Realistics Premises of Epistemic Argumentation for Dynamic Epistemic Logics

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In the paper, certain rational postulates for protocols describing real communicating are introduced.These rational postulates, on the one hand, allow assigning a certain typology of real systems of interactions, which is consistent with the reality of epistemic argumentation in systems of communicating, and on the other one – defining rules of using argumentation in real situations. Moreover, the presented postulates for protocols characterize information networks and administering knowledge in real interactivity systems. Due to the epistemic character of the considerations, the problem undertaken in the paper concerns working out fundamental assumptions that refer to building of epistemic logics. They allow establishing the correctness of the discourse defined by rational postulates of protocols of real communication. In the context of the presented problem there are the following two research questions distinguished: 1) How do we determine the rule of building of real dynamic epistemic logics? and 2) How should we define semantics for these logics? Within the framework of considerations relating to the research questions asked, certain epistemic operators, relativized to types of communicating, are introduced. Basic logical relations between using these operators are established for these operators. The relations are presented by a diagram called the square of epis temic operators. On the basis of these logical relations some axioms for real dynamic epistemic logics are presented. The semantics of real dynamic epistem ic logics is extended by the methods of lower and upper approximation of formula evaluating. This allows defining ‘approximation Kripke models’. The results of conceptualization of knowledge on real premises of epistemic argum entation presented in this paper can be applied to rhetoric in real systems of interaction.
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BRYRPO
Upload history
Archival date: 2021-10-02
View other versions
Added to PP index
2018-03-10

Total views
28 ( #63,287 of 65,772 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #49,836 of 65,772 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.