How Does Agent-­‐Causal Power Work?

Modern Schoolman 88 (1/2):105-121 (2011)
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Abstract
Research on the nature of dispositionality or causal power has flourished in recent years in metaphysics. This trend has slowly begun to influence debates in the philosophy of agency, especially in the literature on free will. Both sophisticated versions of agent-­‐causalism and the new varieties of dispositionalist compatibilism exploit recently developed accounts of dispositionality in their defense. In this paper, I examine recent work on agent-­‐causal power, focusing primarily on the account of agent-­‐causalism developed and defended by Timothy O’Connor’s in his work on free will. Assuming the existence of irreducible causal powers, I offer an
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0026-8402  
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BUCHDA
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Archival date: 2012-07-25
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Agent Causation as a Solution to the Problem of Action.Michael Brent - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):656-673.

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2012-04-17

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