Results for 'substance dualism'

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  1. A Moral Argument for Substance Dualism.Gerald K. Harrison - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association (1):21--35.
    This paper presents a moral argument in support of the view that the mind is a nonphysical object. It is intuitively obvious that we, the bearers of conscious experiences, have an inherent value that is not reducible to the value of our conscious experiences. It remains intuitively obvious that we have inherent value even when we represent ourselves to have no physical bodies whatsoever. Given certain assumptions about morality and moral intuitions, this implies that the bearers of conscious experiences—the objects (...)
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  2. Descartes's substance dualism and his independence conception of substance.Gonzalo Rodríguez Pereyra - 2008 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (1):69-89.
    Descartes maintained substance dualism, the thesis that no substance has both mental and material properties. His main argument for this thesis, the so-called separability argument from the Sixth Meditation (AT VII: 78) has long puzzled readers. In this paper I argue that Descartes’ independence conception of substance (which Descartes presents in article 51 of the Principles) is crucial for the success of the separability argument and that Descartes used this conception of substance to defend his (...)
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  3. Coherence of Substance Dualism.Seyyed Jaaber Mousavirad - 2023 - International Philosophical Quarterly 63 (1):33-42.
    Many contemporary philosophers of mind disagree with substance dualism, saying that despite the failure of physical theories of mind, substance dualism cannot be advocated, because it faces more serious problems than physical theories, lacking compatibility with philosophical arguments and scientific evidence. Regardless of the validity of the arguments in support of substance dualism, it is demonstrated in this article that this theory is coherent, with no philosophical or scientific problems. The main arguments of opponents (...)
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  4. There are no good objections to substance dualism.José Gusmão Rodrigues - 2014 - Philosophy 89 (2):199-222.
    This article aims to review the standard objections to dualism and to argue that will either fail to convince someone committed to dualism or are flawed on independent grounds. I begin by presenting the taxonomy of metaphysical positions on concrete particulars as they relate to the dispute between materialists and dualists, and in particular substance dualism is defined. In the first section, several kinds of substance dualism are distinguished and the relevant varieties of this (...)
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  5. Solitude without Souls: Why Peter Unger hasn’t Established Substance Dualism.Will Bynoe & Nicholas K. Jones - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (1):109-125.
    Unger has recently argued that if you are the only thinking and experiencing subject in your chair, then you are not a material object. This leads Unger to endorse a version of Substance Dualism according to which we are immaterial souls. This paper argues that this is an overreaction. We argue that the specifically Dualist elements of Unger’s view play no role in his response to the problem; only the view’s structure is required, and that is available to (...)
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  6. A Cartesian Argument for Substance Dualism.Richard Swinburne - 2023 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 36 (1):33-47.
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  7. Swinburne on Substance Dualism.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (2):5--15.
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  8. The Contours of Locke’s General Substance Dualism.Graham Clay - 2022 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 4 (1):1-20.
    In this paper, I will argue that Locke is a substance dualist in the general sense, in that he holds that there are, independent of our classificatory schema, two distinct kinds of substances: wholly material ones and wholly immaterial ones. On Locke’s view, the difference between the two lies in whether they are solid or not, thereby differentiating him from Descartes. My way of establishing Locke as a general substance dualist is to be as minimally committal as possible (...)
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  9. On the alleged explanatory impotence/conceptual vacuity of substance dualism.James Moreland - 2023 - Ratio 36 (3):180-191.
    In the last decade, there has been a notable upsurge in property (PD) and generic substance dualism (SD). By SD I mean the view that there is a spiritual substantial soul that is different from but variously related to its body. SD includes Cartesian, certain forms of late Medieval hylomorphic (e.g., Aquinas'), and Haskerian emergent SD. Nevertheless, some form of physicalism remains the majority view in philosophy of mind. Several fairly standard objections have been raised against SD, and (...)
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  10. Descartes’s Independence Conception of Substance and His Separability Argument for Substance Dualism.Robert K. Garcia - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Research 39:165-190.
    I critically examine the view that Descartes’s independence conception (IC) of substance plays a crucial role in his “separability argument” for substance dualism. I argue that IC is a poisoned chalice. I do so by considering how an IC-based separability argument fares on two different ways of thinking about principal attributes. On the one hand, if we take principal attributes to be universals, then a separability argument that deploys IC establishes a version of dualism that is (...)
