Two internal critiques for theists who oppose moral enhancement on a process virtue basis

Abram Brummett & Parker Crutchfield

Bioethics 36 (4):367-373 (2022) Copy BIBT_EX

Abstract

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 4, Page 367-373, May 2022.

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Author Profiles

Oakland University

Parker Crutchfield

Western Michigan University School Of Medicine

Archival history

Archival date: 2021-10-15
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Categories

Arguments Against Theism in Philosophy of Religion

Cognitive Enhancement in Applied Ethics

Intrinsic Value in Value Theory, Miscellaneous

Keywords

bioconservative moral enhancement neuroethics theism

DOI

10.1111/bioe.12985

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