Access to Collective Epistemic Reasons: Reply to Mitova

Asian Joural of Philosophy:1-11 (forthcoming)
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In this short paper, I critically examine Veli Mitova’s proposal that social-identity groups can have collective epistemic reasons. My primary focus is the role of privileged access in her account of how collective reasons become epistemic reasons for social-identity groups. I argue that there is a potentially worrying structural asymmetry in her account of two different types of cases. More specifically, the mechanisms at play in cases of “doxastic reasons” seem fundamentally different from those at play in cases of “epistemic-conduct reasons”. The upshot is a need for further explanation of what unifies these dimensions of the account.

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Cameron Boult
Brandon University


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