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  11. Pure or Compound Dualism? Considering Afresh the Prospects of Pure Substance Dualism.Joshua Ryan Farris - 2013 - Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 3 (1):151-160.
    Substance dualism has received much attention from philosophers and theologians in contemporary literature. Whilst it may have been fashionable in the recent past to dismiss substance dualism as an unviable and academically absurd position to hold, this is no longer the case. My contention is not so much the merits of substance dualism in general, but a more specified variation of substance dualism. My specific contribution to the literature in this article is (...)
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  12. Can a Post-Galilean Science of Consciousness Avoid Substance Dualism?R. S. Weir - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (9-10):212-228.
    In Galileo's Error, Philip Goff sets out a manifesto for a post-Galilean science of consciousness. Article four of the manifesto reads: 'Anti-Dualism: Consciousness is not separate from the physical world; rather consciousness is located in the intrinsic nature of the physical world.' I argue that there is an important sense of ‘dualism’ in which Goff’s arguments are not only compatible with but entail dualism, and not only dualism but substance dualism. Substance dualism, (...)
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  13. An Embodied Existence in Heaven and the Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism (Revisited).Pérez Alejandro - 2021 - TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 2 (5).
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  14. The Substance-attributes Relationship in Cartesian Dualism.Françoise Monnoyeur - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Research 43:177-189.
    In their book on Descartes’s Changing Mind, Peter Machamer and J. E. McGuire argue that Descartes discarded dualism to embrace a kind of monism. Descartes famously proposed that there are two separate substances, mind and body, with distinct attributes of thought and extension. According to Machamer and McGuire, because of the limitations of our intellect, we cannot have insight into the nature of either substance. After reviewing their argument in some detail, I will argue that Descartes did not (...)
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  15. Against Emergent Dualism.Brandon L. Rickabaugh - 2018 - In Jonathan J. Loose, Angus John Louis Menuge & J. P. Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism. Oxford, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 73-86.
    Emergent substance dualism is explained in detail and several criticisms are raised against the view.
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  16. An Argument for Dualism from the Lived Experience of Being in Space.Steven Duncan - manuscript
    This is a companion to an earlier essay, "An Argument for Dualism from the Lived Experience of Time," in which I argue that our lived experience of being in space is best accounted for on a substance dualist ontology of the experiencing subject and a 3-dimensionalist account of time. Such an account excludes the metaphysical possibility of 4-dimensionalism as a literal, descriptive account of noumenal time inasmuch as it is incompatible with facts we know with greater certainty than (...)
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  17. An Argument for Dualism from the Lived Experience of being in Space.Steven Merle Duncan - manuscript
    In a sequel to the author's argument for dualism from the lived experience of time, this paper continues the line of thought initiated by in that study a bit further by considering the implications of our experience of being in space for dualism. I conclude that four-dimensionalism cannot accommodate the facts of our experience of ourselves as being in time - localized in space but not located there after the manner of a material thing. Substance dualism, (...)
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  18. Objections to Dualism.Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
    In this essay, I discuss the standard objections to substance dualism and conclude that they are far less formidable than is usually supposed.
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  19. Dismantling Bodily Resurrection Arguments Against Mind-Body Dualism.Brandon Rickabaugh - 2018 - In R. Keith Loftin & Joshua Farris (eds.), Christian Physicalism? Philosophical Theological Criticisms. Lanham: Lexington Books. pp. 295-317.
    According to the Christian doctrine of bodily resurrection, human persons will have an embodied existence in eternity. Many Christian materialists, especially Lynne Rudder Baker, Trenton Merricks, and Kevin Corcoran, argue that the doctrine of bodily resurrection creates serious problems for substance dualism (dualism). These critiques argued that bodily resurrection is made trivial by dualism, that dualism makes it difficult if not impossible to explain why we need to be embodied, or that dualism should be (...)
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  20. Physicalism, Dualism and the Mind-Body Problem.Dolores G. Morris - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    In this dissertation, I examine the implications of the problem of mental causation and what David Chalmers has dubbed the “ hard problem of consciousness” for competing accounts of the mind. I begin, in Chapter One, with a critical analysis of Jaegwon Kim’s Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. (2005) There, I maintain that Kim’s ontology cannot adequately address both the problem of mental causation and the “ hard problem of consciousness.” In Chapter Two, I examine the causal pairing problem for (...)
