Aggregating Causal Judgments

Philosophy of Science 81 (4):491-515 (2014)
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Abstract
Decision-making typically requires judgments about causal relations: we need to know the causal effects of our actions and the causal relevance of various environmental factors. We investigate how several individuals' causal judgments can be aggregated into collective causal judgments. First, we consider the aggregation of causal judgments via the aggregation of probabilistic judgments, and identify the limitations of this approach. We then explore the possibility of aggregating causal judgments independently of probabilistic ones. Formally, we introduce the problem of causal-network aggregation. Finally, we revisit the aggregation of probabilistic judgments when this is constrained by prior aggregation of qualitative causal judgments.
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2014
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BRAACJ
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Archival date: 2016-08-20
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References found in this work BETA
Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference.Hitchcock, Christopher & Pearl, Judea
Democracy and Disagreement.Gutmann, Amy & Thompson, Dennis

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Citations of this work BETA
The Similarity of Causal Structure.Eva, Benjamin; Stern, Reuben & Hartmann, Stephan

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2009-01-28

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