Mental imagery and the varieties of amodal perception

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):153-173 (2011)
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Abstract
The problem of amodal perception is the problem of how we represent features of perceived objects that are occluded or otherwise hidden from us. Bence Nanay (2010) has recently proposed that we amodally perceive an object's occluded features by imaginatively projecting them into the relevant regions of visual egocentric space. In this paper, I argue that amodal perception is not a single, unitary capacity. Drawing appropriate distinctions reveals amodal perception to be characterized not only by mental imagery, as Nanay suggests, but also by genuinely visual representations as well as beliefs. I conclude with some brief remarks on the role of object-directed bodily action in conferring a sense of unseen presence on an object's occluded features
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First archival date: 2011-01-02
Latest version: 2 (2014-08-25)
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Amodal Completion and Knowledge.Helton, Grace & Nanay, Bence

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2011-01-02

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