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  21. Dualists needn’t be anti-criterialists.Duncan Matt - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):945-963.
    Sometimes in philosophy one view engenders another. If you hold the first, chances are you hold the second. But it’s not always because the first entails the second. Sometimes the tie is less clear, less clean. One such tie is between substance dualism and anti-criterialism. Substance dualism is the view that people are, at least in part, immaterial mental substances. Anti-criterialism is the view that there is no criterion of personal identity through time. Most philosophers who (...)
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  22. "Platonic Dualism Reconsidered".Suzanne Obdrzalek - 2024 - Phronesis 69 (1):31-62.
    I argue that in the Phaedo, Plato maintains that the soul is located in space and is capable of locomotion and of interacting with the body through contact. Numerous interpreters have dismissed these claims as merely metaphorical, since they assume that as an incorporeal substance, the soul cannot possess spatial attributes. But careful examination of how Plato conceives of the body throughout his corpus reveals that he does not distinguish it from the soul in terms of spatiality. Furthermore, assigning (...)
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  23. Substance, Causation, and the Mind-Body Problem in Johann Clauberg.Nabeel Hamid - 2022 - Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 11:31-66.
    This essay proposes a new interpretation of Clauberg’s account of the mind-body problem, against both occasionalist and interactionist readings. It examines his treatment of the mind-body relation through the lens of his theories of substance and cause. It argues that, whereas Clauberg embraces Descartes’s substance dualism, he retains a broadly scholastic theory of causation as the action of essential powers. On this account, mind and body are distinct, power-bearing substances, and each is a genuine secondary cause of (...)
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  24. An introduction to dualism: the mental to the fore?Filippo Pelucchi - manuscript
    The contemporary debate around consciousness presents us (and often leads us to embrace) a specific current of thought: physicalism, which states that everything in our reality is physical1. In this paper I want to introduce the main points of the opposite view, dualism, according to which there are two different realms of reality: the mental and the physical one. In the introduction I give the main idea and sketch the general intuition behind dualism. In Section 1 I present (...)
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  25. Nicole Oresme, Dualist.Jack Zupko - 2019 - In Fabrizio Amerini, Simone Fellina & Andrea Strazzoni (eds.), _Tra antichità e modernità. Studi di storia della filosofia medievale e rinascimentale_. Raccolti da Fabrizio Amerini, Simone Fellina e Andrea Strazzoni. Parma: E-theca OnLineOpenAccess Edizioni. pp. 433-465.
    According to Nicole Oresme (c. 1320–1382), human beings, unlike all other animals, consist of two substances: a thinking substance and a sensing substance. This paper presents and explores the arguments Oresme uses to arrive at this position, which is unusual in medieval philosophical psychology and which at least superficially – though their methods are completely different – resembles what Descartes concluded about the nature of the human soul and body two and a half centuries later. The paper also (...)
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  26. Substance, Reality, and Distinctness.Boris Hennig - 2008 - Prolegomena 7 (1):2008.
    Descartes claims that God is a substance, and that mind and body are two different and separable substances. This paper provides some background that renders these claims intelligible. For Descartes, that something is real means it can exist in separation, and something is a substance if it does not depend on other substances for its existence. Further, separable objects are correlates of distinct ideas, for an idea is distinct (in an objective sense) if its object may be easily (...)
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  27. Soul Substance (jīva dravya) – As Expounded In Dravyasamgraha.Vijay K. Jain - manuscript
    Soul substance (jīva dravya) is ubiquitous but unseen. Driving force within each one of us, it has been, since time immemorial, a subject matter of research by philosophers, religious leaders and laity. Still, ambiguity and misconceptions prevail as regard its real nature. Some negate the existence of soul and attribute consciousness to the union of four basic substances – earth (prthvī), water (jala), fire (agni), and air (vāyu); death leads to its annihilation. Some believe it to be momentary, devoid (...)
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  28. Elisabeth of Bohemia as a Naturalistic Dualist.Frederique Janssen-Lauret - 2018 - In Emily Thomas (ed.), Early Modern Women on Metaphysics. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. pp. 171-187.
    Elisabeth was the first of Descartes' interlocutors to press concerns about mind-body union and interaction, and the only one to receive a detailed reply, unsatisfactory though she found it. Descartes took her tentative proposal `to concede matter and extension to the soul' for a confused version of his own view: `that is nothing but to conceive it united to the body. Contemporary commentators take Elisabeth for a materialist or at least a critic of dualism. I read her instead as (...)
