The Indefensibility of the Scientific Concept of Probability

Abstract

Whereas many philosophers accept the validity of 'probability' and confine themselves to interpreting it, this paper challenges its conceptual coherence by critically examining its use in the empirical world. While measure theory provides a rigorous mathematical framework for manipulating probability functions, we argue that applying precise probability measures to empirically uncertain outcomes introduces a fundamental contradiction. Probability measures claim to quantify uncertainty while simultaneously implying a degree of understanding about events that we do not fully possess. This inconsistency undermines the idea that probability offers objective or reliable insights into reality. Moreover, we argue that it is impossible to assign a correct probability in the empirical world—neither deduction nor induction provides a justifiable basis for doing so. Therefore, despite probability appearing to work as a practical tool for managing uncertainty, its theoretical foundation collapses under scrutiny in empirical applications.

Author's Profile

Alec Braynen
University of South Florida

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Added to PP
2024-09-23

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