solymosi & John Shook (eds.), Neuroscience, Neurophilosophy and Pragmatism: Understanding Brains at Work in the World. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 140-161.
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  26. Emotions and the Social Niche.Joel Krueger - 2014 - In Christian von Scheve & Mikko Salmela (eds.), Collective Emotions. Oxford University Press. pp. 156-171.
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  27. Mental Pictures, Imagination and Emotions.Maria Magoula Adamos - 2012 - In P. Hanna (ed.), Anthology of Philosophical Studies, vol. 6. ATINER. pp. 83-91.
    Although cognitivism has lost some ground recently in the philosophical circles, it is still the favorite view of many scholars of emotions. Even though I agree with cognitivism's insight that emotions typically involve some type of evaluative intentional state, I shall argue that in some cases, less epistemically committed, non-propositional evaluative states such as mental pictures can do a better job in identifying the emotion and providing its intentional object. Mental pictures have different logical features from propositions: they are representational, (...)
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  28. A Theory of Affect Perception.Edoardo Zamuner - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (4):436-451.
    What do we see when we look at someone's expression of fear? I argue that one of the things that we see is fear itself. I support this view by developing a theory of affect perception. The theory involves two claims. One is that expressions are patterns of facial changes that carry information about affects. The other is that the visual system extracts and processes such information. In particular, I argue that the visual system functions to detect the affects of (...)
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  29. Facts and Values in Emotional Plasticity.Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet - 2008 - In Louis Charland & Peter Zachar (eds.), Fact and Value in Emotion. John Benjamins. pp. 101--137.
    How much can we shape the emotions we experience? Or to put it another way, how plastic are our emotions? It is clear that the exercise of identifying the degree of plasticity of emotion is futile without a prior specification of what can be plastic, so we first propose an analysis of the components of emotions. We will then turn to empirical data that might be used to assess the degree of plasticity of emotions.
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  30. “Face Value. Perception and Knowledge Others’ Happiness”.Edoardo Zamuner - 2008 - In Lisa Bortolotti (ed.), The Philosophy of Happiness. Palgrave.
    Happiness, like other basic emotions, has visual properties that create the conditions for happiness to be perceived in others. This is to say that happiness is perceivable. Its visual properties are to be identified with those facial expressions that are characteristic of happiness. Yet saying that something is perceivable does not suffice for us to conclude that it is perceived. We therefore need to show that happiness is perceived. Empirical evidence suggests that the visual system functions to perceive happiness as (...)
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  31. What is a definition of emotion? And are emotions mental-behavioral processes?Rainer Reisenzein - 2007 - Social Science Information 7 (3):26-29.
    [I argue that a precise definition of emotions is neither necessary nor possible prior to empirical research on emotions. It is not necessary because all that is needed for for fruitful research and successful communication is a working definition of emotions, a description that allows to roughly demarcate the class of emotions. It is not possible because precise emotion definitions are real definitions, empirical claims about the essence of emotions. These claims about the nature of emotion are always formulated against (...)
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  32. Book ReviewsRobert C Roberts,. Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. 357. $29.99. [REVIEW]Christine Tappolet - 2006 - Ethics 117 (1):143-147.
    A critical review of Robert C. Roberts' "Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology", Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
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  33. Great Anger.Anthony Cunningham - 2005 - The Dalhousie Review 85 (3).
    Anger has an undeniable hand in human suffering and horrific deeds. Various schools of thought call for eliminating or moderating the capacity for anger. I argue that the capacity for anger, like the capacity for grief, is at the heart of our humanity.
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  34. Emotional Truth.Ronald De Sousa & Adam Morton - 2002 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76:247-275.
    [Ronald de Sousa] Taking literally the concept of emotional truth requires breaking the monopoly on truth of belief-like states. To this end, I look to perceptions for a model of non-propositional states that might be true or false, and to desires for a model of propositional attitudes the norm of which is other than the semantic satisfaction of their propositional object. Those models inspire a conception of generic truth, which can admit of degrees for analogue representations such as emotions; belief-like (...)
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  35. The Sudden, the Sudded, and the Sidesplitting.Karl Pfeifer - 1995 - In Kjell S. Johannessen & Tore Nordenstam (eds.), Culture and Value: Philosophy and the Cultural Sciences (Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Vol. 3, 1995). Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 224-232.
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  36. Cognitive pleasure and distress.Irwin Goldstein - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 39 (January):15-23.
    Explaining the "intentional object" some people assign pleasure, I argue that a person is pleased about something when his thoughts about that thing cause him to feel pleasure. Bernard Williams, Gilbert Ryle, and Irving Thalberg, who reject this analysis, are discussed. Being pleased (or distressed) about something is a compound of pleasure (pain) and some thought or belief. Pleasure in itself does not have an "intentional object".
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