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  29. Does Consciousness-Collapse Quantum Mechanics Facilitate Dualistic Mental Causation?Alin C. Cucu - forthcoming - Journal of Cognitive Science.
    One of the most serious challenges (if not the most serious challenge) for interactive psycho-physical dualism (henceforth interactive dualism or ID) is the so-called ‘interaction problem’. It has two facets, one of which this article focuses on, namely the apparent tension between interactions of non-physical minds in the physical world and physical laws of nature. One family of approaches to alleviate or even dissolve this tension is based on a collapse solution (‘consciousness collapse/CC) of the measurement problem in (...)
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  30. Mind body dualism.Kent Lin - 2014 - Asian Philosophy 24.
    Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind (1949/2002. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press) is generally considered a landmark in the quest to refute Cartesian dualism. The work contains many inspirational ideas and mainly posits behavioral disposition as the referent of mind in order to refute mind–body dualism. In this article, I show that the Buddhist theory of ‘non-self’ is also at odds with the belief that a substantial soul exists distinct from the physical body and further point out (...)
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  31. Mind and Brain: Toward an Understanding of Dualism.Kristopher Phillips, Alan Beretta & Harry A. Whitaker - 2014 - In C. U. M. Smith & Harry Whitaker (eds.), Brain, Mind and Consciousness in the History of Neuroscience. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 355-369.
    A post-Newtonian understanding of matter includes immaterial forces; thus, the concept of ‘physical’ has lost what usefulness it previously had and Cartesian dualism has, consequently, ceased to support a divide between the mental and the physical. A contemporary scientific understanding of mind that goes back at least as far as Priestley in the 18th century, not only includes immaterial components but identifies brain parts in which these components correlate with neural activity. What are we left with? The challenge is (...)
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  32. Swinburne on Substances, Properties, and Structures.William Jaworski - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (2):17-28.
    Mind, Brain, and Free Will, Richard Swinburne’s stimulating new book, covers a great deal of territory. I’ll focus on some of the positions Swinburne defends in the philosophy of mind. Many philosophers are likely to have reservations about the arguments he uses to defend them, and others will think his basic position is unmotivated. My goal in this brief discussion is to articulate some of the reasons why.
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  33. Revisiting the mind-brain reductionisms: Contra dualism and eliminativism.Nythamar de Oliveira - 2016 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 61 (2):363-385.
    In this paper, I should like to argue against both eliminative materialism and substance/property dualism, aiming more specifically at the reductionist arguments offered by the Churchlands’ and Swinburne’s versions thereof, insofar as they undermine moral beliefs qua first-personish accounts dismissed as folk psychology by the former, as the latter regards them as supervening on natural events extendedly, that is, necessarily both ways of the biconditional linking mental and physical substances (for every A-substance x there is a B- (...) y, such that necessarily if y exists x exists). (shrink)
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  34. Responding to N.T. Wright's Rejection of the Soul.Brandon L. Rickabaugh - 2018 - Heythrop Journal 59 (2):201-220.
    At a 2011 meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers, N. T. Wright offered four reasons for rejecting the existence of soul. This was surprising, as many Christian philosophers had previously taken Wright's defense of a disembodied intermediate state as a defense of a substance dualist view of the soul. In this paper, I offer responses to each of Wright's objections, demonstrating that Wright's arguments fail to undermine substance dualism. In so doing, I expose how popular arguments (...)
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  35. The AI Ensoulment Hypothesis.Brian Cutter - forthcoming - Faith and Philosophy.
    According to the AI ensoulment hypothesis, some future AI systems will be endowed with immaterial souls. I argue that we should have at least a middling credence in the AI ensoulment hypothesis, conditional on our eventual creation of AGI and the truth of substance dualism in the human case. I offer two arguments. The first relies on an analogy between aliens and AI. The second rests on the conjecture that ensoulment occurs whenever a physical system is “fit to (...)
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  36. The modal argument and Bailey’s contingent physicalism: a rejoinder.J. P. Moreland - forthcoming - Religious Studies.
    Philosophy is experiencing a resurgence of property (PD) and generic substance dualism (SD). One important argument for SD that has played a role in this resurgence is some version of a modal argument. Until recently, premise (3) of the argument (Possibly, I exist, and no wholly physical objects exist.) has garnered most of the attention by critics. However, more recently, the focus has also been on (2) (Wholly physical objects are essentially, wholly, and intrinsically physical and wholly spiritual (...)
