Ontology of Knowledge and the form of the world 20200505

Academia (2020)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In this article, we will try to illustrate how, according to the Ontology of Knowledge (OK), reality appears to the subject in the form of objects « in becoming » in a four-dimensional space whose time of the subject (his becoming) would be a privileged dimension. For the OK, reality is formless and it is the subject that gives it shape. The shape of the world results from the Logos, a transcendent principle by which the complexity of logical interdependence, the amorphous "substance" of reality, is metastablely and necessarily aggregated into singularities bounded by cuts, making it appear to the subject as a structured meaning. The process will include four steps: - with Husserl: from proper and improper to multiplicities - with Poincaré: from isomorphism to morphogenesis, from understanding to the subject's perspective the fusion of Acting, Giving-Sense and Becoming - with Russel and Poincaré: Quantity, divisibility, continuity, cut - with Hahn and Gonseth: the idoneity of four-dimensional space-time the subject as one of the possible meanings of reality The aim is not to reconstruct a two-century history of the notion of space-time, nor to "show false" the analysis of these authors. We only want to use their concepts to illustrate the OK, both by evoking similarities and differences. NB: Rather than proposing one more analysis of the authors in question, we will quote (sometimes by large excerpts) modern articles that seem clear and adapted to the subject. Of course, we will give credit to the authors.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BOUOOK-2
Upload history
First archival date: 2020-02-24
Latest version: 4 (2020-05-06)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-02-24

Total views
53 ( #42,095 of 51,218 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
53 ( #10,156 of 51,218 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.