Against and for Ethical Naturalism Or: How Not To "Naturalize" Ethics

American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (4):327-352 (2022)
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Abstract

Moral realism and ethical naturalism are both highly attractive ethical positions but historically they have often been thought to be irreconcilable. Since the late 1980s defenders of Cornell Realism have argued that the two positions can consistently be combined. They make three constitutive claims: (i) Moral properties are natural kind properties that (ii) are identical to (or supervene) on descriptive functional properties, which (iii) causally regulate our use of moral terms. We offer new arguments against the feasibility of Cornell realism and then show that there is a way to be a naturalistic realist that avoids internal inconsistency and uniquely provides for moral normativity.

Author Profiles

Berit Brogaard
University of Miami
Michael Slote
University of Miami

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