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  37. Mereological Nihilism and Personal Ontology.Andrew Brenner - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (268).
    Mereological nihilists hold that composition never occurs, so that nothing is ever a proper part of anything else. Substance dualists generally hold that we are each identical with an immaterial soul. In this paper, I argue that every popular objection to substance dualism has a parallel objection to composition. This thesis has some interesting implications. First, many of those who reject composition, but accept substance dualism, or who reject substance dualism and accept composition, (...)
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  38.  14
    Consciousness and the Self without Reductionism: Touching Churchland's Nerve.Eric LaRock & Mostyn W. Jones - forthcoming - In Mihretu P. Guta & Scott B. Rae (eds.), Taking Persons Seriously: Where Philosophy and Bioethics Intersect. Eugene, Oregon.: Pickwick Publications, Wipf and Stock Publishers..
    Patricia Churchland's Touching a Nerve: The Self as Brain is her most recent wide-ranging argument for mind-to-brain reductionism. It's one of the leading anti-dualist works in neurophilosophy. It thus deserves careful attention by anti-reductionists. We survey the main arguments in this book for her thesis that the self is nothing but the brain. These arguments are based largely on the self's dependence upon neural activities as reflected in its various impairments, its unified experiences, and its powers of agency. We show (...)
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  39. Leibniz’s Lost Argument Against Causal Interaction.Tobias Flattery - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7.
    Leibniz accepts causal independence, the claim that no created substance can causally interact with any other. And Leibniz needs causal independence to be true, since his well-known pre-established harmony is premised upon it. So, what is Leibniz’s argument for causal independence? Sometimes he claims that causal interaction between substances is superfluous. Sometimes he claims that it would require the transfer of accidents, and that this is impossible. But when Leibniz finds himself under sustained pressure to defend causal independence, those (...)
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  40. Једно и мноштво у Платоновој психологији.Александар Ристески - 2020 - In Оливера Марковић Савић & Неџиб Прашевић (eds.), Наука без граница III, 5, Друштво у огледалу науке. pp. 155–170.
    In this paper the author will assess Plato’s tripartite psychology in the light of his metaphysical account of μέγιστα γένη and One and Many, in order to further clarify the structure of his “dualism”. By doing so, the author will try to show that the tripartition is not a metaphysical conundrum of Plato’s thought and that it cannot be read in the light of Cartesian substance dualism, which is a noticeable approach in contemporary discussions. Aside of that, (...)
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  41. Neuroscience, Spiritual Formation, and Bodily Souls: A Critique of Christian Physicalism.Brandon Rickabaugh & C. Stephen Evans - 2018 - In R. Keith Loftin & Joshua Farris (eds.), Christian Physicalism? Philosophical Theological Criticisms. Lanham: Lexington. pp. 231-256.
    The link between human nature and human flourishing is undeniable. "A healthy tree cannot bear bad fruit, nor can a diseased tree bear good fruit" (Matt. 7:18). The ontology of the human person will, therefore, ground the nature of human flourishing and thereby sanctification. Spiritual formation is the area of Christian theology that studies sanctification, the Spirit-guided process whereby disciples of Jesus are formed into the image of Jesus (Rom. 8:28-29; 2 Cor. 3:18; 2 Peter 3:18). Until the nineteenth century, (...)
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  42. A Physicalist Solution to the Explanatory Gap.Yanssel Garcia - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Rochester
    As substance dualism fell out of favor, philosophers became increasingly interested in making sense of mind in purely physicalist terms. Along the way, the physicalist project has hit a few snags. Perhaps the most popular challenge was presented by Frank Jackson’s Mary’s Room thought experiment, wherein Mary, a brilliant color scientist, comes to know all of the physical facts about color whilst confined to a black-and-white room. Once released, Mary is presented with a ripe tomato. The intuition is (...)
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  43. The Mind-Body Problem.Tim Crane - 1999 - In Rob Wilson & Frank Keil (eds.), The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
    The mind-body problem is the problem of explaining how our mental states, events and processes—like beliefs, actions and thinking—are related to the physical states, events and processes in our bodies. A question of the form, ‘how is A related to B?’ does not by itself pose a philosophical problem. To pose such a problem, there has to be something about A and B which makes the relation between them seem problematic. Many features of mind and body have been cited as (...)
