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  1. added 2018-09-18
    The Stoic Invention of Cosmopolitan Politics.Eric Brown - 2010 - In Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, Andreas Niederberger & Philipp Schink (eds.), Kosmopolitanismus: Zur Geschichte und Zukunft eines umstrittenen Ideals. Weilerswist, Germany: pp. 9-24.
    This lecture explores the political import of Chrysippus' account of why and how one should live as a citizen of the cosmos, and it makes a case for seeing this account as the invention of political cosmopolitanism. (The version uploaded here is the final English draft on which the German translation was based.).
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  2. added 2018-08-26
    Bodies, Predicates, and Fated Truths: Ontological Distinctions and the Terminology of Causation in Defenses of Stoic Determinism by Chrysippus and Seneca.Jula Wildberger - 2013 - In Francesca Guadelupe Masi & Stefano Maso (eds.), Fate, Chance, Fortune in Ancient Thought. Amsterdam: Hakkert. pp. 103-123.
    Reconstructs the original Greek version of the confatalia-argument that Cicero attributes to Chrysippus in De fato and misrepresent in crucial ways. Compares this argument with Seneca's discussion of determinism in the Naturales quaestiones. Clarifies that Seneca makes a different distinction from that attested in Cicero's De fato. Argues that problems with interpreting both accounts derive from disregarding terminological distinctions harder to spot in the Latin versions and, related to this, insufficient attention to the ontological distinction between bodies (such as Fate) (...)
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  3. added 2017-03-23
    Ambivalence for Cognitivists: A Lesson From Chrysippus?Bill Wringe - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):147-156.
    Ambivalence—where we experience two conflicting emotional responses to the same object, person or state of affairs—is sometimes thought to pose a problem for cognitive theories of emotion. Drawing on the ideas of the Stoic Chrysippus, I argue that a cognitivist can account for ambivalence without retreating from the view that emotions involve fully-fledged evaluative judgments. It is central to the account I offer that emotions involve two kinds of judgment: one about the object of emotion, and one about the subject's (...)
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  4. added 2016-05-14
    Aristotle and Chrysippus on the Psychology of Human Action: Criteria for Responsibility.Priscilla K. Sakezles - 2007 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15 (2):225 – 252.
    This Article doDespite obvious differences in the Aristotelian and Stoic theories of responsibility, there is surprisingly a deeper structural similarity between the two. The most obvious difference is that Aristotle is (apparently) a libertarian and the Stoics are determinists. Aristotle holds adults responsible for all our "voluntary" actions, which are defined by two criteria: the "origin" or cause of the action must be "in us" and we must be aware of what we are doing. An "involuntary" action, for which we (...)
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  5. added 2016-05-14
    Chrysippus' Puzzle About Identity.John Bowin - 2003 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 24:239-251.
    In 'Chrysippus' Puzzle about Identity', John Bowin (thereafter JB) cogently strengthens David Sedley's reading of the puzzle of Chrysippus as a reductio ad absurdum of the Growing Argument. For Sedley, Chrysippus reduces to absurdity the assumption that matter is the sole principle of identity by refuting its presupposition that the two protagonists of the puzzle, namely Theon and Dion, are related as part to the whole. According to Plutarch's Comm. not. 1083 a8-c1, however, the Growing Argument concludes by posing that (...)
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  6. added 2016-05-14
    Chrysippus and the Epistemic Theory of Vagueness.Susanne Bobzien - 2002 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):217-238.
    ABSTRACT: Recently a bold and admirable interpretation of Chrysippus’ position on the Sorites has been presented, suggesting that Chrysippus offered a solution to the Sorites by (i) taking an epistemicist position1 which (ii) made allowances for higher-order vagueness. In this paper I argue (i) that Chrysippus did not take an epistemicist position, but − if any − a non-epistemic one which denies truth-values to some cases in a Sorites-series, and (ii) that it is uncertain whether and how he made allowances (...)
