Locke's Answer to Molyneux's Thought Experiment

History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (2):165-80 (2010)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Philosophical discussions of Molyneux's problem within contemporary philosophy of mind tend to characterize the problem as primarily concerned with the role innately known principles, amodal spatial concepts, and rational cognitive faculties play in our perceptual lives. Indeed, for broadly similar reasons, rationalists have generally advocated an affirmative answer, while empiricists have generally advocated a negative one, to the question Molyneux posed after presenting his famous thought experiment. This historical characterization of the dialectic, however, somewhat obscures the role Molyneux's problem has played in spawning debates within the empiricist tradition. Fortunately, the differences between various empiricist accounts have been widely recognized and discussed among historians of philosophy working on the topic. The focus of the present essay is to develop an interpretation of John Locke's views on Molyneux's problem that best coheres with his other views on human understanding as well as with the predominant scientific opinion about the nature of perception during the period in which he lived.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BRULAT-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-06-14
View other versions
Added to PP index
2012-11-06

Total views
228 ( #27,281 of 2,448,672 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #47,044 of 2,448,672 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.