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  44. Naturalistic Theories of Life after Death.Eric Steinhart - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (2):145-158.
    After rejecting substance dualism, some naturalists embrace patternism. It states that persons are bodies and that bodies are material machines running abstract person programs. Following Aristotle, these person programs are souls. Patternists adopt four-dimensionalist theories of persistence: Bodies are 3D stages of 4D lives. Patternism permits at least six types of life after death. It permits quantum immortality, teleportation, salvation through advanced technology, promotion out of a simulated reality, computational monadology, and the revision theory of resurrection.
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  45. No Work for a Theory of Personal Identity.John Schwenkler - 2021 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 69 (1):57-65.
    A main element in Richard Swinburne’s (2019) argument for substance dualism concerns the conditions of a person’s continued existence over time. In this commentary I aim to question two things: first, whether the kind of imaginary cases that Swinburne relies on to make his case should be accorded the kind of weight he supposes; and second, whether philosophers should be concerned to give any substantial theory, of the sort that dualism and its competitors are apparently meant to (...)
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  46.  80
    Сумњати срцем: дуализам супстанција у светлу Персове критике "духа картезијанизма".Aleksandar Risteski - 2021 - Collection of Papers of the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Priština (2):363–386.
    To Doubt in Our Hearts: The Substance Dualism in the Light of Peirce’s Criticism of "the Spirit of Cartesianism" -/- In this article, the author addresses the problem of Cartesian dualism through the prism of Peirce’s criticism of the "spirit of Cartesianism". The faith in the intuitive knowledge and the strong emphasis on individualism Peirce sees as its two main features, therefore, they are the focus of the paper. The underlying idea is to show that, in the (...)
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  47. Dualismus von Eigenschaften und Substanzen. Eine Bestandsaufnahme aktueller Überlegungen.Patricia Wallusch - 2015 - In Patricia Wallusch & Heinrich Watzka (eds.), Verkörpert existieren. Ein Beitrag zur Metaphysik menschlicher Personen aus dualistischer Perspektive. Aschendorff Verlag. pp. 59-70.
    Zu den Anliegen dieses Beitrags zählt zum einen die Diskussion einiger aktuellerer Argumente gegen die Vereinbarkeit eines Dualismus von Eigenschaften mit einem (Substanz-)Physikalismus und zum anderen in einer Präsentation und Verteidigung des von E. J. Lowe (1950-2014) vertretenen (Nicht-Cartesianischen) Substanzendualismus. -/- Erschienen in: Patricia Wallusch/ Heinrich Watzka (Hrsg.): Verkörpert existieren. Ein Beitrag zur Metaphysik menschlicher Personen, Münster: Aschendorff 2015, pp. 59-70. ISBN 978-3-402-11892-4 .
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  48. Survivalism, Suitably Modified.James Dominic Rooney - 2021 - The Thomist 85 (3):349-376.
    A well-known problem seems to beset views on which humans are essentially material, but where I can survive my death: they seem incoherent or reducible to substance dualism. Thomas Aquinas held a unique hylomorphic view of the human person as essentially composed of body and soul, but where the human soul can survive the death of the body. ‘Survivalists’ have argued that, post mortem, a human person comes to be composed of their soul alone. ‘Corruptionists’ point to Thomas’ (...)
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  49. Evolution, Emergence, and the Divine Creation of Human Souls.Christopher Hauser - forthcoming - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association.
    In a series of publications spanning over two decades, William Hasker has argued both that (1) human beings have souls and (2) these souls are not directly created by God but instead are produced by (or “emergent from”) a physical process of some sort or other. By contrast, an alternative view of the human person, endorsed by the contemporary Catholic Church, maintains that (1) human beings have souls but that (2*) each human soul is directly created by God rather than (...)
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  50. Qualia in a contemporary neurobiological perspective.Jakob Korf - 2015 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 8 (2):39-44.
    Qualia are defined as subjective or private feelings associated with sensory and other experiences. This article argues that private feelings might be expressed by or in a personal brain and discusses possible neurobiological implications. Four issues are considered: Functional dualism implies that mental functions are realized as emergent properties of the brain. In practice, functional dualism is compatible with both substance dualism and pan-psychism. The (adult) human brain is the product of biological and environmental processes, including (...)
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