Mereological Nihilism and Personal Ontology

Philosophical Quarterly 67 (268) (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Mereological nihilists hold that composition never occurs, so that nothing is ever a proper part of anything else. Substance dualists generally hold that we are each identical with an immaterial soul. In this paper, I argue that every popular objection to substance dualism has a parallel objection to composition. This thesis has some interesting implications. First, many of those who reject composition, but accept substance dualism, or who reject substance dualism and accept composition, have some explaining to do. Secondly, one popular objection to mereological nihilism, one which contends that mereological nihilism is objectionable insofar as it is incompatible with the existence of people, is untenable.

Author's Profile

Andrew Brenner
Hong Kong Baptist University

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-01-10

Downloads
1,377 (#4,248)

6 months
199 (#2,642)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?