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  7. added 2016-05-14
    Chrysippus' Theory of Causes.Susanne Bobzien - 1999 - In Katerina Ierodiakonou (ed.), Topics in Stoic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    ABSTRACT: A systematic reconstruction of Chrysippus’ theory of causes, grounded on the Stoic tenets that causes are bodies, that they are relative, and that all causation can ultimately be traced back to the one ‘active principle’ which pervades all things. I argue that Chrysippus neither developed a finished taxonomy of causes, nor intended to do so, and that he did not have a set of technical terms for mutually exclusive classes of causes. Rather, the various adjectives which he used for (...)
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  8. added 2016-05-14
    Chrysippus' Modal Logic and Its Relation to Philo and Diodorus.Susanne Bobzien - 1993 - In K. Doering & Th Ebert (eds.), Dialektiker und Stoiker. Franz Steiner. pp. 63--84.
    ABSTRACT: The modal systems of the Stoic logician Chrysippus and the two Hellenistic logicians Philo and Diodorus Cronus have survived in a fragmentary state in several sources. From these it is clear that Chrysippus was acquainted with Philo’s and Diodorus’ modal notions, and also that he developed his own in contrast of Diodorus’ and in some way incorporated Philo’s. The goal of this paper is to reconstruct the three modal systems, including their modal definitions and modal theorems, and to make (...)
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  9. added 2016-03-23
    Stoic Trichotomies.Daniel Nolan - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 51:207-230.
    Chrysippus often talks as if there is a third option when we might expect that two options in response to a question are exhaustive. Things are true, false or neither; equal, unequal, or neither; the same, different, or neither.. and so on. There seems to be a general pattern here that calls for a general explanation. This paper offers a general explanation of this pattern, preserving Stoic commitments to excluded middle and bivalence, arguing that Chrysippus employs this trichotomy move when (...)
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  10. added 2016-02-15
    Rational Impressions and the Stoic Philosophy of Mind.Vanessa de Harven - forthcoming - In John Sisko (ed.), History of Philosophy of Mind: Pre-Socratics to Augustine. Acumen Publishing.
    This paper seeks to elucidate the distinctive nature of the rational impression on its own terms, asking precisely what it means for the Stoics to define logikē phantasia as an impression whose content is expressible in language. I argue first that impression, generically, is direct and reflexive awareness of the world, the way animals get information about their surroundings. Then, that the rational impression, specifically, is inherently conceptual, inferential, and linguistic, i.e. thick with propositional content, the way humans receive incoming (...)
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  11. added 2015-09-09
    The Stoic Account of Apprehension.Tamer Nawar - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14:1-21.
    This paper examines the Stoic account of apprehension (κατάληψις) (a cognitive achievement similar to how we typically view knowledge). Following a seminal article by Michael Frede (1983), it is widely thought that the Stoics maintained a purely externalist causal account of apprehension wherein one may apprehend only if one stands in an appropriate causal relation to the object apprehended. An important but unanswered challenge to this view has been offered by David Sedley (2002) who offers reasons to suppose that the (...)
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  12. added 2015-01-09
    Necessity, Possibility and Determinism in Stoic Thought.Vanessa de Harven - 2016 - In Max Cresswel, Edwin Mares & Adriane Rini (eds.), Logical Modalities from Aristotle to Carnap: The Story of Necessity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 70-90.
    At the heart of the Stoic theory of modality is a strict commitment to bivalence, even for future contingents. A commitment to both future truth and contingency has often been thought paradoxical. This paper argues that the Stoic retreat from necessity is successful. it maintains that the Stoics recognized three distinct senses of necessity and possibility: logical, metaphysical and providential. Logical necessity consists of truths that are knowable a priori. Metaphysical necessity consists of truths that are knowable a posteriori, a (...)
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  13. added 2015-01-09
    How Nothing Can Be Something: The Stoic Theory of Void.Vanessa de Harven - 2015 - Ancient Philosophy 35 (2):405-429.
    Void is at the heart of Stoic metaphysics. As the incorporeal par excellence, being defined purely in terms of lacking body, it brings into sharp focus the Stoic commitment to non-existent Somethings. This article argues that Stoic void, far from rendering the Stoic system incoherent or merely ad hoc, in fact reflects a principled and coherent physicalism that sets the Stoics apart from their materialist predecessors and atomist neighbors.
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